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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
This thesis consists of three essays focusing on three different issues. The first 
revisits the question whether analysts anticipate the persistence of accruals in future 
earnings. We find that if total accruals are used (covering also non-current operating 
and financing accruals, unlike previous research that uses mainly working capital 
accruals), analysts’ forecast errors are uncorrelated with accruals. Our findings 
overall do not warrant the lack of sophistication argument. The second chapter 
examines whether multi segmentation affects the probability of meeting analysts’ 
forecasts, and whether the ‘diversification’ discount that multi segment firms seem 
to suffer from is alleviated/exacerbated when multi segment firms meet/miss 
analysts’ forecasts. We find for multi segment firms, no (less) earnings/forecast 
management to meet forecasts, more complex information environment, lower 
probability of meeting analysts’ forecasts, and weaker investor reaction to 
meeting/missing forecasts, while significant discount if they meet forecasts by 
engaging in earnings/forecast management. The third chapter examines whether 
unconditional accounting conservatism provides a rational explanation to book to 
price (B/P) effect in stock returns (higher B/P yielding higher returns) coined as 
anomaly. We test an argument following Penman and Reggiani (2013) linking 
conservative accounting to future returns and subsequent earnings growth, and we 
find strong support to the conservative accounting explanation to B/P effect. 
  
9 
  
INTRODUCTION 
The first chapter of the thesis revisits the question whether analysts anticipate the 
persistence of accruals in future earnings. Previous research finds that accruals are 
less persistent than cash flows, that investors fail to understand this property (e.g., 
Sloan, 1996), and also that analysts who provide information to investors do not 
inform investors about the predicted future reversals of accruals (e.g., Bradshaw, 
Richardson and Sloan, 2001). This research finds that analysts are overoptimistic 
with respect to working capital accruals, and this is interpreted as their failure to 
anticipate accruals’ persistence. However, this interpretation is challenged by other 
research findings. For instance, analysts’ forecasting abilities are praised by another 
research (e.g., Fried and Givoly, 1982). There is also substantial evidence that 
analysts can be strategic in their forecasts (e.g., Francis and Philbrick 1993), and 
evidence indicates that traditional accrual definition omitting noncurrent operating 
and financing activity accruals results in noisy measures of both accruals and cash 
flows (e.g., Richardson, Soliman, Sloan, and Tuna, 2005). Therefore, we argue that 
analysts’ optimism with respect to working capital accruals might not be related to 
their lack of sophistication, but due to incomplete accrual information. We give 
consideration to ‘total accruals’ covering also noncurrent operating and financing 
activity accruals, and revisit the issue. 
Our results overall do not warrant the lack of sophistication argument; we find no 
association between forecast errors and total accruals. Analysts seem to reflect 
predicted earnings reversals of total accruals in their forecasts. We also find strong 
evidence that analysts’ optimism with working capital accruals documented by 
previous research is a result of analysts focusing on total accruals. Since accrual 
components have different persistence degrees, and total accruals’ persistence is an 
average of its components’ persistence, it is likely that individual components are 
associated with forecast errors if separately tested. Hence, a low persistent working 
capital accruals may exhibit optimistic errors, while a high persistent financing 
activity accruals pessimistic errors. Indeed, we find optimistic (pessimistic) forecast 
errors with less (high) persistent accrual components, and no association between 
forecast errors and middle persistent accrual components. Our results remain robust 
to different periods, samples and model specifications. 
10 
  
The second chapter investigates whether multi segmentation affects the probability 
of meeting analysts’ forecasts, and whether the ‘diversification’ discount that multi 
segment firms appear to suffer from is mitigated/exacerbated when multi segment 
firms meet/miss analysts’ forecasts. Analysis of this issue is important because 
previous research shows that meeting/missing analysts’ earnings forecasts leads to 
premium/discount (e.g., Kasznik and McNichols 2002), and despite their obvious 
importance in the economy, we lack evidence about the meeting/missing forecast 
behaviour of multi segment firms. The subject becomes even more important given 
the evidence that multi segment firms suffer from higher agency conflicts (traded 
at discount, Berger and Ofek, 1995), and exhibit more complex information 
environment (e.g., Bushman et al. 2004), both of which significantly affect also 
meeting forecast probability (e.g., Matsumoto, 2002).  
We argue that higher agency conflicts induce higher monitoring, and discourage 
multi segment firms’ managers from earnings/forecast management activity to meet 
forecasts while more complex information environment leads to greater forecast 
bias making forecasts harder to meet, and both will lead to lower probability of 
meeting analysts’ forecasts for multi segment firms. Our findings confirm these 
expectations; multi segment firms exhibit less (no) earnings (forecast) management 
activity to meet forecasts, more complex information environment and lower 
probability of meeting analysts’ forecasts relative to single segment firms. 
We next test whether the ‘diversification’ discount is alleviated/exacerbated when 
multi segment firms meet/miss analysts’ forecasts. We argue that if the discount is 
a results of higher agency conflicts, then meeting analysts’ forecasts does not 
mitigate the discount. We also argue that investors will be aware that multi segment 
firms show more complex information environment and use less earnings/forecast 
management to meet forecasts. Hence, we expect that investors react less strongly 
to meeting/missing forecasts by multi segment firms. Confirming this argument, we 
find no evidence that meeting forecasts results in a premium in multi segment 
setting, or that it reduces the diversification discount, while single segment firms 
experience significant premium (discount) when they meet (miss) forecasts.. We 
also find significant incremental multi segment discount if earnings/forecast 
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management is used to meet forecasts implying that there are significant costs for 
multi segment firms from engaging in these activities to meet forecasts. 
The third chapter tests whether unconditional accounting conservatism provides a 
rational explanation to book to price (B/P) effect in stock returns. Research shows 
that stocks with higher ratios of fundamentals to price, i.e., high B/P tend to yield 
higher future returns than stocks with lower ratios of fundamentals to price (e.g., 
(e.g., Graham and Dodd, 1934; Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein, 1985, Chan, Hamao, 
and Lakonishok, 1991; Fama and French, 1992). Various explanations have been 
brought forward to the phenomenon from both mispricing (e.g., DeBondt and 
Thaler, 1985; Lakonishok, Shleifer, Vishny, 1994) and rational pricing of risk 
perspective (e.g., Fama and French 1993), but challenged by subsequent evidence. 
We offer a risk explanation using the mechanisms of unconditional accounting 
conservatism following Penman and Reggiani (2013). In a pricing equation, a risk-
free earnings growth adds to price, while a risky growth adds to required return 
rather than price making B/P ratio higher due to denominator effect. Accordingly, 
a higher B/P corresponds to higher return. Conservative accounting produces such 
risky growth (earnings are deferred under uncertainty producing earnings growth 
that can be deemed at risk), and can explain the phenomenon. 
We test the above argument within unconditional conservatism setting, which we 
proxy by hidden reserves to price (HR/P) based on immediately expensed intangible 
investments (Penman and Zhang, 2002).  
We argue and find that HR/P is positively associated with both future returns and 
subsequent earnings growth for any given B/P and long term earnings that we 
construct to capture the risky earning growth following. Our paper makes several 
contributions. We show unconditional accounting conservatism rationally explains 
B/P effect in stock returns. We also show that stock market anomalies can be traced 
within the accounting system, and by documenting that accounting conservatism is 
a response to risk, and this risk perception aligns with the investors’ risk perception, 
we shed more light on the rationale of accounting conservatism.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
Do analysts understand accruals’ persistence? Evidence revisited 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we revisit the question whether analysts anticipate accruals’ predicted 
reversals (or persistence) in future earnings. Prior evidence shows that analysts are 
over optimistic with respect to working capital accruals, and this is interpreted as 
their inability to understand accruals’ persistence. However, using total accruals 
that cover also noncurrent operating and financing accruals as well as working 
capitals, we show that analysts’ forecast errors are uncorrelated with accruals. Since 
accruals have different components with different persistence characteristics, and 
total accruals reflects an average of its components’ persistence, it is likely that 
forecast errors are correlated with individual components if separately tested, but 
this does not indicate analysts’ lack of sophistication as long as analysts correctly 
anticipate total accruals. Consistent with this conjecture, we find low persistent 
accruals (e.g., working capital accruals) are optimistically, but high persistent 
accruals (e.g., financing accrual) pessimistically associated with forecast errors, 
while in the middle persistent, the association approaches zero. Overall these results 
do not warrant the analysts’ lack of sophistication argument. 
 
Keywords: earnings/accrual persistence, analyst earnings/revenue forecast errors, 
efficiency 
 
JEL Classification: M41, G10 
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1.1. Introduction  
In this paper, we revisit the question whether sell side security analysts anticipate 
the persistence (or predicted reversals) of accruals in future earnings. Analysis of 
this issue is important, because evidence shows that accrual components of earnings 
are less persistent than cash flows, investors do not seem to anticipate this property 
(they experience negative future returns for buying high accruals, see Sloan, 1996), 
and that analysts who provide information to investors also fail to inform them of 
this accrual problem; Analysts are found to be overoptimistic with respect to high 
working capital accruals (e.g., Bradshaw et al., 2001), and this is mainly interpreted 
as their lack of necessary sophistication to fully understand accruals’ persistence.  
However, this interpretation does not reconcile with other research findings. For 
instance, analysts’ forecasting abilities are highly praised in another research; they 
issue more accurate forecasts than earnings expectation models (e.g., Fried and 
Givoly, 1982). There is also substantial evidence that analysts can be strategic in 
their forecasts, which indicates their sophistication (e.g., Francis and Philbrick 
1993). Finally, traditional accrual definition used in forecast error tests seems to 
omit economically important accrual categories that can be highly relevant to 
analysts (e.g., Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna, 2005).  
Therefore, we argue that analysts’ optimism with respect to working capital 
accruals might not be due to lack of sophistication, but driven by incomplete accrual 
information, hence give consideration to ‘total accruals’ suggested by Richardson 
et al. (2005) covering also noncurrent operating and financing activity accruals.  
Our empirical tests show no correlation between analysts’ forecast errors and total 
accruals. Findings are robust to different samples, periods, specifications, decile 
ranked accruals, high accruals, absolute forecast errors, controlling for cash flows 
and high conservatism. We then decompose total accruals into components, and 
repeat the same test for individual accrual components [to be comparable to these 
tests, we also test the persistence degree of individual components as auxiliary, and 
find that different components exhibit different persistence degrees with working 
capital accruals less persistent than financing activity accruals (%67 vs %79), and 
that total accruals reflect an average of its components’ persistence (%73)]. We 
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argue that if analysts focus on achieving minimum forecast error1, they should be 
focusing on the accuracy of total accruals (given earnings=  total accruals +  cash 
flows), hence, it is highly likely that forecast errors may be correlated with 
individual accrual components that significantly deviate from the total accruals’ 
persistence (in individual cases associations maybe observed as previous research 
documents, but this does not indicate analysts’ not understanding of accruals’ 
persistence as long as total accruals are not associated with forecast errors). To be 
precise, forecast errors can exhibit optimism (pessimism) with accrual components 
that are less (higher) persistent than total accruals. Confirming, our argument, we 
find that forecast errors are optimistically correlated with less persistent working 
capital, but pessimistically correlated with higher persistent financial accruals while 
with noncurrent operating accruals (having almost equal persistence as total 
accruals with %74), the correlation is insignificant. Optimism in working capital 
accruals is consistent with prior research, but we additionally show forecasts errors 
to be pessimistically correlated with financial accruals, which also challenges to the 
notion that analysts’ overall optimism in earnings forecasts may stem from their 
over optimism about current accruals. 
Our paper makes several contributions to existing knowledge. Firstly, our findings 
do not warrant analysts’ lack of sophistication argument with respect to accruals, 
rather reinforce the evidence praising analysts’ forecasting abilities (e.g., Fried and 
Givoly, 1982; Elgers and Murray, 1992). Secondly, our findings do not also support 
the argument that analysts’ optimism in earnings forecasts may stem from accruals’ 
overestimation (analysts may intentionally collude with management and exhibit 
optimism by inflating accrual expectations, but we find no such overestimation in 
total accruals). Thirdly, although forecast errors are uncorrelated with total accruals, 
we find that stock returns are negatively correlated, supporting the evidence in 
Sloan (1996), who find that stock prices act as if investors fail to anticipate accruals’ 
persistence. Our findings also corroborate Elgers et al. (2001; 2003) findings; who 
find that investors fail to efficiently impound all earnings relevant information 
contained in analysts’ forecasts. Finally, we find that the effect of conservative 
                                                          
1 We assume that analysts’ ultimate objective is to achieve minimum forecast error given that the 
accuracy is one of key indicators of their performance. Analysts who excel in recommending and 
finding winning stocks, and more accurately estimating earnings are branded as ‘all-star’.  
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accounting on accruals’ persistence is well understood by analysts, which provides 
further support to their sophistication with respect to accruals.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follow. The next section provides 
literature review and develops hypotheses. Section 1.3 describes the data, Section 
1.4 explains research design and presents the results. Section 1.5 reports sensitivity 
analyses and Section 1.6 concludes.  
1.2. Literature review and hypotheses  
1.2.1. Literature review  
Evidence shows that earnings mean reverse (gradually decline in time), and accrual 
components of earnings mean reverse quicker than cash flows, i.e., accruals are less 
persistent2 than cash flows, but investors do not seem to anticipate this property. 
Firms with high accruals are likely to experience lower earnings in future, and 
investors without realising this property buy high accruals, and suffer from negative 
stock returns (e.g., Sloan, 1996)3. This finding is important for analysts, because 
they provide information to investors, and possibly affect their investment decisions 
(Mendenhall, 1991). Hence, scholar also ask whether analysts inform investors 
about this accrual problem, and by regressing forecast errors on past accruals, they 
find analysts to be over optimistic with respect to working capital accruals (e.g., 
Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan, 2001; Thomas and Zhang, 2002; Collins, Gong, 
and Hribar, 2003; Elgers, Lo, and Pfeiffer 2001, 2003; Hanlon, 2005; Mashruwala, 
Rajgopal, and Shevlin 2006; Drake and Myers, 2011), and this is interpreted as their 
failure to anticipate the subsequent earnings declines associated with high accruals 
consistent with the evidence in Sloan (1996).  
However, this interpretation is not accommodated by other research findings. For 
instance, analysts’ forecasting abilities are praised by another stream of literature; 
they seem to provide superior and more accurate forecasts than estimates generated 
by earnings expectation models (e.g., Brown and Rozeff, 1978; Fried and Givoly, 
                                                          
2
 Persistence indicates the continuity from one period to another. Evidence shows that earnings mean 
reverse (gradually decline in time), and accruals mean reverse quicker than cash flows.  
3
 The is coined as accrual anomaly and explained by Sloan (1996) as investors’ fixation on reported 
earnings.  
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1982; Brown, Richardson, Schwager, 1987; Brown, Griffin, Hagerman, Zmijewski, 
1987; Elgers and Murray, 1992). There is also growing evidence that analysts are 
strategic in their forecasts indicating their sophistication (one cannot add bias into 
a forecast without knowing the accurate one). Analysts issue optimistic forecasts to 
curry favour with managers in order to obtain better access to private information, 
to attract more investors and to boost investment banking fees, etc4. (e.g., Francis 
and Philbrick 1993, Lin and McNichols, 1998; Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998; Hong 
and Kubik, 2003; Basu and Markov, 2004; Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki, 2004; 
Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy, 2006; Raedy, Shane, and Yang, 2006; Teoh, 
Groysberg, Healy, and Maber, 2011; Simon and Curtis, 2011). Evidence also 
suggests that analysts’ optimism in earnings is rational and originates in the loss 
functions underpinning analysts’ decisions (e.g., Gu and Wu, 2003; Basu and 
Markov, 2004), which offers another challenge to lack of sophistication argument.  
Finally, the accrual variable used in forecast error tests seems to be subject to 
omitted information bias. Prior studies use working capital accruals assuming that 
they ‘do a better job’ in capturing accruals leading to earnings reversals. They argue 
that accruals related to a number of special items (restructuring, impairments, equity 
method losses, sale of plant/other investments, etc.) are nonrecurring, ‘tend to mean 
revert very quickly’ and ‘investors are more likely to anticipate’ their nature (e.g., 
Bradshaw et al., 2001). However, the evidence in Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman 
(2003) indicates that such “special” accruals are far from nonrecurring and relevant 
to anticipate future stock returns. They show that firms with relatively large 
omissions of such items in their definitions of pro forma earnings suffer from lower 
returns. Similarly, Richardson et al. (2005) show that the accrual definition 
proposed by Healy (1985) based on working capital excludes important accrual 
categories, and results in noisy measures of both accruals and cash flows. They 
document that the omitted parts of accruals (noncurrent and financial) also contain 
measurement errors leading to significant security mispricing. For instance, great 
subjectivity involves in the evaluation of noncurrent accruals (changes in tangible 
                                                          
4 Analysts can also exhibit self-selection bias, i.e., they follow firms if they hold favourable views 
about them and censure negative views due to conflict of interest (see McNichols and O’Brien 1997; 
Michaely and Womack, 1999), which may lead to optimism on average 
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intangible assets); capitalised interest expense5, write downs, depreciation amount, 
etc., can restrict investors anticipating future economic benefits. There is also error 
margin in the evaluation of financial accruals despite their higher reliability. Long 
term investments and long term receivables can also be used to manipulate earnings. 
1.2.2. Hypotheses  
We argue that analysts’ optimism with respect to working capital accruals may not 
be attributed to their lack of sophistication, but driven by incomplete accrual 
information. Therefore, we focus on ‘total accruals’ in our analysis suggested by 
Richardson et al. (2005) covering also noncurrent operating and financing accruals. 
We assume that this broader accrual measure provides more powerful tests on 
analysts’ sophistication regarding accruals as it hypothetically covers all relevant 
accrual information available to analysts. Hence, if analysts lack the necessary 
sophistication to understand accruals’ persistence, their forecast errors (realized 
earnings minus forecast earnings) will also be associated with total accruals as 
observed in previous research. Then we expect 
H1: Analysts’ forecast errors are negatively correlated with current total 
accruals. 
On the other hand, if analysts fully understand accruals’ persistence, we expect6  
H1A: Analysts’ forecasts errors are not correlated with current total accruals 
Richardson et al (2005) disaggregate total accruals into components, and rate each 
accrual category according to its reliability (reliability is determined by the degree 
of measurement error the category involves). They find that less reliable accruals 
lead to lower earnings persistence, and significant security mispricing, i.e., as the 
persistence of an accrual component decreases it becomes harder to predict 
                                                          
5 Interest expense charged to assets (capitalised) transforms it into an operating item. There are also 
similar transitions between operating and financing activities, and omitting this information possibly 
results in some relevant information loss to explain future earnings.  
6 There is also another alternative that analysts may collude with management to be optimistic by 
inflating accrual expectations, but we find this alternative unsustainable since missing analysts’ 
forecasts leads to significant discount in share prices on average (e.g., Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 
2002; Skinner and Sloan 2002), which managers do not always desire, and analysts’ utility function 
cannot maximise being consistently optimistic (e.g., Gu and Wu, 2003; Basu and Markov, 2004)..  
18 
  
(forecasting difficulty increases). They also find that working capital accruals are 
less persistent than financial accruals (they explain this as working capital to be 
subject to more measurement errors due to items containing subjective estimates 
such as allowances for bad debts while financial items are mainly measured at fair 
values). A related set of studies also finds that analysts issue more optimistic 
forecasts for firms whose earnings are more difficult to predict (Das, Levine, and 
Sivaramakrishnan, 1998, Ke and Yu, 2006), and that the difficulty of forecasting 
earnings interacts with analysts’ incentives to be optimistic which in turn, results in 
optimistically biased forecast (Bradshaw, Lee, and Peterson, 2016). Therefore, if 
the lack of sophistication argument holds, we expect  
H2: Analysts’ forecast errors become more (less) optimistic as the 
persistence of an accrual component decreases (increases)  
However, if the alternative holds (analysts fully understand accruals’ persistence), 
analysts will focus on the accuracy of total accruals (since higher accuracy in total 
accruals hypothetically leads to minimum forecast error given earnings= total 
accruals +  cash flows). Accordingly, it is highly likely that forecast errors can be 
correlated with individual components whose persistence significantly deviate from 
total accruals’ persistence, and this will not indicate analysts’ lack of sophistication 
as long as H1A holds (no association between forecast errors and total accruals). 
Therefore, given Richardson et al (2005), who find that working capital (financial) 
accruals exhibit the lowest (highest) persistence among accrual components, and 
that total accruals reflect an average of its components’ persistence, we expect, as 
an alternative to H2, 
H2A: Analysts’ forecast errors are optimistically (pessimistically) 
correlated with less (higher) persistent accruals, while in the middle 
persistence, they approach zero. 
1.3. Data and sample selection 
In the data selection process, we follow Bradshaw et al. (2001) and Richardson et 
al. (2005). We use non-financial US firms for the period between 1976 and 2013. 
Financial statement data is obtained from Compustat annual database. Analysts 
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forecast data is from the IBES summary statistics file and stock returns data are 
from CRSP daily files. To decompose accruals into components we rely on the 
accrual definition from Richardson et al. (2005) 7:  
TACC =  ΔWC + ΔNCO +  ΔFIN  (1) 
where TACC denotes total accruals, ΔWC is the change in noncash working capital, 
ΔNCO is the change in net noncurrent operating assets and ΔFIN is the change in 
net financial assets. TACC is further decomposed into its underlying components: ܶܣܥܥ = ∆ܥܱܣ − ∆ܥܱܮ⏟        ∆ௐ஼ + ∆ܰܥܱܣ − ∆ܰܥܱܮ⏟            ∆ே஼ை + ∆ܵܶܫ + ∆ܮܶܫ − ∆ܨܫܰܮ⏟              ∆ி�ே   (2) 
Where ΔCOA (ΔCOL) denotes current operating assets (liabilities), ΔNCOA 
(ΔNCOL) noncurrent operating assets (liabilities), and ΔSTI, ΔLTI and ΔLFINL 
short term investment, long term investment and financial liabilities respectively. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. Following Richardson et al. (2005), the 
missing data on short term debt, investment and advances, long term debt, preferred 
stock and short term investments are set to zero, while other missing observations 
are eliminated from the analysis. Earnings variables (accruals and cash flows) are 
winsorised to +1 and -1 and deflated by average assets, while all other continuous 
variables (e.g., earnings forecast errors) are winsorised to 1% and 99% to eliminate 
the extreme observations. Following Bradshaw et al. (2001), we define earnings 
forecast errors, Ferror, as the analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts minus the 
actual earnings provided by IBES deflated by share price from CRSP. We perform 
our tests across 12 months starting from the initial analysts’ forecasts, which are 
generally issued in the first month after the prior period earnings announcement 
date. Our final sample contains 48,142 firm-year observations per month.  
1.3.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 1.1 Panel A reports descriptive statistics for earnings (ROA), total (TACC), 
working capital (ΔWC), noncurrent (ΔNCO) and financial (ΔFIN) accruals. It also 
                                                          
7
 Richardson et al. (2005) define accrual-based earnings through the definition of net assets: Accrual 
earnings = Assets – Liabilities + Net cash distribution. Given that Accruals = Accrual earnings – 
Cash earnings, and that Cash earnings = Cash + Net cash distribution, they define Accruals = Assets –Liabilities – Cash. 
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includes descriptive statistics for conservatism proxies, Hidden_reserves and 
C_Score. Mean TACC is 0.051 or roughly 5% of total assets. Means of ΔWC and 
ΔNCO are positive while mean ΔFIN is negative, which is indicative of an average 
firm increasing its non-current operations, and financing this increase by net debt. 
Panel B reports pairwise correlations, and reveals that all accrual components are 
positively correlated with ROA, with ΔWC having the highest correlation. The 
positive correlation between ΔWC and ΔNCO suggests that they grow together. 
Both ΔWC and ΔNCO are negatively correlated with ΔFIN, in line with the 
suggestion that growth in operating activities is largely financed by debt.  
Table 1.2 reports the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for the extended 
accrual decomposition. Panel A shows that mean values of all accrual components 
are positive with ΔNCOA (change in non-current assets) having the highest mean 
(0.055) while ΔLTI (change in long term investments) the lowest (0.002) suggesting 
that non-current operating accruals constitute the major part of accruals. Standard 
deviations show that much of the variation in working capital accruals is attributed 
to ΔCOA. Similar pattern is found with respect to ΔNCOA implying that the asset 
side of operating of accruals is more likely to be subject to measurement error. In 
contrast, much of the variation in ΔFIN can be attributable to ΔFINL (financial 
liability). These observations suggest that the variation in operating accruals are 
driven by assets, while the variation in financial activity accruals are driven by 
liabilities. Panel B reports pairwise correlations and shows strong correlation 
among accrual components. In particular, the positive correlation between ΔCOA 
and ΔCOL suggests that a growing (shrinking) business generally results in an 
increase (decrease) in both current operating assets and liabilities. There is also a 
positive correlation between ΔCOA and ΔFINL suggesting that current operations 
are not only funded by operating liabilities, but also by financial debt. Moreover, 
ΔNCOA is positively correlated with all liability accruals8  
Table 1.3 reports the descriptive statistics of forecast errors across 12 months, and 
shows negative means consistent with the prior evidence that analysts are optimistic 
on average. It also shows that mean errors (and standard deviations) are gradually 
                                                          
8
 Note that the liability component of accruals is substracted from the asset component to arrive at 
net accruals. Hence, a positive relation between asset and liability implies they are likely to offset 
each other’s effects on net accruals. 
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disappearing as the earnings announcement date approaches (while initial earnings 
forecast error is 1.6% of the share price, the last month forecast error is only 0.3% 
of the price). This trend is expected, since the arrival of new information (e.g., 
quarterly earnings announcements) prompts analysts to revise their forecasts and 
forecast errors decrease gradually.  
Table 1.4 Panels A and B report Pearson correlations between forecast errors, 
accrual components and conservatism proxies, and show that forecast errors are not 
correlated with total accruals, but optimistically (pessimistically) correlated with 
operating (financial) accruals. Similar pattern is observed for the extended accrual 
components providing an initial support to H1A and H2A:  
1.4. Empirical Analysis 
1.4.1. Forecast error regressions on total accruals (TACC) 
To test H1 (H1A), we use forecast error model by Bradshaw et al. (2001) employing 
total accruals (TACC), and extend the model by breaking TACC into components. 
We conduct regressions using ordinary least squares (OLS) and cluster standard 
errors by firm and year following Petersen (2009)9. We also use Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) procedure that estimates annual cross sectional regressions and reports the 
time series average of the resulting coefficients. The regressions are run for 12 
consecutive months and also incorporate cash flows (CF) following Drake and 
Myers (2011), who argue that accruals and cash flows are the primary components 
of earnings and that they are highly correlated.  ܨ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ௦,௜௧+ଵ = ߚ଴+ߚଵܶܣܥܥ௜௧ + ߚଶܥܨ௜௧ + ߝ௜௧+ଵ   (3) 
                                                          
9
 The method deals with the potential time and firm effects that can be present in panel data. Firm 
effect means the residuals may be correlated across years for a given firm, and time effect means 
the residuals of a given year may be correlated across different firms. Petersen (2009) shows that in 
the presence of firm and time effects, clustering the standard errors by two dimensions 
simultaneously yields unbiased estimates as long as there are sufficient number of clusters, see,  
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/petersen/htm/papers/se/se programming.html 
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Where Ferror denotes earnings forecast errors calculated as analysts’ forecasts of 
earnings minus actual earnings. While H1 requires a negative coefficient on TACC, 
the alternative hypothesis H1A requires insignificant coefficient on TACC.  
Table 1.5 Panels A and B (without and with cash flows) present the results for 
Equation (3). Both panels confirm H1A: analysts’ forecasts errors are not correlated 
with current TACC (the inclusion of CF  does not alter the result). The coefficients 
on TACC are statistically and economically zero across all 12 months and t-stats are 
far below the thresholds.10  
1.4.2. Forecast error regressions on accrual components 
To test H2 (H2A), we next conduct the same analysis with the initial and extended 
accrual decompositions by fitting the following models: ܨ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ௦,௜௧+ଵ = ߚ଴+ߚଵ∆ܹܥ௜௧ + ߚଶ∆ܰܥܱ௜௧ + ߚଷ∆ܨܫ ௜ܰ௧ + ߚସܥܨ௜௧ + ߝ௜௧+ଵ (4) ܨ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ௦,௜௧+ଵ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ�ܥܱܮ௜௧ + ߚଶ�ܥܱܣ௜௧ + ߚଷ�ܰܥܱܮ௜௧ + ߚସ�ܰܥܱܣ௜௧  +ߚହ�ܮܶܫ௜௧ + ߚ଺�ܨܫܰܮ௜௧+ߚ଻�ܵܶܫ௜௧ + ߚ଼ܥܨ௜௧ + ߝ௜௧+ଵ (5) 
Where ΔWC + ΔNCO +  ΔFIN= TACC. A negative (positive) sign on coefficients 
indicates forecast optimism (pessimism)11. Before running Equations (4) and (5), 
to be comparable to these tests, we also run persistence tests for individual accrual 
components following Richardson et al (2005). Reported in Appendix A panels A, 
B and C, these tests show that CF  has the highest persistent among earnings 
components with %80, while ΔFIN with %79 (0.791-0.002), ΔNCO with %74 (0.791-
0.051), TACC with %73 (0.797-0.068), and ΔWC with %67 (0.791-0.122). This 
confirms accrual components exhibiting different persistence characteristics, and 
TACC reflecting an average of its components’ persistence. Hence, if the lack of 
                                                          
10
 Note that panel B shows pessimistic errors with CF, which has the highest persistent among 
earnings components, thus should be easier to predict relative to TACC. Bilinski (2014) shows that 
accuracy of CF estimates depends on the accuracy of accrual estimates, i.e., if analysts are accurate 
in estimating accruals, they should also be accurate in estimating CF. Hence, we avoid interpreting 
this observation as analysts’ lack of sophistication given that they seem to be accurate in TACC. 
11
 Analysts’ earnings forecasts have historically been optimistically biased leading to negative 
forecast errors if calculated as Forecast minus Actual. Hence, our tests are restricted to predicting a 
negative relation between less persistent accruals and forecast errors as in Bradshaw et al. (2001). 
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sophistication argument holds H2 will prevail. Since forecasting difficulty increases 
in less persistence, analysts will exhibit greater bias, and optimistic forecast errors 
will increase as the persistence of an accrual component decreases, and vice versa 
(e.g., β1ΔWC< β2ΔNCO< β3ΔFIN< 0).  
However, if analysts fully understand accruals’ persistence, then H2A will hold. 
Forecast errors will be correlated with individual accrual components deviating 
from total accruals’ persistence, i.e., errors can be optimistically (pessimistically) 
correlated with working capital (financial) accruals, while in the middle persistent, 
they will approach zero (e.g., β1ΔWC< 0, β2ΔNCO=012, β3ΔFIN > 0). We acknowledge 
that the confirmation of H2A will only support the argument of analysts fully 
understand accruals’ persistence if the H1A also holds, i.e., if there is no correlation 
between forecast errors and TACC.  
Table 1.6 reports the results for Equations (4) and (5) in Panels A and B. Confirming 
H2A, both panels show that forecast errors are optimistically correlated with low 
persistence accruals, but pessimistically correlated with high persistence accruals 
across 12 months, while the accruals of the medium persistence do not show any 
association with errors (e.g., β1ΔWC=-0.039, β2ΔNCO=0, β3ΔFIN >=0.017 for month 1). 
Moreover, the coefficient magnitudes in Panels A and B of Table 1.6 line up closely 
with the relative persistence rankings reported in Appendix A Panels B and C (e.g., 
persistence degrees respectively are ΔCOL=%62.9 (0.803-0.177), ΔCOA=%66.8, 
ΔNCOL=%70.6, ΔNCOA=%72.6, ΔLTI=%74.4, ΔFINL=%75.1, and ΔSTI=%76.9, 
and their coefficients in forecast errors tests are ΔCOL=-0.062, ΔCOA=-0.037, 
ΔNCOL=-0.031, ΔNCOA=-0.002, ΔLTI=0.006, ΔFINL=0.024, and ΔSTI=0.010. F-
tests confirm that the coefficients are different from each other). 
In sum, both tests reported in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 confirm H1A and H2A and reject 
H1 and H2, i.e., analysts’ forecasts errors are not correlated with current total 
accruals, and analysts’ forecast errors are optimistically (pessimistically) correlated 
with less (higher) persistent accruals, while in the middle persistence, they approach 
                                                          
12
 The persistence of ΔNCO is highly close to the persistence of TACC (%74 and %73), hence we 
expect the coefficient on ΔNCO is zero (or close to zero) as in the coefficient on TACC in Table 1.5. 
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zero, these results indicate that analysts lack of sophistication argument with respect 
to accruals’ persistence is unwarranted.  
1.4.1. Additional notes on empirical findings 
When all accrual components are combined, they form total accruals (TACC), and 
we show that forecast errors are not correlated with TACC. We interpret this 
observation as analysts correctly anticipating accruals persistence, which is 
plausible since accruals exhibit predicted reversals (Appendix A panels A, B and C 
show that accrual components exhibit inherent persistence characteristics, i.e., 
components’ persistence degrees are not random, but can be predictable). 
Richardson et al (2005) attribute these inherent properties to their degree of 
reliability, which can be explained by the measurement errors they involve. 
The fact that analysts correctly anticipate accruals’ persistence, does not also mean 
that analysts are entirely correct in all their earnings estimates. There can be still 
forecast errors explained by other factors such as strategic reasons and specific firm 
characteristics, etc. Our results eliminate only one option, accruals.  
We use actual EPS provided by IBES when examining analyst forecast accuracy. 
Reported EPS is entered into the database on the same basis as analysts’ forecasts, 
and by and large corresponds to earnings that represents core business activities as 
opposed to net income (and may be quite different from the net income). Hence, 
the database is considered to be the closest match with analysts’ forecasts. Evidence 
also shows so. For instance, Bradshaw and Sloan (2002, p.41) find that ‘there has 
been a dramatic increase in the frequency and magnitude of cases where “GAAP” 
and “Street” earnings differ’. They also find that ‘market response to the Street 
earnings number has displaced GAAP earnings as a primary determinant of stock 
prices’. See also, Ramnath, Rock, and Shane (2008) and Brown (2007) for studies 
that use IBES EPS when investigating analyst forecast accuracy, analyst forecast 
revisions, capital market reaction to earnings surprises published after 1990. 
However, we have also performed forecast error tests using the Fully Reported 
(GPS) instead of Actual IBES EPS (please the section ‘other robustness’ tests).  
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Bradshaw et al. (2001) use decile ranked accruals focusing on high/low magnitude 
of accruals following Sloan (1996), who argues that accruals anomaly (negative 
returns to past accruals) is caused by investors buying high accruals. However, 
Richardson et al. (2005) findings indicate that the persistence rather than the 
magnitude may drive security mispricing. They show that more measurement errors 
lead to lower persistence, and lower persistence results in less predictability. This 
implies that high magnitude does not always translate into more forecast errors, on 
the contrary, low magnitude but low persistence (e.g., working capital accrual) can 
cause greater forecast bias. Supporting this argument, Kraft, Leone, and Wasley 
(2006) revisiting the accrual anomaly also show that it may not be the accruals’ 
magnitude that drives stocks mispricing, and Xie (2001) shows that investors 
overprice the portion of abnormal accruals stemming from managerial discretion 
(managerial discretion that adds greater measurement errors to accruals). Since the 
persistence degree depends on measurement error, we consider more appropriate to 
use actual values in our tests (decile ranking instead aims to eliminate measurement 
errors). Nevertheless, our results remain robust to also decile ranked accruals, and 
high/low accrual portfolios (reported in Tables 1.9, 1.10, and 1.11). 
1.5. Sensitivity analyses 
1.5.1. Future stock returns, accruals anomaly and analysts  
Our first sensitivity test focuses on the associations between future stock return and 
current accruals to examine whether investors and analysts exhibit the similar 
behaviour in using accrual information. Even though, the evidence suggests that 
investors follow analysts (e.g., Bartov and Mohanram, 2014), there is also strong 
evidence that they use public information in different manners. Elgers et al. (2001, 
2003) find that average investors make more accrual related error compared to 
analysts, and give delayed response to more accurate analyst’ forecasts.  
Hence, we predict investors to naively ignore the persistence of TACC and be 
negatively surprised by the subsequent earnings declines resulting in negative 
future returns as opposed to analysts’ zero TACC related error (there will be a 
negative relation between TACC and Returns). Moreover, the negative relation 
between accruals and returns will be more pronounced as the accrual component’s 
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persistence decreases, i.e., investors will experience greater negative returns with 
less persistent accruals, and vice versa. To test these predictions, we use the 
following returns models ܴ݁ݐ௜௧+ଵ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܥܨ௜௧ + ߚଶܶܣܥܥ௜௧ + ∑ ߜ௝ܺ௜௧௞௝=ଵ +ߝ௜௧+ଵ (6) ܴ݁ݐ௜௧+ଵ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܥܨ௜௧ + ߚଶ�ܹܥ௜௧ + ߚଶ�ܰܥ ௜ܱ௧ + ߚଶ�ܨܫ ௜ܰ௧ +                                  ∑ ߜ௝ܺ௜௧௞௝=ଵ +ߝ௜௧+ଵ     (7) 
Where Ret denotes annual buy and hold stock returns for firm i at time t+ 1 adjusted 
by size and market returns. The accumulation starts in the fourth month after the 
fiscal year end, and continues for 12 months. We control for firm size, market Beta, 
B/P, E/P and past returns following prior research (e.g., Fama and French, 1993).  
Table 1.7 reports the results of Equations (6) and (7), and confirming our prediction 
shows negative correlation between future returns and TACC (as opposed to 
analysts, who exhibit zero forecast error in TACC), while the coefficient on CF  is 
statistically insignificant13.. In addition, we observe increasing investor optimism 
as the accrual component’s persistence decreases, i.e., investors experience greater 
(less) negative returns with less (high) persistent accruals consistent with Sloan 
(1996), who documents stock prices act as if investors fail to anticipate accruals’ 
persistence. These findings overall show that analysts do a better job in anticipating 
accruals’ persistence implying their relatively higher degree of sophistication. This 
evidence also corroborates Elgers et al. (2001; 2003) who find that investors fail to 
efficiently use earnings relevant information contained in analysts’ forecasts. 
Note, even though we find that average investors seem to exhibit relatively less 
sophistication than analysts in using accrual information, Lev and Nissim (2006, 
p.193) show that the magnitude of accruals related trading is becoming small. ‘By 
                                                          
13 Note, in a pricing equations, CF is used to calculate firm value; if it is correctly predicted, with a 
correct discount factor, the true value of a firm can be achieved. However, this CF concept is 
different from the CF we use in this analysis. Our CF variable is of a single year while the CF in a 
pricing equation is an average of all future CF covering also future/past accruals too that turn into 
CF in the long run. Therefore, a correct anticipation of one year ahead CF (as in table 1.7) does not 
indicate that investors also correctly anticipate the CF to calculate firm value. On the contrary, the 
failure of anticipation of correct accruals that are relevant to true firm value results in negative future 
returns defined as accruals anomaly. 
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and large, institutions shy away from extreme accruals firms’. They also show that 
individual investors too are unable to profit from trading on accruals information 
because of high information and transaction costs associated with implementing a 
consistently profitable accruals strategy. 
1.5.2. Accounting conservatism on earnings forecasts errors 
Evidence shows, transitory shocks to earnings due to high conditional conservatism 
lead to lower persistence of earnings (Konstantinidi, Kraft, and Pope, 2016) and 
that analysts’ forecast bias becomes greater with high conditional conservatism 
(Helbok and Walker 2004)14. Evidence also shows that intangible investments 
immediately expensed due to unconditional conservatism result in more volatile 
earnings (e.g., Kothari, Laguerre, and Leone, 2002; Amir, Guan, and Livne, 2007). 
These findings suggest that in the presence of high conservatism, earnings become 
less predictable. Therefore, we also test whether analysts anticipate accruals’ 
persistence under high conservatism, which would provide further evidence about 
their sophistication. We use Hidden_reserves (Penman and Zhang 2002) and 
C_Score (Khan and Watts, 2009)15 to proxy unconditional and conditional 
conservatism respectively (see Appendix A for definitions).  
To distinguish between firms with high versus low unconditional (conditional) 
conservatism, we group the sample into quintiles based on the magnitude of 
Hidden_reserves (C_score) for the first three months before the quarterly earnings 
announcement, and use the following model.  
    ܨ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ௦,௜௧+ଵ = ߚ଴+ߚଵܥܨ௜௧ + ߚଶܦ + ߚଷܶܣܥܥ௜௧ + ߚସܦ ∗ ܶܣܥܥ௜௧ + ߝ௜௧+ଵ     (8) 
                                                          
14 Under conditional conservatism book values are written down when the news is bad, but not 
written up when the news is favourable (Basu, 1997). Under unconditional conservatism however, 
accounting generates pervasive bias regardless of news (Pope and Walker, 2003; Beaver and Ryan, 
2005). It is determined at the inception of accounting transaction, and gives rise to hidden reserves 
(unrecorded goodwill) by means of an immediate expensing of R&D and advertising expenditures. 
15
 The variable is derived using Basu’s (1997) measure of asymmetric timeliness of bad relative to 
good news, ௜ܺ௧ = ߚଵ + ߚଶܦ௜ + ߚଷܴ௜௧ + ߚସܦ௜ܴ௜௧ + ݁௜௧ where the asymmetric timeliness is measured 
by the differential coefficient ߚସ. 
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Where D, conservatism dummy, differentiates between low/high Hidden_reserve 
(C_score) firm-years taking 1(0) if the earnings forecast error is in the high (low) 
conservatism quintile.  
The coefficient on TACC measures the average forecast errors for low conservative 
firm-year, while the coefficient on interaction term measures the average 
incremental forecast error for high versus low conservative firm-year. We predict 
insignificant coefficient on TACC (D*TACC) if analysts fully understand accruals 
persistence (i.e., H1A holds, forecasts errors are not correlated with current TACC), 
We do not expect conservatism to play a significant role in the association between 
accruals and forecasts errors.  
Table 1.8 reports the results for Equation (8), and confirms our expectations. The 
coefficients on TACC (D*TACC) are insignificant (marginally significant at %10 
for D*TACC in one month). These findings overall indicate analysts’ sophistication 
with respect to accruals. Notice that the coefficients on D for conditional 
conservatism are negative and significant consistent with Helbok and Walker 
(2004), who show greater forecast error under conditional conservatism.  
1.5.3. Decile ranked accruals   
We replace actual values of accruals with their decile ranks in the forecast error 
regressions (3), (4) and (5) following Bradshaw et al. (2001). Each year, we rank 
firms into deciles by the magnitude of accruals from low to high, and scale them to 
(0,9) range so that lowest (highest) accrual firm years are assigned to 0 (9). The 
scaling is used to alleviate nonlinearities in the data, and minimize the effects of 
measurement errors.  
The intercept in the decile rank regressions measures the average forecast error for 
a low accrual firm year, while the coefficient on the accrual rank measures the 
average incremental forecast errors for a high versus a low accrual firm year. If 
analysts’ understanding of accruals’ persistence is affected by the magnitude, we 
should observe significant negative correlations between forecast errors and high 
accruals (supporting both H1 and H2), which would be consistent with Bradshaw 
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et al. (2001). However, we find the same pattern observed in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 that 
confirm the alternatives, H1A and H2A.  
Table 1.9 Panels A, B and C report the results of forecast error regressions on past 
decile ranked accruals for Equations (3), (4), and (5), and confirm H1A that 
forecasts errors are not correlated with total accruals, and H2A forecast errors are 
optimistically (pessimistically) correlated with working capital (financing activity) 
accruals, while in the middle persistence, forecast errors approach zero. 
1.5.4. High/low accruals  
We repeat the forecast error test for only the high accrual portfolios. Specifically, 
each year, we rank firms into five quintiles from low to high by the magnitude of 
accruals, and run Equations (3), (4), and (5) only with the high accrual portfolios. 
We run these regressions for the first six months. Reported in Table 1.10 Panel A 
and B, the results further confirm the hypotheses H1A and H2A.  
We also run forecast errors on high and low TACC portfolios. Each year we rank 
firms into five quintiles from low to high by the magnitude of TACC, then assign a 
dummy, D of 1 (0) to the high (low) TACC portfolios and run Equation (3) in the 
following form.  
    ܨ݁ݎݎ݋ݎ௦,௜௧+ଵ = ߚ଴+ߚଵܦ + ߚଶܶܣܥܥ௜௧ + ߚଷܦ ∗ ܶܣܥܥ௜௧ + ߚସܥܨ௜௧ + ߝ௜௧+ଵ     (9) 
D differentiates between low/high accruals. This method excludes middle quintiles 
from the test and keeps only the highest/lowest quintiles. Hence, the coefficient on 
the TACC measures the average forecast error for the lowest TACC firm year, while 
the coefficient on the interaction term measures the average incremental forecast 
errors for a high versus a low TACC firm year. Table 1.11 reports the results for 
Equation (9) and confirms H1A; insignificant coefficients on both TACC and 
D*TACC (in some months marginally but pessimistic coefficients on D). 
1.5.5. Absolute forecast errors and accruals  
There are high correlations (some in opposite ways) among accrual components as 
observed in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. The question is whether they affect the zero 
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correlation between forecast errors and TACC, i.e., whether in the aggregate the 
opposite signed errors cancel each other’s effect on forecast errors. We also run 
Equation (3) with absolute forecast errors to test this question. This method 
eliminates the above possibility, but may lead to other problems such as the 
deviations both in the covariates’ coefficients and R2. Hence, the interpretation of 
the results is limited to certain circumstances.  
Since we use absolute values, a negative(positive) coefficient on accruals will now 
indicate analysts’ pessimism(optimism) contrary to signed error tests. Hence, with 
absolute errors, we should observe a positive coefficient on TACC, if analysts lack 
the necessary sophistication, otherwise (with other signs) H1 will be rejected.  
Table 1.12 reports the results for Equation (3) using absolute forecast errors for the 
first six months, and shows significant negative coefficient on TACC. A negative 
sign means analysts’ pessimism, which rejects H1. Forecast errors should not 
decrease as accruals increase in magnitude, just the opposite is expected, if the lack 
of sophistication argument holds. Although, a significant coefficient on TACC does 
not confirm H1A too, it does not reject it either. Hence, we conclude saying 
‘analysts’ lack of sophistication argument is unwarranted. 
1.5.6. Other sensitivity analyses  
We also performed forecast error tests using the Fully Reported (GPS) instead of 
Actual IBES EPS. Forecast errors are calculated as Analyst Forecast of Earnings 
minus the Fully Reported GPS and tests are run for the first six months. When using 
the GPS, forecast errors seem to be optimistically correlated with both cash flows 
and TACC, while optimism is greater with cash flows (e.g., the coefficient on TACC 
is -0.029 while the coefficient on TACC is -0.115 and F-tests shows the coefficients 
are different from each other). This observation is inconsistent with both previous 
research and with the theory. Therefore, we do not tabulate these results since using 
Fully Reported (GPS) is unlikely to provide better outcome, and may even cause 
greater noise and mislead the inferences  
Our findings are also robust to Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure, but we report 
standard errors clustered by time and firm using Petersen (2009) approach. Time 
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series regressions do not provide correct standard errors for autocorrelation in the 
long term (stocks have weak time-series autocorrelation in daily and weekly 
holding periods, but higher autocorrelation over long horizons, see Fama and 
French, 1988). For alternative methods of correcting standard errors for time series 
and cross-sectional correlations, we find appropriate to use Petersen (2009).  
Other unreported tests which control for regulatory changes such as the enactment 
of Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Global Analyst Research Settlement in 2002 
reveal that the main findings remain robust. Regressions are also run by controlling 
industry fixed effects using Fama and French industry classifications and for 
different time periods such as using data post 1993 to test whether the main findings 
alter after the change in IBES’s method of calculating earnings (Konstantinidi et al. 
2016). Our results remain robust also to these tests.  
1.6. Conclusion  
This paper revisits the question whether analysts anticipate the persistence of 
accruals in future earnings. Previous research finds that accruals are less persistent 
than cash flows, that investors fail to understand this property, and also that analysts 
also fail to inform investors about this accrual problem. However, this research uses 
working capital accruals to arrive that conclusion and substantial evidence indicates 
that such accrual definition excluding noncurrent operating and financing activity 
accruals can be subject to omitted information bias. Therefore, we use total accruals 
in our analysis that covers the omitted parts of accruals, and revisit the issue. 
Our results show that there is no correlation forecast errors and total accruals, and 
that forecast errors increase in both highest and lowest persistent accrual 
components while in the middle persistent, forecast errors approach zero. This 
confirms our conjecture that analysts focus on total accruals’ accuracy (since 
accruals components have different persistence degrees, and total accruals reflect 
an average of its components’ persistence, it is plausible that individual components 
are associated with forecast errors, but this will not indicate analysts’ lack of 
sophistication to anticipate accruals’ persistence as long as forecast errors 
uncorrelated with Total accruals. Our results remain robust to different periods, 
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samples and model specifications, and therefore, our findings overall do not warrant 
the lack of sophistication argument.  
.  
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Appendix A  
Variable definitions 
Ferror Analysts’ earnings forecast errors computed as actual EPS from 
IBES for year t+1 minus analysts’ consensus (median) forecast EPS 
from IBES in month s (s=1, 2, 3, ….12) scaled by price from CRSP 
in the first month year t earnings is announced. Ferror s, t+1 =  [Actual 
EPS t+ 1 –Forecast EPS s, t+ 1]  / P1,t 
 
ROA Earnings. Operating income after depreciation (Compustat Item 
OIADP, #178) deflated by average assets (Compustat Item AT, #6) 
 
TACC Total accruals is the change in non-cash assets - change in liabilities 
deflated by average assets (Compustat Item AT, #6) 
 
CF  Cash flows (Compustat Item OANCF, #308) from operating 
activities deflated by average assets. 
 
ΔOPAC Operating accruals: change in non-cash working capital (ΔWCt) plus 
change in net non-current operating assets (ΔNCOt), deflated by 
average assets. 
 
ΔWC Working capital accruals is the change in net working capital = WCt 
- WCt-1. WC is current operating assets (COA) less operating 
liabilities (COL). COA=current assets (Compustat Item ACT, #4) - 
cash and short term investments (Compustat Item CHE, #1), and 
COL=current liabilities (Compustat Item LCT, #5) - short term debt 
(Compustat Item DLC, #34). 
 
ΔNCO Non-current operating accruals is the change in net non-current 
operating assets = NCOt - NCOt-1. NCO is = non-current operating 
assets (NCOA) - non-current op.liabilities (NCOL). NCOA=total 
assets (Compustat Item AT, #6) - current assets (Compustat Item 
ACT, #4) - investments and advances (Compustat Item IVAO, #32), 
and NCOL=total liability (Compustat Item LT, #181) - current 
liabilities (Compustat Item LCT, #5) - short term debt (Compustat 
Item DLC, #34) - long term debt (Compustat Item DLTT, #9) 
 
ΔFIN Financing accruals is the change in net financial assets = FINt -FINt-
1. FIN=financial assets (FINA) - financial liabilities (FINL). 
FINA=short term investments (STI) (Compustat Item IVST, #193) 
+ long term investments (LTI) (Compustat Item IVAO, #32). FINL= 
long term debt (Compustat Item DLTT, #9) + short term debt 
(Compustat Item DLC, #34) + preferred stock (Compustat Item 
UPSTKC, #130) 
 
Returns Size adjusted returns are calculated as the sum of 12-month buy and 
hold stock returns from CRSP (accumulation starts in the fourth 
month after the fiscal year end) minus the corresponding value-
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weighted average returns for all firms in the same size-matched 
decile. To form size deciles, market values are ranked annually, and 
assigned in equal numbers to ten portfolios. 
 
E/P Earnings to price ratio calculated as operating income after 
depreciation (Compustat Item OIADP, #178) at time t deflated by 
market value at time t-1. 
 
Size Natural log of market value of equity.  Market value is calculated 
as the share price (Compustat item PRCC_F, #199) multiplied by 
common shares outstanding (Compustat item CSHO, #25) 
 
B/P Book value of equity divided by market value of equity.  Book value 
of equity = Common ordinary equity total (Compustat Item CEQ, 
#60) + Preferred treasury stock Current Assets (Compustat Item 
TSTKP, #227) + Preferred dividends in arrears (Compustat Item 
DVPA, #242) 
 
Beta Estimated 60 month rolling regressions using the market model  
  (ܴ݁ݐ௜௧ − ௙ܴ) = ߙ + ߚ௜(ܴ݁ݐ௠௧ − ௙ܴ) + ߳௜௧  
Ret is the CRSP monthly buy and hold returns for 12 month for stock 
i at time t, ௙ܴ is risk the free rate, ሺܴ݁ݐ௠௧ − ௙ܴሻ is the equity risk 
premium of the market portfolio. Rf is obtained from the US Federal 
Reserve, H15 report as the 10-year US Treasury bond rate for the 
relevant year. Retmt is the CRSP monthly value weighted return on a 
market portfolio cumulated over 12 months. 
 
C_Score Firm specific conditional conservatism proxy varying across years 
developed using the following Khan and Watts (2009) model based 
on Basu (1997) asymmetric timelines of earnings measure; ܺ௜௧ = ߚଵ + ߚଶܦ௜ + ߚଷܴ௜ (�ଵ + �ଶܵ��݁௜ + �ଷܯܤ ௜ + �ସ�݁ݒ௜ܦ௜) + ߚସܦ௜ܴ௜ ቀߛଵ + ߛଶܵ��݁௜ + ߛଷ ெ஻௜ + ߛସ�݁ݒ௜ቁ + ߜଵܵ��݁௜+ߜଶ ெ஻௜ +                        ߜଷܮ݁ݒ௜ + ߜସܦ௜ܵ��݁௜ + ߜହܦ௜ܯܤ ௜ + ߜ଺ܦ௜ܮ݁ݒ௜ + ݁௜௧ 
The parameters are estimated annually, C_Score is calculated as ܥ_ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜௧ ≡ ߚସ = ߛଵ + ߛଶܵ��݁௜௧ + ߛଷܯ௜௧ ܤ௜௧⁄ + ߛସ�݁ݒ௜௧ 
Where X is earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat item IB, 
#18) deflated by market value (MV) at time t-1, MV is calculated as 
the share price (Compustat item PRCC_F, #199) multiplied by 
common shares outstanding (Compustat, CSHO, #25). R denotes 
annual buy and hold return inclusive of dividends and other 
distributions, accumulation period starts in the fourth month after 
the fiscal year end t-1 and continues for the next 12 months. D is set 
to 1 if R< 0 and zero otherwise. The coefficient ߚସ measures the 
incremental timeliness for bad news over good news, or 
conservatism. E/P  is income at time t deflated by market value at 
time t-1. Size is the natural log of market value at time t, leverage is 
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measured as long term debt (Compustat Item DLTT, #9) plus short 
term debt (Compustat Item DLC, #34)] divided by the market value 
at time t. M/B is calculated as market value at time t divided by the 
book value of equity at time t. Following Khan and Watts (2009), all 
firm years with missing data, negative total assets and book values 
are eliminated in estimation. Firms with share price less than $1 are 
eliminated, and all variables are winsorised to 1% and 99%. 
 
Hid_Res  Hidden reserves to proxy unconditional accounting conservatism by 
Penman and Zhang, (2002; 2016) deflated by average assets ܪ�݀݀݁݊_ܴ݁ݏ݁ݎݒ݁ݏ௧ = ܴ&ܦݎ݁ݏ௧  + ܣܦܸݎ݁ݏ௧ + ܮܫܨܱݎ݁ݏ௧   
R&Dres is unamortised balance of R&D expenditures (Compustat 
Item XRD, #46) that would have appeared on balance sheet if it had 
been capitalised and amortised at a straightline rate of 20%, 
assuming a uniform distribution. ܴ&ܦݎ݁ݏ௜௧ = Ͳ.ͻܴ&ܦ௜௧ + Ͳ.͹ܴ&ܦ௜௧−ଵ + Ͳ.ͷܴ&ܦ௜௧−ଶ+ Ͳ.͵ܴ&ܦ௜௧−ଷ + Ͳ.ͳܴ&ܦ௜௧−ସ 
ADVres is advertisement reserve calculated using advertisement 
expenditures (Compustat Item XAD, #45) assuming a useful life of 
two years, and providing more benefits when first initiated   ܣܦݎ݁ݏ௜௧ = ܣܦ ௜ܸ௧ + ͳ/͵ܣܦ ௜ܸ௧−ଵ 
LIFOres is LIFO reserves reported in the inventory footnotes in 
financial reports (Compustat Item LIFR, #240). 
 
Replicating the persistence tests in Richardson et al. (2005) 
To measure the relative degree of earnings and accrual components, we replicate 
the tests from Richardson et al. (2005) by estimating the following model; ܴܱܣ௧+ଵ = ߛ଴ + ߛଵሺܴܱܣ௧ − ܶܣܥܥ௧ሻ + ߛଶܶܣܥܥ௧ + ߴ௧+ଵ   
ROA denotes earnings scaled by total assets, ሺܴܱܣ − ܶܣܥܥሻ cash flows, and TACC 
total accruals. As accrual are expected to be less persistent than cash flows, the 
prediction is ሺߛଶ − ߛଵሻ < Ͳ. To measure the relative persistence of accrual 
components, we expand the equation  ܴܱܣ௧+ଵ = ߛ଴ + ߛଵሺܴܱܣ௧ − ∆ܹܥ௧ − ∆ܰܥܱ௧ − ∆ܨܫ ௧ܰሻ  +ߛଶ∆ܹܥ௧ + ߛଷ∆ܰܥܱ௧ + ߛସ∆ܨܫ ௧ܰ + ߴ௜௧+ଵ  
The coefficient ߛଵ measures the persistence of the cash flows while ሺߛଶ − ߛଵሻ, ሺߛଷ − ߛଵሻ,  and ሺߛସ − ߛଵሻ measure the persistence of ΔWC, ΔNCO, ΔFIN 
respectively relative to cash flows. Rewriting the equation results in  ܴܱܣ௧+ଵ = �଴ + �ଵܴܱܣ௧ + �ଶ∆ܹܥ௧ + �ଷ∆ܰܥܱ௧ + �ସ∆ܨܫ ௧ܰ + ߴ௜௧+ଵ  
Results reported in Panels A-C below show that the mean reversion of accruals are 
quicker than cash flows (the coefficient on ROA is 0.80 while the coefficient on 
TACC is %7 lower than ROA). Panels B and C reporting persistence results for 
accrual components show that operating accruals are less persistent than financial 
accruals, and the magnitude of the persistence coefficients approach zero from 
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negative as the persistence increases. In summary, the preceding analysis provides 
two objectives. First, the results confirm the persistence ranks of accruals from 
Richardson et al. (2005). Second, the findings provide us with the measure of 
persistence for each accrual component which we use to explain how analysts 
approach to accrual information. 
PANEL A: Persistence of accruals (total accruals-TACC)  
 
PANEL B: Persistence of accruals (initial decomposition) 
 
PANEL B: Persistence of accruals (extended decomposition) 
 
  
intercept R 2
mean coef. 0.008 0.797 *** -0.068 *** 0.632
t-stat 99.11 -16.15
ROA TACC
intercept ROA R 2
mean coef. 0.007 0.791 *** -0.122 *** 0.631
pvalue -16.09
mean coef. 0.008 0.782 *** -0.051 *** 0.625
t-stat -10.79
mean coef. 0.005 0.777 *** 0.002 0.629
t-stat 0.26
mean coef. 0.009 0.804 *** -0.137 *** -0.065 *** -0.045 *** 0.634
t-stat -19.59 -12.32 -11.78
Persistence order highest low medium high
ΔWC ΔNCO ΔFIN
intercept R 2
Predicted reliability a
mean coef. 0.005 0.776 *** -0.035 *** 0.62
t-stat -4.03
mean coef. 0.008 0.786 *** -0.065 *** 0.63
t-stat -11.3
mean coef. 0.005 0.777 *** -0.044 *** 0.62
t-stat -4.52
mean coef. 0.007 0.782 *** -0.047 *** 0.62
t-stat -10.17
mean coef. 0.006 0.78 *** -0.037 *** 0.63
t-stat -4.45
mean coef. 0.005 0.776 *** 0.010 *** 0.62
t-stat 2.00
mean coef. 0.006 0.775 *** -0.026 *** 0.62
t-stat -5.53
mean coef. 0.008 0.803 *** -0.177 *** -0.132 *** -0.097 *** -0.077 *** -0.059 *** -0.052 *** -0.034 *** 0.63
t-stat -18.40 -19.11 -8.38 -14.21 -6.65 -9.46 -6.77
Persistence Order 8 Highest 1 Low 2 3 4 5 6 7  high
ROA ;-ͿΔCOL ΔCOA ;-ͿΔNCOL ΔNCOA ΔLTI ;-ͿΔFINL ΔSTI
High High
ROA t+1 denotes earnings and ROA t denotes cash flows by the model construction. Other variables represent accrual components of
earnings. See Appendix for models ROA (1), (2) and (3). Standard errors are clustered by firm and year using the Petersen (2009)
approach. The sample consists of 142,821 firm-year observations for 1976-2013, all earnings and accrual variables are deflated by
average assets and winsorised to +1 and -1.  See Appendix for variable definitions.  *** denotes the statistical significance at 1% level
High Low Medium Low Medium
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          Table 1.1  
          Descriptive statistics and correlations for ROA, accruals, conservatism 
 
PANEL A: Descriptive statistics 
mean std.dev. 25% median 75%
ROAt+ 1 0.045 0.214 0.007 0.08 0.14
ROAt 0.043 0.186 0.002 0.076 0.136
TACC t 0.051 0.195 -0.021 0.037 0.109
ΔOPAC t 0.063 0.195 -0.027 0.041 0.135
ΔFIN t -0.012 0.176 -0.071 -0.002 0.048
ΔWC t 0.015 0.106 -0.024 0.008 0.052
ΔNCO t 0.048 0.159 -0.015 0.021 0.084
C_Score t 0.013 0.115 -0.052 0.012 0.081
Hidden_Reserves t 0.163 0.190 0.035 0.098 0.218
PANEL B: Correlation matrix—Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal) 
ROAt+ 1 - 0.75 *** 0.13 *** 0.09 *** 0.05 *** 0.01 *** 0.04 *** -0.24 *** -0.16 ***
ROAt 0.79 *** - 0.22 *** 0.18 *** 0.05 *** 0.20 *** 0.08 *** -0.27 *** -0.17 ***
TACC t 0.23 *** 0.38 *** - 0.69 *** 0.45 *** 0.40 *** 0.47 *** -0.10 *** -0.02 ***
ΔOPAC t 0.13 *** 0.27 *** 0.60 *** - -0.45 *** 0.60 *** 0.84 *** -0.08 *** -0.06 ***
ΔFIN t 0.09 *** 0.08 *** 0.29 *** -0.47 *** - -0.22 *** -0.41 *** -0.02 *** 0.04 ***
ΔWC t 0.12 *** 0.23 *** 0.41 *** 0.63 *** -0.27 *** - 0.07 *** -0.01 *** -0.02 ***
ΔNCO t 0.11 *** 0.22 *** 0.47 *** 0.80 *** 0.41 *** 0.16 *** - -0.12 -0.07 ***
C_Score t -0.02 *** -0.02 *** -0.08 *** -0.06 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.06 - 0.05
H_Rt -0.39 *** -0.43 *** -0.05 *** -0.08 *** 0.03 *** -0.05 *** -0.07 *** 0.00 -
Earmings/accruals sample consists of 142,821 firm-year observations, while Hidden_Reserves (H_R) and C_Score (C_S) samples
consist of 98,196 and 96,324 firm-year observations respectively for 1976-2013. All earnings and accrual variables are deflated by
average assets and winsorised to +1 and -1, while C_Score and Hidden_Reserves are winsorised to %1 and %99. See Appendix for
variable definitions.  *** denotes the statistical significance at 1% level
ROAt+ 1 ROAt TACC t ΔOPAC t ΔFIN t ΔWC t ΔNCO t C_S t H_R t
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          Table 1.2 
          Descriptive statistics and correlations for extended accrual decomposition 
 
PANEL A: Descriptive statistics 
mean std.dev. 25% median 75%
ΔCOA t 0.040 0.132 -0.01 0.022 0.081
ΔCOL t 0.025 0.09 -0.009 0.015 0.051
ΔNCOA t 0.055 0.163 -0.012 0.025 0.091
ΔNCOL t 0.006 0.049 -0.001 0.001 0.011
ΔSTI t 0.007 0.105 0 0 0
ΔLTI t 0.002 0.047 0 0 0
ΔFINL t 0.021 0.141 -0.023 0 0.051
PANEL B: Correlation matrix—Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal) 
ROAt+ 1 - 0.75 *** 0.11 *** 0.04 *** 0.05 *** 0.02 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 *** -0.03***
ROAt 0.79 *** - 0.16 *** 0.00 0.09 *** 0.01 *** 0.04 *** 0.02 *** -0.02 ***
ΔCOA t 0.20 *** 0.31 *** - 0.60 *** 0.29 *** 0.08 *** 0.01 0.01 *** 0.33 ***
ΔCOL t 0.15 *** 0.18 *** 0.57 *** - 0.31 *** 0.07 *** 0.09 *** 0.03 *** 0.20 ***
ΔNCOA t 0.14 *** 0.25 *** 0.38 *** 0.35 *** - 0.23 *** -0.01 -0.01 *** 0.51 ***
ΔNCOL t 0.15 *** 0.19 *** 0.14 *** 0.11 *** 0.31 *** - 0.01 *** 0.06 *** 0.03 ***
ΔSTI t 0.07 *** 0.09 *** -0.02 *** 0.08 *** -0.02 *** 0.02 *** - -0.02 *** 0.03 ***
ΔLTI t 0.02 *** 0.04 *** 0.03 *** 0.04 *** 0.02 *** 0.06 *** 0.00 - 0.08 ***
ΔFINL t -0.04 *** -0.04 0.32 *** 0.17 *** 0.05 *** 0.11 *** -0.02 *** 0.05 *** -
The sample consists of 142,821 firm-year observations for 1976-2013. Variables are deflated by average assets and
winsorised to +1 and -1.  See Appendix for variable definitions.  *** denotes the statistical significance at 1% level 
ROAt+ 1 ROAt ΔCOA t ΔCOL t ΔNCOA t ΔNCOL t ΔSTI t ΔLTI t ΔFINL t
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Table 1.3 
Descriptive statistics for earnings forecast errors 
 
  
mean std.dev. 25% median 75%
M1Ferror -0.016 0.049 -0.020 -0.002 0.003
M2Ferror -0.015 0.048 -0.018 -0.002 0.003
M3Ferror -0.013 0.056 -0.016 -0.001 0.003
M4Ferror -0.012 0.055 -0.014 -0.001 0.003
M5Ferror -0.011 0.054 -0.013 -0.001 0.003
M6Ferror -0.009 0.038 -0.010 -0.001 0.003
M7Ferror -0.008 0.039 -0.008 0.000 0.002
M8Ferror -0.007 0.037 -0.007 0.000 0.002
M9Ferror -0.005 0.038 -0.005 0.000 0.002
M10Ferror -0.004 0.040 -0.003 0.000 0.002
M11Ferror -0.004 0.040 -0.002 0.000 0.002
M12Ferror -0.003 0.033 -0.002 0.000 0.002
m1, m2, ...m12 denote months, Ferror denotes analysts' earnings forecast error. The
number of firm-year observations are 48,142 across 12 months for 1976-2013.  See appendix 
for variable definitions.
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Table 1.4 
Correlations between analysts forecast errors, accruals and conservatism 
across 12 months 
 
 
PANEL A: Pearson correlations: intial accrual decomposition and average forecast errors
M1Ferror t+ 1 0.01 -0.06 *** 0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.03 *** -0.11 *** 0.00
M2Ferror t+ 1 0.00 -0.06 *** 0.07 *** 0.07 *** -0.04 *** -0.09 *** 0.01
M3Ferror t+ 1 0.00 -0.05 *** 0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.03 *** -0.09 *** 0.02
M4Ferror t+ 1 0.00 -0.05 *** 0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.03 *** -0.09 *** 0.02 ***
M5Ferror t+ 1 0.00 -0.05 *** 0.05 *** -0.04 *** -0.03 *** -0.08 *** 0.03 ***
M6Ferror t+ 1 0.00 -0.06 *** 0.06 *** -0.06 *** -0.03 *** -0.08 *** 0.03 ***
M7Ferror t+ 1 0.00 -0.06 *** 0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.04 *** -0.08 *** 0.03 ***
M8Ferror t+ 1 0 -0.05 *** 0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.03 *** -0.06 *** 0.03 ***
M9Ferror t+ 1 0.01 -0.04 *** 0.05 *** -0.04 *** -0.02 *** -0.06 *** 0.03 ***
M10Ferror t+ 1 0 -0.04 *** 0.04 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.05 *** 0.02 ***
M11Ferror t+ 1 0 -0.04 *** 0.04 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.05 *** 0.03 ***
M12Ferror t+ 1 0.00 -0.03 *** 0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.02 *** -0.05 *** 0.02 ***
PANEL B: Pearson correlations: extended accrual decomposition and average forecast errors
M1Ferror t+ 1 -0.04 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.02 *** 0.03 *** 0.01 0.07 ***
M2Ferror t+ 1 -0.04 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.01 0.07 ***
M3Ferror t+ 1 -0.03 *** -0.01 *** -0.03 *** -0.01 *** 0.02 *** 0.01 0.05 ***
M4Ferror t+ 1 -0.03 *** -0.01 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.02 *** 0.01 0.05 ***
M5Ferror t+ 1 -0.03 *** -0.01 *** -0.02 *** -0.03 *** -0.02 *** 0.00 0.05 ***
M6Ferror t+ 1 -0.04 *** -0.01 *** -0.03 *** -0.02 *** -0.02 *** 0.00 0.06 ***
M7Ferror t+ 1 -0.03 *** -0.02 *** -0.02 *** -0.05 *** 0.02 *** 0.01 0.05 ***
M8Ferror t+ 1 -0.03 *** -0.02 *** -0.02 *** -0.05 *** 0.02 *** 0.00 0.05 ***
M9Ferror t+ 1 -0.03 *** -0.01 -0.02 *** -0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.01 0.04 ***
M10Ferror t+ 1 -0.02 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.05 *** 0.02 *** 0.01 0.04 ***
M11Ferror t+ 1 -0.01 *** -0.02 *** -0.01 *** -0.05 *** 0.02 *** 0.00 0.03 ***
M12Ferror t+ 1 -0.01 *** -0.02 *** -0.01 -0.04 *** 0.01 *** 0.00 0.03 ***
TACC t ΔOPAC t ΔFIN t ΔWC t ΔNCO t C_Score t H_Reserv t
ΔCOA t
m1, m2, ...m12 denote months, Ferror denotes analysts' earnings forecast error. The number of firm-
year observations are 48,142 across 12 months for 1976-2013 for which consensus analsyt earning
forecasts and actual earnings are available on the IBES summary file. Accrual variables are winsorised
to +1 and -1, while forecast errors are winsorised to 1% and 99%. See Appendix fr variable defnition.
*** denotes the statistical significance at 1% level
ΔLTI tΔSTI tΔNCOL tΔNCOA tΔCOL t ΔFINL t
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Table 1.5 
Regressions for forecast errors on total accruals and cash flows over 12 months 
 
PANEL A: Forecast errors and total accruals 
Month m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10 m11 m12
Intercept (coef.) -0.017 ***-0.015 ***-0.013 ***-0.012 *** -0.01 ***-0.009 ***-0.008 ***-0.007 ***-0.005 ***-0.004 ***-0.003 ***-0.003 ***
TACC (coef.) 0.002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0
t-stat 0.94 0.39 -0.05 -0.1 -0.22 0.15 -0.07 0.08 0.67 0.15 0.15 0.2
PANEL B: Forecast errors, total accruals and cash flows
Month m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10 m11 m12
Intercept (coef.) -0.018 ***-0.016 ***-0.013 ***-0.013 ***-0.011 ***-0.009 ***-0.008 ***-0.007 ***-0.005 ***-0.004 ***-0.004 ***-0.003 ***
TACC (coef.) 0 -0.002 -0.03 0.003 -0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0 -0/001 0 0
t-stat 0.19 0.72 -1.17 -0.88 -0.90 -0.71 -0.70 -0.48 0.67 -0.42 -0.32 -0.35
CF(coef.) 0.043 *** 0.037 *** 0.032 *** 0.029 0.026 *** 0.022 *** 0.021 *** 0.017 *** 0.014 *** 0.013 *** 0.012 *** 0.11 ***
t-stat 8.85 8.75 7.45 8.05 8.00 6.97 7.41 6.92 6.46 6.43 6.30 6
%R 2 1.63 1.27 0.65 0.53 0.45 0.72 0.59 0.43 0.27 0.19 0.17 0.22
m1, m2, ...m12 denote months, Ferror denotes analysts' earnings forecast error. The number of firm-year observations are 48,142 from 1976 to 2013
for which consensus analsyt earning forecasts and actual earnings are available on the IBES summary statistics file. Standard errors are clustered by firm and 
year using the Petersen (2009) approach.  See Appendix for variable definitions.  *** denotes the statistical significance at 1% level
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Table 1.6 
Forecast errors and accrual components over 12 months 
 
 
 
  
PANEL A: Forecast errors and accruals (initial accrual decomposition) 
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10 m11 m12
Intercept (coef.) -0.015 *** -0.014 *** -0.12 *** -0.011 *** -0.01 *** -0.008 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 *** -0.005 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 ***
Persistence Order (d)
ΔWC (coef.) 1 Low -0.039 *** -0.038 *** -0.033 *** -0.027 *** -0.025 *** -0.026 *** -0.023 *** -0.019 *** -0.015 *** -0.013 *** -0.011 *** -0.010 ***
t-stat -8.63 -8.85 -5.98 -6.19 -6.27 -9.12 -8.52 -7.11 -6.73 -5.25 -3.82 -4.46
ΔNCO (coef.) 2 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
t-stat -0.33 -1.00 -1.22 -1.06 -1.13 -0.99 -0.97 -0.78 -0.47 -0.86 -0.81 -0.74
ΔFIN (coef.) 3 0.017 *** 0.015 *** 0.012 *** 0.011 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.009 *** 0.008 *** 0.007 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 ***
t-stat 5.46 5.03 4.38 3.82 3.76 4.15 3.84 3.96 4.27 4.00 3.56 3.88
CF (coef.) 4 High 0.042 *** 0.035 *** 0.030 *** 0.027 *** 0.025 *** 0.021 *** 0.020 *** 0.016 *** 0.013 *** 0.012 *** 0.011 *** 0.010 ***
t-stat 8.58 8.57 7.10 7.70 7.77 6.85 7.48 6.99 6.39 6.63 6.58 6.29
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PANEL B: Forecast errors and accruals (extended accrual decomposition) 
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10 m11 m12
Intercept (coef.) -0.016 *** -0.014 *** 0.012 *** -0.011 *** 0.010 *** -0.009 *** -0.008 *** -0.008 *** -0.005 *** -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 ***
Persistence Order
(-)ΔCOL (coef1 Low -0.062 *** -0.034 *** -0.030 *** -0.024 *** -0.023 *** -0.024 *** -0.021 *** -0.017 *** -0.013 *** -0.011 *** -0.009 *** -0.008 ***
t-stat -7.26 -7.44 -5.47 -5.47 -5.56 -7.85 -7.37 -6.39 -6.04 -4.87 -3.58 -4.03
ΔCOA (coef.) 2 -0.037 *** -0.034 *** -0.030 *** -0.024 *** -0.023 *** -0.024 *** -0.021 *** -0.017 *** -0.013 *** -0.011 *** -0.009 *** -0.008 ***
t-stat -7.26 -7.44 -5.47 -5.47 -5.56 -7.85 -7.37 -6.39 -6.04 -4.87 -3.58 -4.03
(-)ΔNCOL (coef.)3 -0.031 *** -0.038 *** -0.031 *** -0.036 *** -0.025 ** -0.027 *** -0.006 -0.005 -0.009 *** -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
t-stat -4.02 -3.21 -3.78 -2.27 -1.96 -3.94 -1.59 -1.57 -2.97 -1.32 -1.28 -1.19
ΔNCOA (coef.) 4 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 0 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
t-stat -0.71 -1.22 -1.32 -1.03 -0.99 -0.69 -0.79 -0.66 -0.11 -0.69 -0.73 -0.62
ΔLTI (coef.) 5 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
t-stat 1.33 1.21 1.13 1.17 0.92 0.91 0.88 0.33 1.01 0.96 0.56 0.48
(-)ΔFINL (coef.)6 0.024 *** 0.022 *** 0.019 *** 0.017 *** 0.016 *** 0.015 *** 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 0.008 *** 0.007 ***
t-stat 5.95 5.65 4.68 4.69 4.94 4.74 4,98 4.75 3.89 4.26 3.85 3.91
ΔSTI (coef.) 7 0.010 *** 0.008 *** 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 ***
t-stat 4.23 3.59 3.15 2.32 2.37 2.75 2.87 3.51 4.21 3.47 2.92 3.45
CF (coef.) 8 High 0.041 *** 0.035 *** 0.030 *** 0.029 *** 0.024 *** 0.020 *** 0.020 *** 0.016 *** 0.012 *** 0.011 *** 0.010 *** 0.010 ***
t-stat 8.71 8.65 7.15 7.67 7.79 6.84 7.21 6.82 5.60 6.68 6.54 5.92
m1, m2, ...m12 denote months, Ferror denotes analysts' earnings forecast error. Persistence order of earnings components is obtained from the multivariate persistence
regressions provided in Appendix(Panels A-C). The number of firm-year observations are 48,142 for 1976-2013 for which consensus analsyt earning forecasts and
actual earnings are available on IBES summary statistics file. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year using Petersen (2009). Untabulated F-tests reveal that
coefficients are different from  each other in the first 3-4 months.  See Appendix for variable definitions.  *** denotes the statistical significance at 1% level
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Table 1.7 
Return regressions on cash flows (CF) and accruals (1976-2013) 
 
 
 
  
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat
Intercept -0.067 -1.35 -0.059 -1.33
CF -0.022 0.55 -0.061 -1.32
TACC -0.168 *** -6.33
ΔWC -0.293 *** -6.47
ΔNCO -0.183 *** -5.07
ΔFIN -0.053 * -1.74
CONTROLS YES YES
%R 2 4.43 4.63
N 78,488 78,373
Table reports the results of equations (8) and (7) respectively.  Control variables are size, 
market Beta, B/P, E/P and past returns . See Appendix for variable definitions.
Standard errors are clustered by firm and year using the Petersen (2009) approach. Un-
tabulated F-tests confirm that coefficients are different from each other. *** , ** and *
denote the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and %10 respectively.
CF, TACC CF, ΔWC, ΔNCO, ΔFIN
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Table 1.8 
Forecast errors and accrual components on high/low conservatism portfolios 
 
 
 
  
m1 m2 m3 m1 m2 m3
Intercept (coef.) -0.018 *** -0.017 *** -0.015 *** -0.008 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 ***
CF (coef.) 0.011 ** 0.008 * 0.004 0.031 *** 0.026 *** 0.022 ***
D  (coef.) -0.004 * -0.004 -0.003 -0.024 *** -0.022 *** 0.020 ***
TACC (coef.) (a) 0.006 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 0.004 -0.004
D*TACC (coef.) (b) -0.009 * -0.008 -0.009 -0.006 -0.008 -0.002
diff (b-a) -0.003 -0.013 -0.011 -0.010 -0.004 -0.006
%R 2 0.10 0.00 0.10 6.43 5.53 5.23
N 6,008 5,873 5,787 6,166 5,983 5,921
High/low Unconditional conservatism High/low  Conditional conservatism
m1, m2, m3 denote months, Ferror denotes analysts' earnings forecast error. Unconditional (conditional)
conservatism is measured by Hidden_reserves (C_Score) . TACC denotes total accruals and D is a dummy
assigning 1 (0) to the highest (lowest) conservatism quintiles formed each year based on Hidden_reserves 
(C_Score) for the first three months of year t before the announcement of quarterly earnings. Standard errors
are clustered by firm and year using the Petersen (2009) approach. Variable definitions are provided in
Appendix.  *** , ** and * denote the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and %10 respectively.
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Table 1.9 
Forecast error regressions on decile ranked accruals 
 
Month m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10 m11 m12
decTACC (coef.) 0 0 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0 -0.001
t-stat -0.28 -0.91 -1.68 -1.59 -1.63 -0.87 -1.28 -0.69 -0.90 -0.90 -0.51 -0.90
PANEL B: Forecast errors and decile ranled working capital, non-current operating, and financial accruals
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10 m11 m12
Intercept (coef.) -0.019 ***-0.018 ***-0.016 ***-0.015 ***-0.013 ***-0.011 *** -0.01 ***-0.009 ***-0.008 ***-0.006 ***-0.005 ***-0.005 ***
dec ΔWC  (coef.) -0.006 ***-0.006 ***-0.004 ***-0.003 ***-0.003 ***-0.003 ***-0.003 ***-0.002 ***-0.001 ***-0.001 -0.001 -0.001
t-stat -6.12 -6.52 -3.44 -2.90 -3.13 -5.02 -4.83 -3.7 -2.54 -1.89 -1.44 -1.77
decΔNCO (coef.) 0.003 *** 0.002 *** 0.001 0.001 0 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0 0
t-stat 3.06 2.50 0.97 0.72 0.56 1.62 1.1 1.18 1.81 0.95 1.17 1.15
decΔFIN (coef.) 0.010 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.003 ***
t-stat 7.53 7.54 6.79 7.51 7.10 6.35 6.61 7.06 6.11 6.13 5.92 5.18
PANEL A: Forecast errors and decile ranked total accruals
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PANEL C: Forecast errors and decile ranked accruals (extended decomposition)
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10 m11 m12
Intercept (coef.) -0.009 ***-0.008 ***-0.008 ***-0.009 ***-0.008 ***-0.006 ***-0.007 ***-0.006 ***-0.005 ***-0.004 ***-0.004 ***-0.003 ***
(-)decΔCOL (coef.) -0.012 ***-0.012 ***-0.008 ***-0.006 ***-0.006 ***-0.006 ***-0.005 ***-0.004 ***-0.003 ***-0.002 ***-0.002 ***-0.002 ***
t-stat -9.69 -9.45 -4.04 -3.04 -2.93 -5.48 -5.35 -5.03 -3.41 -3.93 -3.91 -3.75
decΔCOA (coef.) -0.006 ***-0.006 ***-0.004 ***-0.003 -0.003 -0.004 ***-0.003 ***-0.0018 ** -0.002 *** -0 -0 -0
t-stat -5.48 -5.76 -1.97 -1.2 -1.15 -4.76 -2.87 -2.58 -2.2 -0.55 -0.46 -0.19
(-)decΔNCOL (coef.) -0.009 ***-0.008 ***-0.008 ***-0.007 ***-0.007 ***-0.005 ***-0.005 ***-0.004 ***-0.003 ***-0.003 ***-0.003 ***-0.003 ***
t-stat -6.72 -6.38 -5.74 -5.01 -4.98 -5.42 -4.41 -4.6 -4.41 -3.83 -3.75 -3.38
decΔNCOA (coef.) -0 -0 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0 0 0 0 0 0 0
t-stat -0.32 -0.6 -0.83 -0.48 -0.52 0.52 0.52 0.61 1.09 0.45 0.23 0.56
decΔLTI (coef.) 0.001 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.002 0.002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
t-stat 1.59 1.98 1.90 1.92 1.77 0.92 0.98 0.92 -0.02 0.55 0.26 0.15
(-)decΔFINL (coef.) 0.009 *** 0.008 *** 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 ***
t-stat 3.87 3.65 3.63 4.74 4.17 3.73 4.29 4.53 3.37 3.38 2.92 2.72
decΔSTI (coef.) 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 ***
t-stat 5.11 5.07 5.62 5.64 5.24 3.73 5.14 6.3 5.14 4.64 4.5 4.13
m1, m2, ...m12 denote months, Ferror denotes analysts' earnings forecast error and dec decile ranks. Decile ranked portfolios are formed based on the
magnirude of a particular accrual component in year t and scaled to (0,9) range. The number of firm-year observations are 48,142 for 1976 to 2013 for which
consensus analsyt earning forecasts and actual earnings are available on the IBES summary statistics file. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year using
Petersen (2009). See Appendix for variable definitions.   ***  denotes the statistical significance at 1% level.
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Table 1.10 
Forecast error regressions on high accrual quintiles over the first 6 months 
 
 
  
Month m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6
Intercept (coef.) -0.021 *** -0.019 *** -0.017 *** -0.016 *** -0.014 *** -0.012 ***
QhTACC (coef.) 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
t-stat 1.73 0.81 0.20 0.12 0.13 0.04
PANEL B: Forecast errors and high accrual quintiles of ΔWCA, ΔNCO and ΔFIN
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6
Intercept (coef.) -0.022 *** -0.020 *** -0.016 *** -0.015 *** -0.015 *** -0.013 ***
Qh ΔWC  (coef.) -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.004 ***
t-stat -2.86 -2.83 -3.45 -3.21 -3.05 -3.28
QhΔNCO (coef.) 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
t-stat -0.07 -0.49 -0.86 -1.02 -0.69 -0.71
QhΔFIN (coef.) 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.005 *** 0.006 *** 0.005 ***
t-stat 3.43 3.15 2.96 2.75 3.58 3.24
PANEL A: Forecast errors and high total accrual (TACC) quintiles
m denotes months, Ferror analysts' earnings forecast error, and Q the quitile of related
accrual component. Each year, we rank firms into five quintiles from low to high by the
magnitude of accruals, and run the equations 3, 4 and 5 only with the highest accrual
portfolios. The number of firm-year observations are 9,605 for which consensus analsyt
earning forecasts and actual earnings are available on IBES summary statistics file.
Standard errors are clustered by firm and year using Petersen (2009). See Appendix for
variable definitions.  ***, **, * denote the statistical significance at 1%, %5 and %10 level
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Table 1.11 
Forecast error regressions on high/low total accrual (TACC) quintiles over 
the first 6 months 
 
 
  
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6
Intercept (coef.) -0.024 *** -0.022 *** -0.019 *** -0.019 *** -0.017 *** -0.014 ***
CF (coef.) 0.042 *** 0.034 *** 0.030 *** 0.029 *** 0.025 *** 0.022 ***
t-stat 6.57 7.09 6.30 6.34 6.44 5.80
D (coef.) 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003
t-stat 2.08 ** 2.17 ** 1.18 1.79 1.53 1.94 *
(a) TACC (coef.) -0.007 -0.009 -0.008 -0.012 -0.009 -0.008
t-stat 0.71 -0.91 -0.78 -1.22 -1.21 -0.88
(b) D*TACC (coef.) 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.009
t-stat 0.75 0.74 0.79 0.91 0.80 0.94
Diff (b-a) 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.003
t-stat 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.20 0.09
m denotes months, Ferror analysts' earnings forecast error. Each year we rank firms into five quintiles
from low to high by the magnitude of TACC , and then assign a dummy, D of 1 (0) to the high (low)
TACC portfolios and run the equations 3. The number of firm-year observations are 16.408 for which
consensus analsyt earning forecasts and actual earnings are available on IBES summary statistics file.
Standard errors are clustered by firm and year using Petersen (2009). See Appendix for variable
definitions.  ***, **, * denote the statistical significance at 1%, %5 and %10 level
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Table 1.12 
Absolute forecast errors on Total Accrual (TACC) over the first 6 months 
 
  
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6
Intercept (coef.) 0.034 *** -0.022 *** 0.031 *** 0.028 *** 0.026 *** 0.023 ***
TACC (coef.) -0.020 *** -0.019 *** -0.019 *** -0.017 *** -0.016 *** -0.015 ***
t-stat -5.08 -4.86 -4.77 -5.75 -5.52 -5.11
CF (coef.) -0.074 *** -0.071 *** -0.065 *** -0.060 *** -0.056 *** -0.049 ***
t-stat -16.85 -16.86 -17.95 -15.59 -14.45 -15.41
m denotes months, AbsFerror analysts' earnings forecast absolute error (unsigned errors). The number
of firm-year observations are 41,225 for which consensus analsyt earning forecasts and actual earnings
are available on IBES summary statistics file. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year using
Petersen (2009). See Appendix for variable definitions. ***, **, * denote the statistical significance at
1%, %5 and %10 level
Important note; since the dependent variable is now all positive, a negative coefficient on accruals will
indicate analysts’ pessimism, but a positive coefficient will indicate analysts’ optimism contrary to signed
error tests (where the mean signed error was negative).
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
How multi segmentation affects the probability of meeting analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and economic consequences associated with it? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines whether multi segmentation affects the probability of meeting 
analysts’ forecasts, and whether the ‘diversification’ discount that multi segment 
firms seem to suffer from is mitigated/exacerbated when multi segment firms 
meet/miss analysts’ forecasts. We find that multi segment firms exhibit lower 
probability of meeting analysts’ forecasts relative to single segment firms, which 
we argue to be caused by less (no) engagement in earnings (forecast) management 
activities and more complex information environment. However, we find no 
evidence that meeting/missing forecasts mitigates/exacerbates the diversification 
discount, while single segment firms experience significant premium (discount) 
when they meet (miss) forecasts. We interpret this finding as indicative of weaker 
investor reaction to meeting forecasts by multi-relative to single segment firms. On 
the other hand, we find significant incremental multi segment discount if earnings 
and/or forecast management activities are used as instruments to meet analysts’ 
forecasts, which implies that there are significant costs for multi segment firms from 
engaging in such activities to meet forecasts.  
 
Key Words: Multi/single segment firm, meeting/missing forecast, earnings 
/forecast management, diversification discount 
JEL Classification: M41, G10 
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2.1.Introduction 
In this paper, we investigate whether multi segmentation16 affects the probability of 
meeting analysts’ forecasts, and whether the ‘diversification’ discount that multi 
segment firms seem to suffer from is alleviated/exacerbated when multi segment 
firms meet/miss analysts’ forecasts. Analysis of this issue is important for several 
reasons. Firstly, research shows that meeting/missing analysts’ earnings forecasts 
at the earnings announcements dates has significant value consequences; meeting 
leads to premium, missing leads to discount in share price (e.g., Kasznik and 
McNichols 2002), i.e., meeting/missing analysts’ forecasts is an economically 
important phenomenon. Secondly, evidence also shows that multi segment firms 
suffer from severe agency conflicts (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995), and exhibit more 
complex information environment (e.g., Bushman Chen, Engel, and Smith 2004), 
while these two significantly affect meeting forecast probability (e.g., Matsumoto, 
2002; Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo, 2009), and thirdly, despite their obvious 
importance in the economy17, we lack evidence about the meeting/missing forecast 
behaviour of multi segment firms, and economic consequences associated with it.  
We argue that higher agency conflicts induce higher monitoring, and discourage 
multi segment firms’ managers from opportunistic earnings/forecast management 
activity to meet forecasts, while more complex information environment results in 
greater forecast error making forecasts harder to meet, and both lead to lower 
probability of meeting analysts’ forecasts for multi segment firms. Our findings 
confirm this argument; multi segment firms exhibit less (no) earnings (forecast) 
management activity to meet forecasts, more complex information environment 
(they receive more comment letters from the SEC, exhibit higher bid-ask spreads, 
higher discretionary accruals, higher trading volume, greater standard deviation in 
working capital accruals and higher forecast errors), and lower probability of 
meeting analysts’ forecasts relative to single segment firms. 
We then focus on the value consequences of meeting/missing forecast phenomenon 
for multi segment firms. In particular, we test whether the ‘diversification’ discount 
                                                          
16
 Multi segment refers to firms that operate in more than one industry. 
17
 (e.g., multi segment firms make up approximately %60 of Compustat population) 
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that multi segment firms appear to suffer from is alleviated/exacerbated by multi 
segment firms meeting/missing analysts’ forecasts. We argue that if the discount is 
caused by higher agency conflicts, simply meeting analysts’ forecasts does not 
mitigate the problem. We also argue that investors will be aware that multi segment 
firms exhibit more complex information environment and engage less in earnings/ 
forecast management to meet forecasts. Hence, we expect investors to react less 
strongly to meeting/missing forecasts by multi segment firms. Confirming our 
prediction, we find no evidence that meeting forecasts results in a premium for multi 
segment firms, or that it reduces the diversification discount (while single segment firms 
experience significant premium/discount when they meet/miss forecasts). Multi 
segment firms rather experience significant incremental discount if they use 
earnings/forecast management as instruments to meet forecasts, which implies that 
there are significant costs for multi segment firms from engaging in these activities. 
Our paper makes several contributions to existing knowledge; Firstly, we show that 
multi segment firms exhibit lower meeting forecast probability and this stems from 
multi segment firms less (no) engaging in earnings(forecast) management activity. 
We attribute this to higher monitoring induced by higher agency conflicts 
(additional analysis shows larger institutional ownership for multi segment firms 
suggesting closer monitoring, under which earnings/forecast management is likely 
to be costlier). Secondly, we show that lower meeting probability is also caused by 
more complex information environment pertinent for multi segment firms 
consistent with Brown et al (2009), who find that higher information asymmetry 
corresponds to more missing incidences. Thirdly, we show that multi segmentation 
is negatively associated with firm value implying diversification discount, 
consistent with Berger and Ofek (1995), who show that multi segment firms are 
traded at a discount. Finally, we show that the ‘diversification’ discount that multi 
segment firms suffer from is not alleviated when multi segment firms meet analysts’ 
forecasts, which is indicative of weaker investor reaction to meeting forecasts by 
multi-relative to single segment firms. We rather find exacerbating discount if multi 
segment firm engage in earnings/forecast management to meet forecasts. These 
findings imply that multi segment firms have also weaker incentives to guide 
analysts’ forecasts downwards and manage earnings upwards to meet forecasts 
since the costs of these activities are significantly higher, consistent with 
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Matsumoto (2002), who shows that firms with certain characteristics place greater 
(less) importance on meeting forecasts due to perceived benefits (costs).  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follow. The next section provides 
literature review and develops hypotheses. Section 2.3 describes the data, Section 
2.4 explains research design and presents the results. Section 2.5 reports sensitivity 
analyses and Section 2.6 concludes the study.  
2.2. Literature review and hypotheses 
2.2.1. Literature review  
Previous research shows that firms that meet/miss analysts’ earnings forecasts 
experience significant premium/discount in their share price in general (e.g., 
Matsunaga and Park 2001; Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 2002; Kinney, Burgstahler 
and Martin 2002; Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Lopez and Rees 2002). This 
research also shows that the premium/discount is unlikely caused by investors’ 
overreaction to positive/negative earnings surprises (forecast minus realised 
earnings), rather earnings surprises seem to possess information content with 
respect to future performance (e.g., Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 2002), which makes 
meeting/missing forecasts an economically important phenomenon.  
Research further shows that the probability of meeting analysts forecasts is highly 
associated with earnings/forecast management activities and firms’ information 
environment. Managers engage in earnings and/or forecast management to meet 
forecasts by manipulating accruals upward or guiding analysts’ forecasts downward 
if they perceive benefits from doing so (e.g., Matsumoto 2002; Burgstahler and 
Eames 2006; Athanasakou, Strong, and Walker 2009)18 while a more complex 
information environment leads to greater forecast bias making the forecasts harder 
to meet (e.g., Brown et al., 2009). In the event that managers avoid engaging in 
earning/forecast management to meet forecasts (since they face greater costs than 
                                                          
18
 Note that firm may manage earnings by engaging in other mechanisms such as real earnings 
management. For instance, a firm may reduce the R&D expenditures of a specific year just to meet 
the forecasts (see, Schipper, 1989; Black and Christensen 2009; Black, Joo, and Schmardebeck, 
2014,), but such activities are not so easily detected, therefore, we focus on earnings management 
via accrual manipulation that is widely used measure in the earnings management literature.  
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benefits such as under high monitoring induced by higher agency conflicts), and 
with more complex information environment, the probability of meeting forecasts 
will be lower. Aware of these properties for such firms, investors’ reaction to 
meeting/missing forecasts will also be weaker, reducing mutually the incentives of 
managers to engage in earnings/forecast management to meet forecasts (evidence 
supports the notion that investors’ reaction to meeting/missing forecasts can be 
different under certain circumstances. For instance, Degeorge, Patel, Zeckhauser 
(1999) show that that meeting/missing forecasts has lower impact on share price for 
firms that incur losses -losses may be less informative to investors, see Hayn (1995), 
while Skinner and Sloan (2002) find that markets react stronger to negative 
surprises of high growth firms).  
We investigate meeting/missing forecast phenomenon within the context of multi 
segmentation since research shows that multi segment firms exhibit more complex 
information environment and suffer from higher agency conflicts, and both also 
significantly influence meeting forecast probability. For instance, research find that 
multi segment firms are traded at a discount, and this is considered due to severe 
agency conflicts that they seem to suffer from (e.g., Lang and Stulz 1994; Berger 
and Ofek, 1995; Comment and Jarrel 1995; Servaes 1996; Stein, 1997; Hyland 
1999; Lins and Servaes 1999; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales 2000)19.. Potential 
agency conflicts for multi segment firms include the existence of higher 
discretionary resources under managers’ use (managers have incentives to grow their 
firms beyond the optimal size, see, Jensen, 1986), cross subsidisation that allows poor 
segments to drain resources from better performing segments, misalignment of 
incentives between central and divisional managers, competition of projects for 
limited sources (managers will try to invest within their expertise at the expense of 
higher NPV projects). 
Evidence also shows that multi segment firms have more complex information 
environment relative to single segment firms stemming mainly from their relatively 
complex business structure. They operate in different industries with complicated 
transfer pricing schemes, different countries with different cultural/legal diversities 
                                                          
19
 See also the argument/evidence that diversification may not destroy value (Khanna and Tice 2001; 
Campa & Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004A, 2004B; Hann, Ogneva and Ozbas, 2013; Custodio, 2014) 
55 
 
under different rules (e.g., Harris, Kriebel, Raviv 1982; Habib, Johnsen, Naik, 1997; 
Bushman, Chen, Engel, Smith 2004), and exhibit greater internal control problems 
(e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, 2007; Doyle, Ge, MacVay, 2007). Guidry, 
Leone, and Rock (1999) further show that individual segment managers conceal 
their units’ underperformance to maximise their bonuses (it appears that they have 
both the motives and opportunity to do so). Multi segment firms’ managers can also 
conceal some segment information from public due to proprietary cost concerns 
(they may hide segment profitability from the rivals) or agency costs concerns (they 
may hide low segment profitability from the public due to agency costs concerns) 
(see, Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Hayes and Lundholm, 1996; Givoly, Hayn and 
D’Souza 1999; Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Berger and Hann 2007; Bens, Berger, 
and Monahan 2011; Bens, Monahan, and Steele, 2015).  
2.2.2. Hypotheses  
Given previous evidence that higher agency conflicts induce closer monitoring 
from capital markets, in particular, if firms frequently require funding for various 
projects (e.g., Rozeff, 1982, Easterbrook, 1984), and given that multi segmentation 
is closely associated with higher agency conflicts, we consider multi segment firm 
to be under closer monitoring (multi segment firms typically grow by acquiring 
other firms, and need larger external funding to finance such projects relative to 
single segment firms, which possibly triggers higher monitoring), therefore, any 
opportunistic managerial activity such as upwards earnings management via accrual 
manipulation or downwards forecast management to meet forecasts will be detected 
and may be severely punished. Accordingly, we expect that multi segment firms’ 
managers will engage less in (or entirely avoid) earnings/ forecast management 
activities as instruments to meet forecasts,  
H1: Multi segment firms exhibit less earnings and forecast management 
activities to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts relative to single segment firms, 
Evidence suggests that more complex information environment leads to greater 
analysts’ forecast errors (e.g., Lehavy, Lee and Merkley, 2011; Feldman, Gilson, 
and Villalonga, 2014), and that analysts issue more optimistic forecasts for firms 
whose earnings are more difficult to predict (e.g., Das, Levine, Sivaramakrishnan, 
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1998, Ke and Yu, 2006; Bradshaw, Lee, and Peterson, 2016). Evidence also shows 
that higher information asymmetry leads to more missing incidences (Brown et al. 
2009), and greater international diversification leads to less accurate and more 
optimistic forecasts (Duru and Reeb, 2002). Therefore, we hypothesise more 
complex information environment for multi segment firms that negatively affects 
their meeting probability (less predictability makes forecasts harder to meet)  
H2: Multi segment firms exhibit more complex information environment 
than single segment firms, and this reduces their meeting forecast probability  
Since both less earnings/forecast management activity (H1) and more complex 
information environment (H2) possibly result in lower propensity of meeting 
analysts’ forecasts, we also hypothesise that  
H3: Multi segment firms exhibit lower probability of meeting analysts’ 
forecasts than single segment firms 
Relying on our expectations set out in hypotheses 1 and 2, in hypothesis 3, we 
predict that multi segment firms show lower meeting probability relative to single 
segment firms. Given that multi segment firms are traded at a discount relative to 
single segment firms (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995), and that missing analysts’ 
forecasts has negative value consequences, a potential question arises whether the 
diversification discount is explained or associated with meeting/missing forecast 
phenomenon, i.e., whether the documented discount by prior research is alleviated/ 
exacerbated when multi segment firms meet/miss analysts’ forecasts. We argue that 
if the discount that multi segment firms seem to suffer from is associated with 
higher agency conflicts, then meeting analysts’ forecast per se does not address the 
problem, therefore, meeting forecasts should not mitigate the diversification 
discount. It is also highly likely that investors will not be willing to trade on 
forecasts with greater bias (due to more complex information environment), nor 
they prefer multi segment firms acting opportunistically and use earnings/forecast 
management just to meet forecasts, hence, they should also react less strongly to 
meeting/missing forecasts by multi segment firms. Overall, these arguments lead to 
the following hypothesis,  
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H4: The ‘diversification’ discount that multi segment firms suffer from is 
not alleviated when multi segment firms meet analysts’ earnings forecasts 
Finally, we argue that under higher monitoring, opportunistic earnings/forecast 
management activities used as instruments to meet forecasts can be easily detected 
and result in a discount since such activities mainly serve the interests of managers 
while harming the interest of shareholders (see, Healy 1985; Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney 1995; Dechow and Skinner 2000; Fields, Lys, and Vincent, 2001; 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005; Barton, Kirk, Reppenhagen, and Thayer, 
2014). The punishment or a discount in share price will be reasonable in such cases, 
because where there is insignificant investor reaction to meeting/missing forecasts, 
the only motivation for a manager to meet a forecast using such activities will most 
likely be based on self-interest. Therefore, we also hypothesise that 
H5: Multi segment firms experience further discount if they meet analysts’ 
forecasts by engaging in earnings and/or forecast management activities. 
2.3. Data and sample selection 
We use non-financial US data for 1999-2014, which SFAS 131 has been in use, 
which requires a firm to report separate information for a segment if its Sales, 
Assets, or Profit/Loss are 10% or more of the combined Sales, Assets, and Profit/ 
Loss of the firm. SFAS 131 (operation segment reporting) replaces SAFS 14 
(regional segment reporting) in 1998. Compustat replaced the segment reporting 
criteria in 1999 according to segments as reported by the firms. Berger and Hann 
(2003, p.163) find that SFAS 131 ‘increased the number of reported segments and 
provided more disaggregated information. By increasing information 
disaggregation, the new standard induced ﬁrms to reveal previously “hidden” 
information about their diversiﬁcation strategies. The newly revealed information 
affected market valuations and lead to changes in ﬁrm behavior consistent with 
improved monitoring following adoption of SFAS 131’. Therefore, we consider the 
SFAS 131 segment classification is the most appropriate for our analysis.  
58 
 
We obtain segment data from Compustat historical segment files, analyst forecast 
data from IBES summary statistics files20, market data from CRSP, financial data 
from Compustat, and institutional ownership data from FactSet Lion Shares and 
Stock Ownership Summary files provided by Ferreira and Maros (2008). In data 
selection process, we follow Berger and Ofek (1995) and Matsumoto (2002). 
Standard & Poors assign each segment a primary (SICS1) and secondary (SICS2) 
code. We classify segment by SICS1, which is the prevalent description of segment 
(SICS2 represents sub operations). We eliminate segment information whose 
names (‘snmns’) do not appear on the main industry list (SIC)21, adjust double 
entries, and remove segments ceasing operation during the year. The final sample 
covers 30,349 firm-year observations (19,057 single, 11,292 multi segment firms). 
2.3.1. Excess Value (EV) construct 
Since one of our research questions is whether the ‘diversification’ discount that 
multi segment firms suffer from is alleviated/exacerbated when multi segment firms 
meet/miss analysts’ forecasts, we use the Excess Value (EV) concept introduced by 
Berger and Ofek (1995) to test the hypotheses H4 and H5. Berger and Ofek (1995) 
use this construct in order to determine whether multi segment firms are traded at 
discount or premium comparing to single segment firms. It helps compare a multi 
segment firm’s actual value (market plus debt) to the total value of its segments if 
                                                          
20
 We use actual IBES EPS and IBES analyst forecast EPS to measure whether a firm meets/misses 
analysts’ forecasts. See also, Ramnath, Rock, Shane (2008) and Brown (2007) for studies that use 
IBES EPS when investigating analyst forecast accuracy, analyst forecast revisions, capital market 
reaction to earnings surprises published after 1990. According to IBES, reported EPS is entered into 
the database on the same basis as analyst forecasts, which by and large corresponds to core earnings 
but may be quite different from reported income. Hence, the IBES EPS is considered to be the closest 
match with analysts’ forecast EPS. Note, it is possible that firms’ meet/beat analysts’ forecasts on a 
proforma basis; some managers may preannounce proforma earnings. They either report these 
adjusted numbers to better reflect core earnings, or may use these earnings adjustments to meet 
strategic earnings targets on a pro forma basis when they fall short based on GAAP reporting 
standards (see, Battacharya, Black, Christensen, and Mergenthaler, 2007; Black and Christensen, 
2009). However, evidence suggests that ‘investors appear to understand these trade-offs as they 
discount pro forma disclosures in the presence of higher levels of prior earnings management’ 
(Black, Joo, and Schmardebeck, 2014). Similarly, Bradshaw and Sloan (2002, p.41) find that ‘over 
the past 20 years there has been a dramatic increase in the frequency and magnitude of cases where 
“GAAP” and “Street” earnings differ, and that ‘market response to Street earnings has displaced 
GAAP earnings as a primary determinant of stock prices’.  
21
 We exclude segments whose names include words ‘adjustment, elimination, correction, currency 
translation, miscellaneous, disposed, divested, sold, for sale, discontinued, liquidated, distributed, 
other, non/not/un allocated, non/not/un assigned, non/not/un classified, non/not/un distributed, 
non/not/un reported, non/not/un restructured, group, corporate, head office, administrative, central, 
consolidation, holding, management, parent, subsidiary, treasury, intercompany, (non)segment’. 
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those segments have been single independent firms. The construct is calculated as 
the natural logarithm (ln) of Actual Value (V) to the sum of Imputed Values (IV) 
for its segments as stand-alone entities;  
ܧܸ = ln (ܸܫܸ) 
Where EV denotes the excess value, and V total capital (or Actual Value), which is 
equal to market value of equity (Compustat item PRCC_F, #199*Compustat item 
CSHO, #25) plus book value of debt (Compustat item DLTT, #9 + Compustat item 
DLC, #34 + Compustat item UPSTKC, #130). Imputed value (IV) is calculated as 
 ܫܸ = ∑ ܣܫ௡௜=ଵ ∗ ሺܫ݊݀௜ ௏஺�ሻ௠௙  
Where n denotes the number of segments, and AI the amount of accounting item 
(Sales, Assets, or EBIT) for each segment. The multiple ሺܫ݊݀௜ ௏஺�ሻ௠௙ is calculated 
for each segment using the corresponding median single segment firm (mf) in the 
same industry. Specifically, the median firm’s total value is divided by the amount 
of its accounting item (AI). For more intuition, consider a multi segment firm with 
a segment operating in food industry with 100 CU sales. Consider also that in the 
same industry, there are five single segment firms operating independently, whose 
median firm with actual value of 150 CU has 90 CU sales. Then, the multiple will 
be ln (150/90) for sales, and multiplied by 100 CU. Repeating the same process for 
all segments (n), and summing them up provides the IV. We calculate the multiple 
initially by using the narrowest SIC code (four-digit) requiring at least five single 
segment firms in the same industry. Otherwise we move to three-digit SIC code, 
and repeat the process until two digit SIC code if necessary.  
The idea behind this method is that if the evaluation is similar for all projects, there 
should not be any difference between the value of a single segment firm operating 
stand alone and the value of a segment operating in a multi segment structure. If 
EV≠0, i.e., positive (negative) however, this will suggest that multi segment firm is 
traded at a premium (discount). Widely documented evidence indicates that multi 
segment firms are traded at a discount as we discuss earlier in the Literature Review. 
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We exclude segments operating in financial services (SICS1 codes 6000-6999), and 
keep only the firms having total sales at least $20 million. Since the sales are almost 
completely allocated among the reported segments (unlike assets and earnings), we 
keep only firms with sum of segment’s sales within %1 of total sales of the firm. 
Further, if the sum of segments’ Assets (EBIT) of a firm deviate from Total Assets 
(EBIT) by more than %25, we exclude the observation from all analyses requiring 
Asset (EBIT) multiples. If the deviation is within %25, we adjust the firm’s imputed 
value. Specifically, the imputed value is grossed up or down by the percentage 
deviation between the sum of its segments’ Assets (EBIT) and Total Assets (EBIT). 
Since a firm’s actual value should not be negative, we replace negative EBIT 
multiplier imputed value with either EBITDA multiplier imputed value if it is 
positive, or with the asset multiplier imputed values. Finally, we exclude the 
‘extreme’ excess values from the tests. ‘Extreme’ is defined as the EV above 1.386 
or below -1.386, i.e., actual firm value is either more than four times imputed value 
or less than one-fourth imputed value. In the final step, all continuous variables are 
winsorised to 1% to 99%. 
We have several reasons to use EV in our analysis. Firstly, EV captures the 
diversification discount (that multi segment firms may suffer from), and thus helps 
us robustly test for instance whether the diversification discount is alleviated when 
multi segment firms meet analysts’ forecasts. Secondly, the variable also captures 
the implications of meeting forecasts on firm value over longer period (Kaznik and 
McNichols, 2002 show that investors condition the premium on firms meeting 
forecasts consistently over time. If there is a reward to meeting forecasts, it becomes 
greater as long as the firm continues meeting forecasts. Therefore, if meeting 
forecasts has any effect on diversification discount, it will be reflected on firm value 
over time. Fourthly, models testing a causality or correlation in shorter periods (e.g., 
event studies) are highly subject to omitted variables bias that can otherwise explain 
the phenomenon. Hence, traditional meeting/missing forecast literature mainly uses 
returns cumulated for at least three months, one, two and three years (e.g., Bartov, 
Givoly and Hayn, 2002; Kaznik and McNichols, 2002; Skinner and Sloan, 2002; 
Koh, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal, 2008). Finally, using a variable that captures longer 
term average helps us avoid from the temporary over/under valuation trap.  
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2.3.2. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 2.1 Panels A, B and C report the descriptive statistics for multi versus single 
segment firms for variables used in the tests (see variable definitions in Appendix).  
Table 2.1 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for meeting probability 
(MEET= 1 if firm meets/exceeds analyst forecast, and zero otherwise), earnings 
management proxy (POSAA= 1 if abnormal accruals are positive and zero 
otherwise), and forecast management proxy (DOWN= 1 if unexpected analyst 
forecast is negative and zero otherwise). Results show no difference between two 
firm types regarding earnings/ forecast management activity if the sample is not 
conditioned on MEET, but if we condition the sample to MEET= 1, observe less 
engagement in both activities by multi segment firms22. Differences are significant 
at %1. This observation lends initial support to H1 multi segment firms exhibit less 
earnings/forecast management to meet analysts’ forecasts. Panel B also shows that 
firms in general tend to engage more in earnings rather than forecasts management.  
Table 2.1 Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for segment number (NofSeg), 
institutional ownership (INS), optimistic and pessimistic forecast errors (|FE/P|op 
and |FE/P|pes respectively. Panel B shows that mean segment number is 2.86 for 
years 1999-2014 and mean MEET %60 for single segment (%56 for multi segment) 
firms. The difference is significant at %1 level supporting H3 (multi segment firms 
exhibit lower meeting probability than single segment firms). Untabulated analysis 
further reveals that having the segment number 4 or more is essentially the same 
regarding meeting incidences (%54.7). Our analysis also implies that when a firm 
becomes multi segment (operating in more than one industry), this is enough to 
make a business more complex (mean meeting probability is %60 for single 
segment firms, while it is %56 for firms with 2 segments). We also observe higher 
institutional ownership23 for multi versus single segment firms suggesting greater 
monitoring. Panel B further reveals that multi segment firms exhibit higher 
optimistic but lower pessimistic forecast errors. Given the evidence that analysts 
                                                          
22 We interpret this observation as multi segment firms engaging in earnings/forecast management 
for purposes other than meeting analysts’ forecasts, see for the objectives of earnings management 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Healy and Wahlen (1999). 
23
 Gompers and Metrick (1998) find that institutional ownership doubled between 1980 and 1996 
presenting more than half the value of the U.S. market. 
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issue more optimistic forecasts in forecasting difficulty (Das et al 1998, Ke and Yu, 
2006; Bradshaw et al 2014), this observation shows support to H2 (multi segment 
firms exhibit more complex information environment)24.  
Table 2.1. Panel C reports the descriptive statistics for the Excess Value (EV) 
constructs based on three accounting items Sales, Assets, and EBIT, and shows that 
mean/median EV for multi segment firms are negative and significantly lower than 
single segment firms. Mean EV based on Sales (Assets and EBIT) is -8.6% (-9.8% 
and -9.8% respectively) for multi segment firms while it is -0.7% (-1.6% and -0.7%) 
for single segment firms. These observations suggest that multi segment firms are 
subject to ‘diversification’ discount consistent with Berger and Ofek (1995). 
Table 2.2 sets out the correlation matrix with Pearson (Spearman) below (above) 
the diagonal, and shows that MEET is negatively correlated with segment indicator 
(Segin taking value of 1 if a firm has more than one segments, and zero otherwise). 
Table shows that Segin is positively correlated with absolute forecast error |FE|  
(consistent with H2), negatively correlated with MEET (consistent with H3), and 
positively correlated with institutional ownership (INS), while no correlation with 
POSAA(DOWN) suggesting no difference between the two firm types if not 
conditioned on MEET. Table 2.2 also shows that Segin is negatively correlated with 
EV constructs providing further evidence of diversification discount. 
2.4. Empirical analysis  
2.4.1. Testing the earnings/forecast management hypothesis 
To test H1 (multi segment firms exhibit less earnings/forecast management activity 
to meet analysts’ forecasts relative to single segment firms), we run the logistic 
models25 of POSAA(DOWN) from Matsumoto (2002) by incorporating the segment 
indicator and MEET variable onto the models in the following forms,  
                                                          
24
 In the remaining tests, we do not separate forecast errors as optimistic and pessimistic. One reason 
is to be more conservative with respect to robustness of our results, and the second reason is to 
employ a relatively larger number of observations in the tests.  
25
 Logistic regression: If an output variable (Y) is discrete or binary, then the estimated output is 
like a probability between 0 and 1. Hence, we use logit regression to model the conditional 
probabilities as a function of covariates (i.e., conditional distributions of output given the input 
63 
 
ܲݎ݋ܾሺܱܲܵܣܣ = ͳሻ = ܨሺߚ଴ + ߚଵܵ݁݃�݊௜ + ߚଶܯܧܧܶ௜ + ߚଷܵ݁݃�݊ ∗ܯܧܧܶ௜ +ߜ௜ܺ௜ + ߝ௜      (1A) ܲݎ݋ܾሺܦܱܹܰ = ͳሻ = ܨሺߚ଴ + ߚଵܵ݁݃�݊௜ + ߚଶܯܧܧܶ௜ + ߚଷܵ݁݃�݊ ∗ܯܧܧܶ௜ +ߜ௜ܺ௜ + ߝ௜      (1B) 
Where ܨሺߚ′ܺሻ = ݁�′௑ ͳ + ݁�′௑⁄  
Where POSAA= 1 (earnings management proxy) if abnormal accruals are positive, 
and DOWN= 1 (forecast management or forecast guidance proxy) if unexpected 
earnings forecast is negative, MEET= 1 if actual earnings meet or exceed consensus 
analysts’ earnings forecasts, and Segin26= 1 if the firms is multi segment, and zero 
otherwise. Vector X denotes controls, which are institutional ownership (INS), 
reliance of implicit claims with stakeholders (ICLAIM), prior period losses (LOSS) 
to measure the value relevance of earnings for the firm, value relevance of earnings 
for industry (EARNRET), growth opportunity (LogB/P), litigation risk of the 
industry (LIT), positive changes in seasonal earnings to control for shocks to 
earnings (POSUE), firm size (LogMV), four-quarter average US growth rate (GDP) 
to control for macroeconomic shocks, and absolute forecast errors |FE|  to control 
for uncertainty in forecast environment (see Appendix B for variable definitions). 
The coefficient on MEET measures the average probability of POSAA(DOWN) 
activity for single segment firms when they meet analysts’ earnings forecasts, while 
the coefficient on the interaction term (Segin*MEET) measures the average 
incremental probability of POSAA(DOWN) activity for multi -relative to single 
segment firms when they meet analysts’ forecasts. We predict positive significant 
coefficients on MEET and negative significant coefficients on the interaction terms 
and the differences should be significant for H1 to hold.  
Table 2.3 reports the results for Equations (1A and 1B), confirming our predictions, 
shows significant negative coefficient on Segin*MEET and positive coefficient on 
                                                          
variables). Logit model estimates the probabilities by maximum likelihood (MLE). Note that the 
estimated conditional probability is the sum of the left-hand side of the model, not the sum of 
coefficients, therefore we also report marginal effects.  
26
 In the robustness tests, we also use number of segments, NofSeg (1, 2, 3, .., N) as an alternative 
segment indicator in all the tests that use Segin.  
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MEET indicating that multi segment firms exhibit less POSAA(DOWN) to meet 
analysts’ forecasts confirming H1. Marginal effects 27 that are analogous to the 
slope coefficient in OLS regressions confirm the results (the probability of engaging 
in earnings/forecast management activity to meet forecasts is lower by %13.5 and 
%14.2 respectively for multi segment firms). 
To complement findings in Table 2.3, we next run the meeting model using POSAA 
(DOWN) as independent and MEET dependent variables, reversing Equation (1). 
We use seemingly unrelated estimation (SUEST) by fitting the following logistic 
model from Matsumoto (2002), run the model for multi (Segin= 1) and single 
segment firms (Segin= 0), and observe the difference in corresponding coefficients, ܲݎ݋ܾሺܯܧܧܶ = ͳሻ = ܨሺߚ଴ + ߚଵܱܲܵܣܣ௜ + ߚଶܦܱܹ ௜ܰ+ߜ௜ܺ௜ + ߝ௜ሻ  (2) 
Where ܨሺߚ′ܺሻ = ݁�′௑ ͳ + ݁�′௑⁄  
The coefficients on POSAA and DOWN measure the average effects of earnings 
/forecast management activity on meeting probability. Hypothesis 1 (H1) requires 
that the coefficients on POSAA(DOWN) are smaller in magnitude for multi segment 
firms than the corresponding coefficients for single segment firms  
Table 2.4 presents the results for Equation (2), and confirming H1, shows that the 
coefficients on POSAA(DOWN) are both smaller for multi- than for the single- 
segment firms (0.014<0.099 and 0.428<0.567). Moreover, the coefficient on 
POSAA is statistically zero for multi segment firms while it is positive for single 
segment firms indicating that multi segment firms do not engage in earnings 
management to meet forecasts as opposed to single segment firms. Marginal effects 
confirm the findings (DOWN has 13% effect on MEET for single- but 10% effect 
for multi segment firms, while POSAA has 3.3% effect on MEET for single-, but 
zero effect for multi-segment firms). This test is particularly important because it 
shows that multi segment firms do not engage in earnings management as opposed 
to single segment firms, which we cannot obtain using Equations (1A and 1B). 
                                                          
27 In logistic model, marginal effects at the means are analogous to the slope coefficient in OLS 
regressions. With binary independent variables (e.g. POSAA) marginal effect measures the discrete 
change, i.e. how MEET (predicted probability) changes as the POSAA changes from 0 to 1, while 
marginal effect for continuous variable (e.g. INS) measures the instantaneous rate of change.  
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Table 2.4 also shows that the coefficients on POSAA are smaller than DOWN for 
both firm types indicating that firms in general engage less in earnings than forecast 
management consistent with Matsumoto (2002) and Athanasakou et al (2009).  
In sum, the results in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 reveal statistically significant differences 
between single- and multi-segment firms with respect to how variable POSAA 
(DOWN) affects the meeting probability, and confirm H1.  
2.4.2. Testing the information environment hypothesis  
To test H2 (multi segment firms exhibit more complex information environment 
than single segment firms, and this reduces their meeting forecast probability), we 
employ two complementing approaches; (i) we regress the segment indicator on 
information asymmetry proxies to detect whether multi segment firms exhibit more 
complex information environment than single segment firms, (ii) we generate a 
factor score using principal component analysis (PCA) by reducing the information 
asymmetry proxies into a single variable, and run the meeting probability model on 
this factor score, segment indicator and their interactions to detect whether multi 
segment firms’ information environment reduces their meeting forecast probability. 
Firstly, to test whether multi segment firms exhibit more complex information 
environment, we regress the segment indicator on widely used six information 
asymmetry proxies28 as follows,  ܵ݁݃�݊௜ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܥܮ௜ + ߚଶܮ݋ܸ݃݋�௜ + ߚଷܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௜ + ߚସܣܾܦ�ݏܽܽܿ௜ 
                       +ߚହܵݐܹܽܿܿ௜ + ߚଷܨܧ௜ + ߝ௜     (3) 
Where CL denotes the receipt of comment letter from the SEC29, LogVol log of 
trading volume, Spread bid-ask spread, AbDisaac absolute sum of three-year 
                                                          
28
 Studies use various measures for information asymmetry (see McNichols, 2002; Francis, LaFond, 
Olsson, and Schipper 2005; Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo, 2009; Khan and Watts, 2009; Gietzmann 
and Isidro, 2013) most of them endogenously correlated providing similar outcome. Hence, for 
practical reasons and for the purpose of our analysis, we limit the numbers to six. 
29
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to 
review firms’ filings (10Q, 10K, etc.) submitted to them at least once every three year. The stated 
objective of the review is to identify potential or actual accounting, auditing, financial reporting and 
disclosure deficiencies (main goal is to improve the quality of corporate information environment). 
If a review identifies deficiency in a firm’s financial report, the SEC sends a comment letter to the 
reviewed firm seeking clarification or if necessary revision of the filing. The SEC started publishing 
these correspondences on its website since 2005 (we obtain data from Audit Analytics Edgar Files). 
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abnormal accruals (for years -1, 0, +1), StWacc standard deviation of working 
capital residuals obtained from the typical accrual model30, and FE initial analyst 
forecast errors. If multi segment firm have more complex information environment, 
then segment indicator should not be orthogonal to these variables. Specifically, we 
expect information asymmetry to be positively correlated with segment indicator.  
Table 2.5 reports the results for Equation (3), and shows that information 
asymmetry proxies are positively correlated with Segin in both univariate and 
multivariate setting (coefficients are significant at %1 level). Multi segment firms 
receive more comment letters from the SEC, exhibit higher bid-ask spreads in share 
prices, higher discretionary accruals, higher trading volume31, greater standard 
deviation in working capital accruals and higher initial forecast errors. 
Secondly, we test whether multi segment firms’ information environment reduces 
their meeting forecast probability by generating a factor score using principal 
component analysis (PCA), which we reduce six information asymmetry proxies 
into a single variable retaining factors with eigenvalues greater than one32. We then 
run the meeting probability model on this factor score, segment indicator and their 
interactions by fitting the following model,  ܲݎ݋ܾሺܯܧܧܶ = ͳሻ = ܨሺߚ଴ + ߚଵܵ݁݃�݊௜+ߚଶܫ݂݊ܲܥܣ௜ + ߚଵܵ݁݃�݊ ∗ ܫ݂݊ܲܥܣ௜ 
  +ߜ௜ܺ௧ + ߝ௜ሻ            (4) 
Where InfPCA denotes the factor score for six information asymmetry proxies, and 
X the vector of control variables as defined in Equation (1) (see Appendix B for 
variable definitions). The coefficient on InfPCA measures the average effect of 
information asymmetry on meeting probability for single segment firms, while the 
                                                          
30
 Standard deviation of working capital accrual residuals are obtained from the typical accrual 
model (see McNichols, 2002; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 2005) 
 ∆WCt =∝଴+ αଵCFt−ଵ + αଶCFtଵ + αଷCFt+ଵ + αସ∆REVt + αହPPEt + εt  where ΔWC is change in working capital (the change in current assets - the change in current 
liabilities - the change in cash + the change in short-term debt), CF cash flows from operations, 
ΔREV change in revenues, and PPE property plant and equipment. 
31
 Investor Recognition Hypothesis (Merton, 1987) assumes that additional attention from the press, 
markets etc. leads to increased trading volume by uninformed investors. If information asymmetry 
is higher, then trading volume is also likely to be higher. 
32
 We also perform communality tests examining the correlation between the common factor and 
the individual variables, and collinearity diagnostics replacing the factor score with individual 
variables in the final model to ensure the factor score represents all six. 
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coefficient on ܵ݁݃�݊ ∗ ܫ݂݊ܲܥܣ measures the average incremental effect of 
information asymmetry for multi segment firms. We predict significant negative 
coefficient on ܵ݁݃�݊ ∗ ܫ݂݊ܲܥܣ 
Table 2.6 reports the results for Equation (4), and confirming our prediction, shows 
significantly negative coefficient on ܵ݁݃�݊ ∗ Table ʹ.ͺ reports resultsܫ݂݊ܲܥܣ and 
the difference between the coefficients on InfPCA and ܵ݁݃�݊ ∗ ܫ݂݊ܲܥܣ is 
significant at %1 indicating that information environment of multi segment firms 
reduces their probability of meeting analysts’ forecasts relative to single segment 
firms.  
Overall, the results from Tables 2.5 and 2.6 confirm H2 that multi segment firms 
exhibit more complex information environment than single segment firms, and this 
reduces their meeting forecast probability. 
2.4.3. Multi segmentation and meeting probability  
To test H3 (multi segment firms exhibit lower probability of meeting analysts’ 
forecasts than single segment firms), we run Equation (3) with only the segment 
indicator and control variables in the following form.  ܲݎ݋ܾሺܯܧܧܶ = ͳሻ = ܨሺߚ଴ + ߚଵܵ݁݃�݊௜ + ߜ௜ܺ௜ + ߝ௜ሻ  (5) 
Where ܨሺߚ′ܺሻ = ݁�′௑ ͳ + ݁�′௑⁄  
Control variables are as defined in Equation (1) (see Appendix B for variable 
definitions). To mitigate the concerns that the model in Equation (5) might suffer 
from multicollinearity bias33 between the Segin and controls, we also employ a two 
stage least square (2SLS) approach. In the first stage, we estimate a new segment 
indicator Seginhat by using natural log of number of shares as an instrument, and 
in the second stage, we re-estimate Equation (5) by replacing Segin with Seginhat. 
                                                          
33
 In a multiple regression, if two or more predictors are highly correlated, multicollinearity (or 
collinearity) arises, meaning that one predictor is also linearly predicted by others with a high degree 
of accuracy, while in a perfect y=a+bX, we assume independent variables are not perfect linear 
functions of each other [Cov (x1, x2)=0]. Multicollinearity does not violate Gauss-Markow main 
assumptions (zero expected error, exogenous independent variables, correct specification), but 
results in larger standard errors, smaller t-stats, and unstable coefficient estimates, which can change 
erratically in response to small changes in the data or the model. Our untabulated tests show that 
most of the covariates are highly correlated with Segin. 
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We consider the number of shares to be a suitable instrument since it is unlikely 
related to meeting probability (affects neither forecast accuracy nor meeting 
ability), while it should theoretically be higher for multi segment firms (multi 
segmentation results from investing in new industries or acquiring other firms that 
would require new share issuances at some point, hence the outstanding number of 
shares of multi- is likely to be higher than for the single- segment firms on average). 
We assume that Segin captures the hypothesised negative effects of earnings/ 
forecast management and more complex information environment on meeting 
probability. Therefore, the we predict the coefficient on Segin (Seginhat) is negative 
and significant (H3). 
Table 2.7 presents the results for Equation (5) performed with both Segin and 
Seginhat. Tests with both variables confirm our prediction that multi segmentation 
is negatively associated with meeting probability. The coefficient on Segin is -0.8% 
significant at the1% with the marginal effect of -1.8% on MEET. The test using 
Seginhat shows larger negative coefficient and greater marginal effect (-12%). This 
is relatively higher marginal effect given the effects of other variables. For instance, 
the marginal effect on MEET of moving from the first to the third quartile of INS is 
3.3% [(0.871 – 0.465)*0.078 ], see Table 2.1 for the quartile values].  
Overall, the results in Table 2.7 confirm hypothesis H3: multi segment firms exhibit 
lower probability of meeting analysts’ forecasts than single segment firms. 
2.4.4. Diversification discount and meeting/missing analysts’ forecasts 
To test H4 (the ‘diversification’ discount that multi segment firms suffer from is 
not alleviated when multi segment firms meet/miss analysts’ forecasts), we use the 
‘Excess Value (EV)’ model by Berger and Ofek (1995) in the following forms. We 
repeat the tests for three different EV constructs that are based on Sales, Assets and 
EBIT. EV represents the log of actual value to imputed value (detailed in section 
2.3.1). The approach is widely used by prior research testing the effects of multi 
segmentation on firm value.  ܧݒ௝௜ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܵ݁݃�݊௝௜ + ߚଶܯ݁݁ݐ௜ + ߚଷܯ݁݁ݐ ∗ ܵ݁݃�݊௜ + �௜ܺ௜+ߝ௜  (6A) ܦ�ݏܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ௝௜ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܵ݁݃�݊௝௜ + ߚଶܯ݁݁ݐ௜ + ߚଷܯ݁݁ݐ ∗ ܵ݁݃�݊௜+�௜ܺ௧ + ߝ௜  (6B) 
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Where Discount denotes the negative excess values, i.e., EV< 0, X is the vector of 
controls that Berger and Ofek (1995) employ, which are firm size (Logof assets), 
profitability (Ebit to sale), and growth opportunity (Capex to sale) (see Appendix 
B for variable definitions). The coefficient on Segin measures the average 
EV(Discount) for multi segment firms that we expect to be significantly negative 
for both Equations implying the existence of diversification discount (e.g., discount 
that is negative will get larger in multi segmentation). The coefficient on MEET 
measures the average EV (Discount) when single segment firms meet analysts’ 
forecasts that we expect to be significantly positive implying premium. Finally, the 
coefficient on interaction term measures the average incremental EV(Discount) for 
multi segment firms that meet analysts’ forecasts, which we expect to be 
insignificant or negative implying that meeting forecast does not lead to premium 
or reduce diversification discount.  
Table 2.8 reports results for Equations (6A) and (6B), and confirming H4, shows 
either insignificant or negative coefficients on ܯ݁݁ݐ ∗ ܵ݁݃�݊ for all three EV or 
(Discount) constructs based on different accounting items (Sales, Assets, EBIT). 
These observations indicate that meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts does not 
reduce the diversification discount associated with multi segmentation, nor does it 
lead to a premium. In other words, multi segment firms do not benefit from meeting/ 
exceeding analysts’ forecasts. Table 2.8 also shows that the coefficients on MEET 
is positive (significant at the 1% level in 5 out of 6 models) implying premium for 
single segment firms meeting analysts’ forecasts, while the coefficients on Segin 
are negative (significant at the 1% level in 5 out of 6 models) implying 
diversification discount, consistent with Berger and Ofek (1995), who show that 
multi segment firms are traded at a discount.  
In sum, the results in Table 2.8 confirm hypothesis H4: The diversification discount 
that multi segment firms seem to suffer from is not alleviated when multi segment 
firms meet analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
2.4.5. The effect of earnings/forecast management on excess value (EV) 
To test H5 (multi segment firms experience further discount if they meet analysts’ 
forecasts by engaging in earnings and/or forecast management activities), we run 
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Equation (6A) separately for cases in which POSAA(DOWN) equals 1/034 with two 
excess value constructs based on Sales and Assets. We predict negative and 
significant coefficients on ܯ݁݁ݐ ∗ ܵ݁݃�݊ for POSAA(DOWN)= 1 cases (earnings/ 
forecast management is engaged) if H5 is to hold. 
Table 2.9 reports the results for Equation (6A) for POSAA(DOWN)=1/0 cases, and 
confirming H5, shows that the coefficients on the interaction term for POSAA 
(DOWN)=1 cases are negative (significant at the 1% level), indicating that investors 
incrementally discount multi segment firms if they engage in earning/forecast 
management activity in order to meet analysts’ forecasts. Table 2.9 also show that 
the coefficients on interaction term are insignificant for POSAA(DOWN)=0 cases 
(earnings/forecast management is not engaged), further confirming H4 that 
diversification discount is not alleviated when multi segment firms meet/miss 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. However, the coefficients on MEET are positive (and 
significant at the 1% level) in all specifications implying that meeting forecasts 
leads to significant premium for single segment firms regardless of whether these 
firms engage in earnings/forecasts management activities or not. These findings are 
also indicative of weaker investors’ reaction to meeting forecasts by multi- relative 
to single segment firms. 
In sum, the results in Table 2.9 confirm hypothesis H5: Multi segment firms 
experience further discount if they meet analysts’ forecasts by engaging in earnings 
and/or forecast management activities 
2.5. Sensitivity analyses 
2.5.1. Testing H4 and H5 by stock returns instead of excess value (EV) 
Our first sensitivity test focuses on using stock returns instead of EV to examine 
whether H4 and H5 hold by an alternative variable measuring the investor response 
to meeting/missing forecast phenomenon. We use cumulative one year market 
adjusted future stock returns following Kaznik and McNichols (2002), which 
                                                          
34 e.g. ܧݒ௝௜ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܵ݁݃�݊௝௜ + ߚଶܯ݁݁ݐ௜ + ߚଷܯ݁݁ݐ ∗ ܵ݁݃�݊௜ + �௜ ௜ܺ+ߝ௜ if POSAA=1  
 ܧݒ௝௜ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܵ݁݃�݊௝௜ + ߚଶܯ݁݁ݐ௜ + ߚଷܯ݁݁ݐ ∗ ܵ݁݃�݊௜ + �௜ ௜ܺ+ߝ௜ if POSAA=0 
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captures the cumulative changes in firm value within a year, hence best corresponds 
to our annual EV construct.  ܴ݁ݐ௝௜+ଵ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܵ݁݃�݊௝௜ + ߚଶܯ݁݁ݐ௜ + ߚଷܯ݁݁ݐ ∗ ܵ݁݃�݊௜ + �௜ܺ௜+ߝ௜    (7) 
Where Ret denotes market-adjusted returns calculated as buy and hold stock return 
cumulated over the 12 months prior to year t’s earnings announcement minus the 
return on the CRSP value-weighted (including dividends) index cumulated over the 
same period. X is the vector of control variables used in Equations (6A) and (6B). 
We additionally employ absolute forecast errors following Kaznik and McNichols 
(2002) to measure the information in current year earnings. The coefficient on 
MEET measures the average annual Return when single segment firms meet analyst 
forecast that we expect to be significantly positive, and the coefficient on interaction 
term measures the average incremental Return for multi segment firms that meet 
analysts’ forecasts, which we expect to be insignificant or negative, i.e., meeting 
forecast does not lead to premium or mitigate the diversification discount. 
Table 2.10 reports results for Equation (7), and confirms both H4 and H5. The 
results are very similar to the results reported in Tables 1.8 and 1.9. We observe 
negative coefficients on ܯ݁݁ݐ ∗ ܵ݁݃�݊ for POSAA(DOWN)=1 cases (markets 
incrementally discount multi segment firms if they meet forecasts using earning/ 
forecast management), while the coefficients on ܯ݁݁ݐ ∗ ܵ݁݃�݊ are insignificant for 
POSAA (DOWN)=0 cases (meeting forecasts results in significant premium for 
single segment firms).  
2.5.2. The effect of institutional ownership on POSAA(DOWN) 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 report higher institutional ownership for multi -relative to single 
segment firms, and we interpret this as a sign of closer monitoring. Theory assigns 
an important role to institutional investors for market efficiency; They are assumed 
to be better information gatherers/processors, have more economical resources, 
price stocks more efficiently, and perform more effective monitoring (e.g., Merton 
1987; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara, 2002).  
Given that higher agency concerns trigger closer monitoring (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Brennan and Thakor, 1990; Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach, 
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1998; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Hunton, Mauldin, Wheeler, 2008), we argue that 
higher institutional ownership will imply higher monitoring and less earnings/ 
forecast management to meet forecast. Therefore, we also test whether earnings/ 
forecast management activities are at a relatively lower extent when firms meet 
analysts’ earnings forecasts under higher institutional ownership. We employ the 
following logistic models, ܲݎ݋ܾሺܯܧܧܶ = ͳሻ = ܨሺߚ଴ + ߚଵܫܰܵ%௜ + ߚଶܱܲܵܣܣ௜ + ߚଷܫܰܵ% ∗ ܱܲܵܣܣ௜ +ߜ௜ܺ௜ + ߝ௜      (8A) ܲݎ݋ܾሺܯܧܧܶ = ͳሻ = ܨሺߚ଴ + ߚଵܫܰܵ%௜ + ߚଶܦܱܹ ௜ܰ + ߚଷܫܰܵ% ∗ ܦܱܹ ௜ܰ +ߜ௜ܺ௜ + ߝ௜      (8B) 
INS% denotes the percentage of institutional ownership, and X the control variables 
as defined in Equation (1) (see Appendix B for variable definitions). The coefficient 
on POSAA(DOWN) measures the average effect of earnings/forecast management 
on meeting probability regardless of institutional ownership, while the coefficient 
on interaction terms measure the average incremental effect of POSAA (DOWN) on 
meeting probability as the institutional ownership percentage changes. We predict 
negative coefficients on the interaction terms.  
Table 2.11 reports results for Equation (8A) and (8B), and confirming our 
prediction, shows significant negative coefficients on the interaction terms, which 
indicates that as institutional ownership increases, the probability of meeting 
forecasts via earnings/forecast management decreases. In other words, firm with 
higher (lower) institutional ownership engage less (more) POSAA and DOWN to 
meet analysts’ forecasts, consistent with Chung et al (2002), who show that the 
existence of institutional investors discourages managers from opportunistic 
earnings management activities. 
2.5.3. Using POSAA(DOWN) as dependent variables in testing the H1 
To provide further robustness to the findings reported in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 that 
confirm H1: multi segment firms exhibit less earnings/forecast management to 
meet analyst forecast relative to single segment firms, we also run meeting models 
for POSAA and DOWN separately (in case using POSAA and DOWN together in 
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Equation 2 affects the coefficients of each other). Note that a firm may engage in 
only forecast (earnings) management if it finds easier to meet the forecast, which 
mechanically indicates less use of earnings (forecast) management, but it may not 
be associated with segmentation. The following models attempt to distinguish the 
segmentation effect with POSAA and DOWN separately.  ܲݎ݋ܾሺܯܧܧܶ = ͳሻ = ܨሺߚ଴ + ߚଵܵ݁݃�݊௜ + ߚଶܱܲܵܣܣ௜ + ߚଷܵ݁݃�݊ ∗ ܱܲܵܣܣ௜ +ߜ௜ܺ௜ + ߝ௜      (9A) ܲݎ݋ܾሺܯܧܧܶ = ͳሻ = ܨሺߚ଴ + ߚଵܵ݁݃�݊௜ + ߚଶܦܱܹ ௜ܰ + ߚଷܵ݁݃�݊ ∗ ܦܱܹ ௜ܰ +ߜ௜ܺ௜ + ߝ௜      (9B) 
The coefficients on POSAA(DOWN) measure the average effects of earnings/ 
forecast management activity on meeting probability for single segment firms, 
while the coefficient on Segin measures the average effect of multi segmentation 
on meeting probability (excluding the incremental effect), and the coefficients on 
interaction variables measure the average incremental effect on meeting probability 
for multi segment firms engaging in earnings/forecast management. We predict 
negative coefficients on the interaction terms but positive coefficient on POSAA 
(DOWN) to be consistent with Tables 2.3 and 2.4, which will indicate that meeting 
probability is lower (or does not increase) for multi -relative to single segment firms 
with earnings/forecast management.  
Table 2.12 reports the results for Equations (9A) and (9B), and in line with our 
prediction shows negative coefficients on Segin*POSAA (Segin*DOWN) while the 
coefficients on POSAA(DOWN) are positive, that shows greater probability of 
meeting forecasts for single segment firms carrying out earnings/forecast 
management. Marginal effects are 3.3% for POSAA and 9.9% for DOWN in single 
segment setting, but -3.1% for POSAA and -2.4% for DOWN in multi segment 
setting. These results (together with the results in Tables 2.3 and 2.4) confirm H1 
that multi segment firms exhibit no (less) less earnings (forecast) management to 
meet analysts’ forecasts relative to single segment firms. Note, these results show 
that multi segment firms engage in such activities, but mainly for other purposes 
rather than meeting forecasts. 
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2.5.4. Using the segment number (NofSeg) instead of Segin 
We also perform tests with the number of segment (NofSeg) that use segment 
indicator, Segin, and obtain categorically the same results. Table 1.13 reports the 
results of one of these tests, namely, for Equation (5). Table 1.13 shows significant 
negative coefficient on segment indicator NofSeg as in Table 1.7 on Segin.  
2.6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we investigate whether multi segmentation affects the probability of 
meeting analysts’ forecasts, and whether the ‘diversification’ discount that is 
alleviated/exacerbated when multi segment firms meet/miss analysts’ forecasts.  
We argue and find that higher agency concerns inducing higher monitoring in multi 
segment firms discourage earnings/forecast management activities to meet 
forecasts, and also more complex information environment leads to greater forecast 
bias making forecasts harder to meet, both leading to lower probability of meeting 
analysts’ forecasts for multi segment firms.  
We also argue and find that the diversification discount that multi segment firms 
appear to suffer from is not mitigated by meeting analysts’ forecasts (missing also 
does not cause extra discount). However, single segment firms experience 
significant premium/discount when they meet/miss forecasts. We also find that 
multi segment firms in fact experience incremental discount if they use 
earnings/forecast management to meet forecasts. This implies that there are 
significant costs for multi segment firms from engaging in such activities. These 
results overall show that investors give weaker reaction to meeting/missing forecast 
in multi segment firm setting. This further implies that multi segment firms have 
also mutually weaker incentives to engage in upwards earnings management (by 
manipulating accruals) and/or guiding analysts’ forecasts downwards to meet 
forecasts since the costs of such activities seem to be significantly higher.  
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Appendix B  
Variable Definitions 
MEET A binary variable taking the value of 1 if actual earnings meet or 
exceed the outstanding/last consensus analyst forecast at the 
earnings announcement date, and zero otherwise. 
Segin A binary variable segment taking the value 1 if the firm is multi 
segment, and 0 otherwise.  
NofSeg  denotes the number of segments (1, 2, 3, ….., N). Maximum 
segment number is 14 in our analysis between 1999 and 2014.  
%INS Quarterly percentage of institutional ownership obtained from 
FactSet Lion Shares and Stock Ownership Summary files provided 
by Ferreira and Maros (2008) 
ICLAIM Reliance on implicit claims with stakeholders, ICLAIM is a factor 
score from principal component analysis (PCA) reducing three 
variables (DUR, R&D and LABOUR) into a single variable 
retaining factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. DUR is a 
dichotomous variable taking 1 if the firm is in a member of a durable 
goods industry (SICs 1500-1799, 2450-2599, 2830-3010, 3240-999) 
and zero otherwise. R&D is research and development expenditures 
deflated by total assets (quarterly Compustat items XRDQ, #4 / 
ATQ, #44, and annually Compustat item XRD, #46), and LABOUR 
denotes labour intensity, [1-gross property plant, equipment / 
(accumulated depreciation, amortisation + gross assets)], i.e., [1-
Compustat item PPEGTQ, #118 / (Compustat item ACTQ, 
#41+Compustat item ATQ, #44). We assume as in Matsumoto 
(2002) that a single construct proxy to three factors. We also perform 
commonality estimates/correlation tests and collinearity diagnostics 
on the final model (i.e., replacing ICLAIM with DUR, RD, and 
LABOR) to ensure that the single variable represents all three.  
LOSS A measure of value relevance of earnings for firms , which takes 1, 
if a firm reports losses before extraordinary items (Compustat item 
IBQ, #8) in each of the last four quarters (q-1 to q-5). 
EARNRET A measure of value relevance of earnings for industry (to capture the 
industry-specific differences in the value-relevance of earnings), 
which is the annual decile rank of industry-year R2 of the value 
relevance regression,  ܴ݁ݐ௤ = ߛ௢ + ߛଵ∆ܧܲܵ௤ + ߝ௤ ,  
where Ret denotes size adjusted excess returns accumulated for the 
coming 12 months from the month end in which quarter q-4 earnings 
are announced, ∆ܧܲܵ seasonal change (q versus q-4) in earnings 
(Compustat item IBQ, #8) scaled by the price per share at q-4 end. 
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Regressions are run by industry-year using the narrowest (four digit) 
SIC code with at least 10 firm-quarter in the same industry each year. 
Due to potential measurement errors, we use yearly decile ranks of 
the industry's R2 
LogB/P Represents growth opportunity, calculated as book value over 
market value of equity at time t where market value is calculated as 
the share price (Compustat item PRCC_F, #199) multiplied by the 
common shares outstanding (Compustat item CSHO, #25) and book 
value is the Common ordinary equity total (Compustat Item CEQ, 
#60). B/P is widely used to proxy growth prospects (e.g., Koh, 
Matsumoto, and Rajgopal, 2008) 
LIT A binary variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is in a member of 
high litigation risk industries (SIC 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 7370-
7374, 3600-3674, 5200-5961) and zero otherwise. 
POSUE Positive change in seasonal earning (q-q4). It controls for 
contemporaneous unexpected firm level changes in earnings, and 
takes the value 1 if the change is positive, and zero otherwise 
(Compustat item IBQ #8)  
GDP Four-quarter average annual US growth rate. It controls for the 
contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks on earnings. Matsumoto 
(2002) uses industrial level production growth, but, since multi 
segment firms operate in various industries, we use overall GDP. 
LOGMV Natural log of market value (Compustat items PRCC_F, #199 
multiplied by common shares outstanding (CSHO, #25).   
|FE|  Controls for the uncertainty in firm level forecasting environment, 
which is the absolute value of first consensus EPS forecast (after 
announcement of year t-1 EPS) minus year t actual EPS deflated by 
price at the end of year t-1). 
LogAssets Natural log of total assets (Compustat item AT, #6),  
EBIT/Sale Annual earnings before interest and taxes to total sales (Compustat 
EBIT / SALE, #12) 
Capex/Sale Annual capital expenditures to total sales (Compustat items CAPX, 
#128 / SALE, #12) respectively. 
Earnings management proxy (positive abnormal accruals-POSAA):  
To estimate upwards earnings management proxy (POSAA), we use the modified 
Jones (1991) model described in Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) adapted for 
quarterly data. ܶܣ௜௝௧௤ ܣ௜௝௧௤−ଵ⁄ = ߙ௝௧[ͳ ܣ௜௝௧௤−ଵ⁄ ] + ߚଵ௝௧[∆ܴܧ ௜ܸ௝௧௤ ܣ௜௝௧௤−ଵ⁄ ]            +ߚଶ௝௧[ܲܲܧ௜௝௧௤ ܣ௜௝௧௤−ଵ⁄ ] + ߚଷ௝௧ܴܳܶͶ௜௝௧௤ + ߝ௜௝௧௤ 
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Where TA is total accruals, defined as ∆current assets - ∆current liabilities - ∆cash 
+ ∆short-term debt– depreciation [i.e., Compustat items ∆ACTQ, #40 - ∆LCTQ, 
#49 - ∆CHEQ, #36 + ∆DLCQ, #45 –DPQ, #77], A is total assets (Compustat item 
ATQ, #44), ∆REV is change in revenues (Compustat item REVTQ, #42), PPE is 
gross property plant and equipment (Compustat item PPEGTQ, #118) for firm i in 
two-digit SIC code j in quarter q of year t, and QTR4 is 1 if quarter is the fourth 
fiscal quarter, and 0 otherwise (since accruals in the fourth quarter might differ from 
accruals of previous quarters). We estimate the model each year for the same two-
digit SIC code for all firms after winsorising data to %0.5 to %99.5 and requiring 
at least 10 observations for a firm in a year for each industry. We then apply the 
estimated parameters to actual values by each firm-quarter to obtain the firm 
specific abnormal accruals adjusting for the change in receivables through the 
following model. ܣܾܣܥܥܴ = ܶܣ௜௝௧௤ ܣ௜௝௧௤−ଵ − ሺ⁄ ̂ߙ௝௧ + ̂ߚଵ௜௝௧[∆ܴܧ ௜ܸ௝௧௤ − ∆ܴܧܥ௜௝௧௤ ܣ௜௝௧௤−ଵ⁄ ]+ ̂ߚଶ௜௝௧[ܲܲܧ௜௝௧௤ ܣ௜௝௧௤−ଵ⁄ ] + ̂ߚଷ௜௝௧ܴܳܶͶ௜௝௧௤ሻ 
Where ∆REC is the change in account receivables (Compustat item RECTQ, #37) 
for firm i in two-digit SIC code j in quarter q of year t. The difference between the 
total actual accruals and the estimated accruals represents abnormal accruals. We 
take this as the discretionary part of total accruals, and classify it POSAA=1 if the 
difference is positive to proxy upward earnings management, and zero otherwise.  
Forecast management proxy (DOWN or Negative abnormal forecast) 
To estimate forecast management proxy, we use Matsumoto (2002) model which 
follows similar steps in the earnings management methodology. She first estimates 
the expected portion of analysts' forecasts by modelling the seasonal change in EPS 
as a function of the prior quarter's seasonal change in EPS and returns cumulated 
over the current year: ∆ܧܲ ௜ܵ௝௧௤ ௜ܲ௝௧௤−ସ⁄ = ߙ௝௧ + ߚଵ௝௧[∆ܧܲ ௜ܵ௝௧௤−ଵ ௜ܲ௝௧௤−ହ⁄ ] + ߚଶ௝௧ܥܴܧ ௜ܶ௝௧௤ + ߝ௜௝௧௤ 
Where ∆ܧܲܵ is seasonal change (q – q-4) in actual earnings per share in IBES files 
for firm i in four-digit SIC code j in quarter q of year t, P is price per share, and 
CRET is the excess monthly returns accumulated for the coming 12 months from 
the month end in which the quarter q-4 earnings are announced. Matsumoto 
includes CRET to capture the additional value-relevant information that an analyst 
can use to forecast earnings. The model parameters are estimated each year for the 
same four-digit SIC code for all firms after winsorising data to %0.5 to %99.5, 
requiring at least 10 quarter observations for a firm in a year for each industry. The 
model has average %33 adjusted R2 for over 174,000 firm-quarter observations. We 
then apply the estimated parameters with one lag to actual values (so that analysts 
could have obtained when forecasting EPS) by each firm-quarter in order to 
determine the expected change in actual EPS as the following. 
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ܧ[∆ܧܲ ௜ܵ௝௧௤] = [̂ߙ௝௧−ଵ + ̂ߚଵ௝௧−ଵ(∆ܧܲ ௜ܵ௝௧௤−ଵ ௜ܲ௝௧௤−ହ⁄ ) + ̂ߚଶ௝௧−ଵܥܴܧ ௜ܶ௝௧௤]∗ ௜ܲ௝௧௤−ସ 
After adding the expected change in EPS to q-4 actual EPS (to obtain the expected 
EPS of quarter q), and subtracting this from the analyst’ consensus earnings 
forecast, we obtain the unexpected portion of analyst forecast. ܷܧܨ௜௝௧௤ = ܨ௜௝௧௤ − ܧ[ܨ௜௝௧௤]ሺ= ܧܲ ௜ܵ௝௧௤−ସ + ܧ[∆ܧܲ ௜ܵ௝௧௤]ሻ 
If UEF  is negative (i.e., if forecast EPS is below the expected EPS), it is considered 
as the evidence of downwards forecast management, and defined as DOWN=1, and 
0 otherwise.  
This guidance proxy has been widely used by previous research (e.g.; Matsumoto, 
2002; Burgstahler and Eames, 2006; Koh, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal, 2008; 
Athanasakou, Strong and Walker, 2009). The model allows for the possibility that 
managers provide long-term guidance that affects the quarter's initial forecast. An 
alternative to forecast guidance is the forecast revision by Bartov, Givoly and Hayn 
(2002). However, using forecast revisions to identify firms that manage analysts' 
forecasts downward assumes that the initial forecast is unbiased. ‘If managers give 
downward biased guidance two or three quarters out, then in subsequent quarters, 
the initial forecast would not need to be managed downward (because it is already 
biased downward)’. The Matsumoto 2002 proxy does not assume that the first 
forecast is unbiased. The cost of using this model however is that the more onerous 
data requirements result in a smaller sample size (See, Koh, Matsumoto, and 
Rajgopal, 2008).  
We assume that bad news is more frequently preannounced than good news (see, 
Sloan 1994, 1997; Soffer, Thiarajagan, and Walther, 2000; Skinner and Sloan 
2002), i.e., analysts are guided downwards more frequently when the news is 
negative, thus we assume that analysts unexpected pessimism is mainly due to 
managerial guidance. Given that firms preannouncing negative news becomes more 
frequent after the Regulation FD (2002) according to the anecdotal evidence, we 
consider the DOWN variable appropriately captures the managerial guidance of 
analysts’ forecasts after controlling for the possible shocks on analysts’ forecasts 
such as the macroeconomic shocks, seasonal changes in quarterly earnings, etc. 
following Matsumoto (2002). 
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Table 2.1 
Descriptive statistics (Single vs Multi Segment firms) during 1999-2014 
 
 
  
PANEL A: Descriptive statistics for POSAA(DOWN) by MEET=0/1 
mean Medn. Std.Dv. 25% 75% mean Medn. Std.Dv. 25% 75% Difference
POSAA (%) 0.614 1.000 0.487 0.000 1.000 0.612 1.000 0.480 0.000 1.000 -0.002
DOWN (%) 0.536 1.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 0.527 1.000 0.482 0.000 1.000 -0.009
Meet=1
POSAA (%) 0.636 1.000 0.481 0.000 1.000 0.605 1.000 0.489 0.000 1.000 -0.031 ***
DOWN (%) 0.581 1.000 0.468 0.000 1.000 0.561 1.000 0.475 0.000 1.000 -0.020 ***
PANEL B: Descriptive statistics for MEET, INS and FE, MV
Variable mean Medn. Std.Dv. 25% 75% mean Medn. Std.Dv. 25% 75% Difference
NofSeg 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.86 2.00 1.16 2.00 3.00 -1.86 ***
MEET (%) 0.602 1.000 0.489 0.000 1.000 0.568 1.000 0.492 0.000 1.000 -0.034 ***
INS(%) 0.623 0.668 0.294 0.389 0.785 0.651 0.706 0.268 0.465 0.871 0.028 ***
|FE/P|
op
0.029 0.012 0.037 0.003 0.036 0.034 0.014 0.061 0.004 0.041 0.005 ***
|FE/P|
pes
0.025 0.009 0.043 0.003 0.026 0.019 0.007 0.034 0.002 0.019 -0.006 ***
MV ($m) 2,525   515      7,823   178      1,589    4,852   1,055   11,826  326      3,521    2,327 ***
PANEL C: Descriptive statistics for Excess Values (EV)
Variable mean Medn. Std.Dv. 25% 75% mean Medn. Std.Dv. 25% 75% Difference
EvSales -0.007 0.040 0.568 -0.280 0.461 -0.086 -0.034 0.109 -0.413 0.343 0.079 ***
EvAssets -0.016 0.014 0.498 -0.243 0.368 -0.098 -0.051 0.449 -0.312 0.238 -0.082 ***
EvEbit -0.007 0.011 0.473 -0.293 0.236 -0.098 -0.116 0.431 -0.360 0.138 -0.091 ***
The sample consists of 30.349 firm-year observations (19.057 single segment, 11.292 multi segment), Meet=1 if
analysts' consensus forecast is met/exceeded by the firm, NofSeg is number of segments ;ϭ,Ϯ,ϯ….NͿ, INS  institutional 
ownership, |FE| absolute analysts' forecast error in optimistic (op) and pessimistic (pes) cases, MV market value,
POSAA=1 (earnings management proxy) if abnormal accruals are positive, and DOWN=1 (forecast management
proxy) if unexpected earning forecast is negative. EV is the natural log of 'Actual Value over Imputed Value' based on
Sales (EvSales), Assets (EvAsset), and EBIT (EvEbit). See Appendix for variable definitions. *** denotes the statistical
significance at %1 level 
Single Segment Firms
Single Segment Firms Multi Segment Firms Mean
Single Segment Firms Multi Segment Firms Mean
Multi Segment Firms Mean
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Table 2.2. 
Correlations-Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal) 
 
  
MEET -0.01 *** 0.11 *** -0.17 *** 0.05 *** 0.10 *** 0.07 *** 0.09 *** -0.04 ***
Segin -0.01 *** 0.06 *** 0.05 *** 0.00 0.00 -0.10 *** 0.11 *** -0.11 ***
%INST 0.12 *** 0.07 *** -0.22 *** 0.02 *** 0.06 *** 0.13 *** 0.09 *** 0.00
|FE| -0.16 *** 0.05 *** -0.24 *** 0.00 -0.05 *** 0.00 0.00 0.11 ***
POSAA 0.50 *** 0.00 0.02 *** 0.00 0.00 0.07 *** 0.04 *** 0.00
DOWN 0.10 *** 0.00 0.06 *** 0.05 *** 0.01 *** 0.06 *** 0.06 *** 0.01 ***
EvSales 0.07 *** -0.10 *** 0.13 *** 0.00 0.07 *** 0.05 *** 0.66 *** 0.32 ***
EvAssets 0.10 *** -0.11 *** 0.09 *** 0.00 0.04 *** 0.06 *** 0.66 *** 0.22 ***
EvEbit -0.04 *** -0.11 *** 0.00 0.01 *** 0.00 0.01 *** 0.32 *** 0.22 ***
Meet=1 if analysts' consensus forecast is met/exceeded by the firm, NofSeg is number of segments
;ϭ,Ϯ,ϯ….NͿ, INS institutional ownership, |FE| absolute analysts' forecast error in optimistic (op) and
pessimistic (pes) cases, MV market value, POSAA=1 (earnings management proxy) if abnormal accruals are
positive, and DOWN=1 (forecast management proxy) if unexpected earnings forecast is negative. Excess
value is the natural log of the ratio of a firŵ’s actual value to its imputed value based on sales (EvSales),
assets (EvAsset), and EBIT (EvEbit). See Appendix for variable definitions. *** denotes the statistical
significance at %1 level 
DOWN EvSales EvEbitEvAssetsPOSAA|FE|%INSTSeginMEET
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Table 2.3 
Logit analysis of POSAA(DOWN) on MEET and Segin, 1999-2014 
 
  
Marginal Marginal
Variable Coeff Effect Coeff Effect
Intercept 0.117 *** -0.409 ***
%INST 0.013 0.003 0.165 *** 0.041
ICLAIM -0.051 *** -0.012 0.073 *** 0.018
LOSS -0.127 *** -0.029 -0.437 *** -0.108
EARNRET 0.249 *** 0.058 0.027 0.006
LogB/P 0.011 0.002 -0.082 *** -0.020
LIT 0.028 -0.006 0.078 *** 0.019
POSUE 0.167 *** 0.039 -0.592 *** -0.146
GDP 0.953 *** 0.224 -0.189 -0.047
LogMV 0.019 ** 0.004 0.038 *** 0.009
|FE| -1.905 *** -0.447 1.137 *** -0.282
Segin 0.034 0.008 0.007 0.002
MEET (b) 0.112 *** 0.026 0.523 *** 0.130
Segin*MEET (a) -0.135 *** -0.031 -0.142 *** -0.030
Difference (a-b) -0.247 *** -0.665 ***
Log likelihood -18630 -15672
Chi-Square 275 917
Pseudo % R
2
0.5 2.8
Obs. (firm-year) 28,284      23,368   
Earnings management (POSAA) Forecast management (DOWN)
Table reports the results for Equations (1A) and (1B). Marginal effects are computed as eβ'x / (l
+ eβ'XͿϮ where β'X is computed at the mean values of the covariates. It measures how P(Y)
changes when holding all other variables at their means. Standard errors are calculated by delta
method. MEET=1 if firm meets or exceeds last consensus analysts earnings forecast, POSAA=1
(earnings management proxy) if abnormal accruals are positive, and DOWN=1 (forecast
management proxy) if unexpected earnings forecast is negative, Segin is segment indicator
taking the value 1 if a firm is multi segment, and zero otherwise. Continuous variables are
winsorised to %1 to %99. See Appendix for variable definitions. ***, **, * denote the statistical
significance at 1%, %5 and %10 levels respectively.
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Table 2.4 
Logit analysis of meeting probability (MEET) on POSAA(DOWN), 1999-2014 
 
  
Marginal Marginal 
Variable Coeff Effect Coeff Effect
Intercept -1.021 *** -0.685 *** -0.336 **
POSUE 0.937 *** 0.216 0.849 *** 0.199 0.088
GDP 1.664 *** 0.384 1.357 ** 0.319 0.307
LogMV 0.114 *** 0.025 0.074 *** 0.017 0.040 **
|FE| -3.498 *** -0.807 -4.812 *** -1.130 1.314 *
POSAA (a) 0.099 *** 0.033 -0.014 -0.003 -0.113 **
DOWN (b) 0.567 *** 0.131 0.431 *** 0.101 -0.136 **
difference (a-b) -0.468 *** -0.445 ***
Log likelihood -9.101 -5421
Chi-Square 1.345 609
Pseudo % R
2
6.9 5.3
Obs. (firm-year) 14,814     8,603       23,417     
Coeff
Table reports the results for Equation (2). Marginal effects are computed as eβ'x / (l + eβ'XͿϮ where β'X is
computed at the mean values of the covariates. It measures how P(Y) changes when holding all other
variables at their means. Standard errors are calculated by delta method. MEET=1 if firm meets/exceeds
last consensus analysts earnings forecast, POSAA=1 (earnings management proxy) if unexpected accruals
are positive, and DOWN=1 (forecast management proxy) if unexpected earnings forecast is negative,
Continuous variables are winsorised to %1 to %99. See Appendix for variable definitions. ***, **, *
denote the statistical significance at 1%, %5 and %10 levels respectively.
Single segment firms Multi segment firms Difference
            Seemingly Unrelated Estimation (SUEST) for multi (Segin=1) and single (Segin=0) segment firms
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Table 2.5 
Segment indicator regressions on information asymmetry proxies, 1999-2014  
 
  
Predicted
Variable Sign Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff
Intercept 0.371 *** 0.071 *** 0.374 *** 0.383 *** 0.358 *** 0.387 *** 0.237 ***
CL (+) 0.111 *** 0.091 ***
LogVol (+) 0.025 *** 0.013 ***
Spread (+) 0.013 *** 0.020 ***
AbDisacc (+) 0.175 *** 0.438 ***
StWcacc (+) 0.001 *** 0.001 ***
FE (+) 0.225 *** 0.306 ***
% R
2
0.3 0.7 1.0 0.1 1.8 0.1 4.4
N (firm-year) 16,189  16,139  37,198  35,154  16,189  35,172  14,988  
Table reports the results for Equation (3). CL=1 if a firm receives a comment letter form the SEC and zero otherwise,
LogVol is natural log of trading volume, Spread is bid-ask spread of share price computed as [high-
low)/((high+low)/2] using monthly/quarterly share price, AbDisaac is the absolute sum of three-year discretionary
accruals (for years -1, 0 and +1), StWacc is standard deviation of residuals of the typical accruals model, and FE is
the initial analysts' forecast error. *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level.
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Table 2.6 
Logit analysis of meeting probability on information asymmetry, 1999-2014 
 
 
  
Marginal 
Variable Coeff Effect
Intercept -1.318 ***
%INST 0.330 *** 0.076
ICLAIM 0.140 *** 0.033
LOSS -0.173 -0.040
EARNRET 0.179 ** 0.042
LogB/P -0.041 -0.009
LIT 0.248 *** 0.058
POSUE 0.945 *** 0.219
GDP 0.942 *** 0.217
LogMV 0.143 *** 0.033
|FE| -2.049 *** -0.476
Segin -0.079 ** -0.018
InfPCA (a) 0.034 -0.007
Segin*InfPCA (b) -0.089 *** -0.021
Difference (b-a) -0.123 **
Log likelihood -8840
Chi-Square 612
 Pseudo % R
2
3.3
N (firm-year) 13,793            
Table reports the results for Equation (4). Marginal effects are computed as e
β'x
/ (l
+ e
β'X
)
2 ǁhere β'X is coŵputed at the ŵeaŶ ǀalues of the coǀariates. It ŵeasures hoǁ 
P(Y) changes when holding all other variables at their means. Standard errors are
calculated by delta method. InfPCA is the information asymmetry proxy, which is a
factor score from the principal component analysis (PCA) reducing six information
asymmetry proxies into a single variable. MEET=1 if firm meets or exceeds the last
consensus analyst earnings forecast. See Appendix for variable definitions. ***, **
denote the statistical significance at %1 and %5 levels, respectively .
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Table 2.7 
Logit analyses of meeting probability (MEET) on Segin, 1999-2014  
 
 
  
Predicted Marginal Marginal 
Variable Sign Coeff Effect Coeff Effect
Intercept -1.102 -0.848
Segin (-) -0.082 *** -0.018 -0.852 *** -0.120
%INST 0.354 *** 0.083 0.331 *** 0.078
ICLAIM 0.134 *** 0.032 0.122 *** 0.029
LOSS -0.178 *** -0.042 -0.249 *** -0.059
EARNRET 0.128 ** 0.031 0.113 ** 0.027
LogB/P 0.015 0.003 0.054 ** -0.013
LIT 0.344 *** 0.081 0.165 ** 0.038
POSUE 0.902 *** 0.212 0.901 *** 0.212
GDP 1.828 *** 0.432 1.494 *** 0.353
LogMV 0.116 *** 0.027 0.142 *** 0.034
|FE| -3.855 *** -0.912 -3.921 *** -1.141
Log likelihood -18.869 -18.245
Chi-Square 2.918 2.827
 Pseudo % R
2
7.2 7.3
N (firm-year) 30,349      30,349      
Two-stage least squares (2SLS)
With Segin With Seginhat
Table reports the results for Equation (5) with Segin and Seginhat . Marginal effects are
computed as e
β'x
/ (l + e
β'X
)
2
where β'X is computed at the mean values of the covariates. It
measures how P(Y) changes when holding all other variables at their means. Standard
errors are calculated by delta method. MEET=1 if the firm meets/exceeds the last consensus
analysts earnings forecast, and Segin (the segment indicator) takes the value 1 if a firm is
multi segment, and zero otherwise. Two stage least squares (2SLS) regression is performed
by employing 'Seginhat' replacing Segin (Seginhat is estimated using the instrumental
variable method). Continuous variables are winsorised to %1 to %99, See Appendix for
variable definitions. ***, ** denote the statistical significance at %1 and %5 levels.
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Table 2.8 
Regressing EV and Discount (EV<0) on MEET and Segin, 1999-2014 
 
 
  
Variable Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff
Intercept -0.098 *** -0.637 *** -0.077 *** -0.505 *** 0.097 *** -0.448 ***
LogAsset 0.022 *** -0.026 *** -0.015 *** 0.014 *** -0.008 *** 0.019 ***
EBIT/Sales
n
0.190 *** -0.216 *** 0.335 *** -0.168 ***
Capex/Sales 0.146 *** -0.166 *** -0.029 -0.098 *** 0.081 *** -0.072 ***
Segin -0.115 *** -0.034 *** -0.089 *** -0.010 -0.115 *** -0.022 ***
MEET 0.095 *** 0.020 *** 0.110 *** 0.029 *** 0.038 *** 0.007
MEET*Segin -0.048 *** -0.004 -0.047 *** -0.007 0.006 0.019
 % R
2
3.0 4.9 4.4 3.9 1.7 1.3
N (fim-year) 28,326    12,590    30,317    14,430      22,003    11,437    
n 
not included in the excess value regressions that use EBIT multiples
Using Sales Multiples Using Asset Multiples Using EBIT Multiples
Table reports the results for Equation (6A) and (6B). Excess value (EV) is the natural log of the ratio of
total actual value. Discount denotes the negative excess values, thus the coefficients should be
interpreted carefully. For instance, a negative coefficient on segin indicates that multi segmentation
increases discount, while positive coefficient on Meet indicates, meeting reduces discount. MEET=1 if
firm meets or exceeds last consensus analysts earnings forecast, Segin is segment indicator taking the
value 1 if a firm is multi segment, and zero otherwise. Continuous variables are winsorised to %1 to
%99. See Appendix for variables definitions. *** denotes the statistical significance at %1 level.
DiscountEBITEvSale DiscountSale EvAsset DiscountAsset EvEBIT
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Table 2.9 
Regressing Excess Values (EV) on MEET and Segin by POSAA(DOWN), 
1999-2014 
 
  
Variable Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff
Intercept -0.097 *** -0.216 *** -0.002 -0.206 *** 0.12 *** 0.037 *** -0.161 *** -0.006
LogAsset 0.022 *** 0.026 *** 0.008 ** 0.031 *** -0.018 *** -0.012 *** -0.023 ** 0.004 **
EBIT/Sales 0.191 *** 0.092 *** 0.211 *** 0.171 *** 0.380 *** 0.240 *** 0.499 *** 0.325 ***
Capex/Sales 0.146 *** 0.303 *** 0.112 *** -0.151 *** -0.073 *** -0.134 *** 0.077 ** -0.020 **
Segin -0.125 *** -0.114 *** -0.106 *** -0.109 *** -0.093 *** -0.093 *** -0.076 *** -0.090 ***
MEET 0.082 *** 0.096 *** 0.092 *** 0.076 *** 0.106 *** 0.104 *** 0.115 *** 0.089 ***
MEET*Segin -0.048 *** -0.035 -0.069 *** -0.031 -0.053 *** -0.032 -0.078 *** -0.010
 % R
2
3.0 3.0 2.6 3.1 5.1 3.3 5.4 3.7
N (firm-year) 16,012  10,177  10,209  9,028  17,042  10,949  10,905  9,530  
Excess value based on Sales Multiples Excess value based on Asset Multiples
POSAA=1 POSAA=0 DOWN=1 DOWN=0 POSAA=1 POSAA=0
Table reports the results for Equation (6A) for POSAA(DOWN)=1/0 cases separately for two Excess value constructs
based Sales and Assets. EV is the natural log of the ratio of total actual value to total imputed value. Actual value is
calculated as the market value plus the book value of debt while total imputed value is the sum of imputed values of
segments. MEET=1 if firm meets or exceeds last consensus analysts earnings forecast, POSAA=1 (earnings
management proxy) if unexpected accruals are positive, and DOWN=1 (forecast management proxy) if unexpected
earnings forecast is negative, Segin is segment indicator taking the value 1 if a firm is multi segment, and zero
otherwise. Continuous variables are winsorised to %1 to %99. See Appendix for variables definitions. ***, ** denote
the statistical significance at %1 and %5 level respectively.
DOWN=1 DOWN=0
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Table 2.10 
Returns regressions on MEET and Segin by POSAA(DOWN), 1999-2014 
 
  
Variable Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff
Intercept 0.111 *** 0.050 *** 0.160 0.224 *** -0.079 ***
LogAsset -0.021 *** -0.014 *** -0.026 ** -0.029 *** -0.003
EBIT/Sales 0.283 *** 0.287 *** 0.261 *** 0.213 *** 0.194 ***
Capex/Sales -0.025 0.052 0.048 * 0.029 0.003
|Ferror| 0.576 *** 0.206 *** 1.001 *** 0.762 *** 0.825 ***
Segin 0.030 *** 0.036 ** 0.019 0.035 ** 0.026 *
MEET 0.156 *** 0.154 *** 0.139 *** 0.133 *** 0.141 ***
MEET*Segin -0.040 *** -0.042 ** -0.025 -0.043 ** -0.032
 % R
2
3.1 2.9 2.6 3.0 2.7
N (firm-year) 31,205       17,640    11,207    12,106    10,543    
Table reports the results for Equation (7). Ret denotes is market-adjusted return calculated as buy and hold
stock return compounded over the twelve months prior to year t’s earnings announcement minus the
return on the CRSP value-weighted (including dividends) index compounded over the same period. MEET=1
if firm meets or exceeds last consensus analysts earnings forecast, POSAA=1 (earnings management proxy)
if unexpected accruals are positive, and DOWN=1 (forecast management proxy) if unexpected earnings
forecast is negative, Segin is segment indicator taking the value 1 if a firm is multi segment, and zero
otherwise. Continuous variables are winsorised to %1 to %99. See Appendix for variables definitions. ***,
**, * denote the statistical significance at %1, %5 and %1 level respectively.
POSAA=1 POSAA=0 DOWN=1 DOWN=0
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Table 2.11 
Logit analysis of meeting probability (MEET) on POSAA(DOWN) separately 
The effects of Institutional Ownership (INS), 1999-2014 
 
  
Marginal Marginal
Variable Coeff Effect Coeff Effect
Intercept -1.111 *** -1.163 ***
POSUE 0.907 *** 0.216 0.934 *** 0.217
GDP 1.425 *** 0.229 1.766 *** 0.411
LogMV 0.095 *** 0.023 0.086 *** 0.020
|FE| -2.348 *** -0.559 -2.659 *** -0.618
INS% 0.214 *** 0.051 0.713 *** 0.165
POSAA 0.629 *** 0.149
INS%*POSAA -0.180 ** 0.043
DOWN 0.540 *** 0.125
INS%*DOWN -0.350 *** -0.081
Log likelihood -21045 -16350
Chi-Square 2951 2281
Pseudo % R
2
6.6 6.5
Obs. (firm-year) 33,507      26,414   
Earnings management (POSAA) Forecast management (DOWN)
Table reports the results for Equations (8A) and (8B). Marginal effects are computed as eβ'x / (l
+ eβ'XͿϮ where β'X is computed at the mean values of the covariates. It measures how P(Y)
changes when holding all other variables at their means. Standard errors are calculated by delta
method. MEET=1 if firm meets or exceeds last consensus analysts earnings forecast, INS denotes
tha percentage of institutional ownership, POSAA=1 (earnings management proxy) if abnormal
accruals are positive, and DOWN=1 (forecast management proxy) if unexpected earnings
forecast is negative. Continuous variables are winsorised to %1 to %99. See Appendix for
variable definitions. ***, ** denote the statistical significance at 1% and %5 levels respectively.
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Table 2.12 
Logit analysis of meeting probability on POSAA(DOWN) separately, 1999-
2014 
 
Marginal Marginal
Variable Coeff Effect Coeff Effect
Intercept -0.304 *** -0.409 ***
POSUE 0.306 *** 0.072 0.294 *** 0.069
GDP 1.612 *** 0.377 1.845 *** 0.431
LogMV 0.100 *** 0.023 0.096 *** 0.023
|FE| -4.264 *** -0.997 -4.194 *** -0.980
Segin -0.080 * -0.019 -0.107 *** -0.025
POSAA 0.143 *** 0.033
Segin*POSAA -0.134 ** -0.031
DOWN 0.423 *** 0.099
Segin*DOWN -0.100 * -0.023
Log likelihood -15090 -15000
Chi-Square 774 953
Pseudo % R
2
2.5 3.1
Obs. (firm-year) 23,415      23,415   
Earnings management (POSAA) Forecast management (DOWN)
Table reports the results for Equations (9A) and (9B). Marginal effects are computed as eβ'x / (l
+ eβ'XͿϮ where β'X is computed at the mean values of the covariates. It measures how P(Y)
changes when holding all other variables at their means. Standard errors are calculated by delta
method. MEET=1 if firm meets or exceeds last consensus analysts earnings forecast, POSAA=1
(earnings management proxy) if abnormal accruals are positive, and DOWN=1 (forecast
management proxy) if unexpected earnings forecast is negative, Segin is segment indicator
taking the value 1 if a firm is multi segment, and zero otherwise. Continuous variables are
winsorised to %1 to %99. See Appendix for variable definitions. ***, **, * denote the statistical
significance at 1%, %5 and %10 levels respectively.
Segin is a covariate interacting with POSAA and DOWN.
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Table 2.13 
Logit analyses of meeting probability (MEET) on NofSeg, 1999-2014 
 
Predicted Marginal 
Variable Sign Coeff Effect
Intercept -1.033
NofSeg (-) -0.170 *** -0.040
Log likelihood -22.838
Chi-Square 2795
 Pseudo % R
2
5.8
N (firm-year) 30,349      
Table reports the results for Equation (5) with the segment number (NofSeg).
Marginal effects are computed as e
β'x
/ (l + e
β'X
)
2
where β'X is computed at the mean
values of the covariates. It measures how P(Y) changes when holding all other
variables at their means. Standard errors are calculated by delta method. MEET=1 if
the firm meets/exceeds the last consensus analysts earnings forecast. Continuous
variables are winsorised to %1 to %99, See Appendix for variable definitions. ***
denotes the statistical significance at %1 level.
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
Does unconditional accounting conservatism through hidden reserves 
provide a rational explanation to B/P effect (value effect) in stock returns? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine whether unconditional accounting conservatism provides a rational 
explanation to book to price (B/P) effect in stock returns. Evidence shows that 
stocks with higher B/P tend to yield higher future returns than stocks with lower 
B/P. This regularity is against the central paradigm (e.g., stock returns follow 
random walk and cannot be predicted), and explanations from both mispricing and 
risk (rationality) perspective are mainly challenged by subsequent evidence. We 
offer a rational explanation using the mechanisms of unconditional conservatism 
following Penman and Reggiani (2013). In a pricing equation, while a riskless 
earnings growth adds to price, a risky growth adds to required return making B/P 
ratio higher due to denominator effect. Hence a higher B/P corresponds to higher 
return as in the B/P effect phenomenon. Conservatism produces such risky growth 
(earnings are deferred under uncertainty producing future growth that can be 
deemed as risk), and can explain the phenomenon. Using hidden reserves to proxy 
unconditional conservatism we find strong support to this explanation. 
 
Key Words: B/P effect, value effect, conditional and unconditional accounting 
conservatism  
 
JEL Classification: M41, G10 
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3.1. Introduction 
This paper examines whether unconditional accounting conservatism provides a 
rational explanation to book to price (B/P) effect in stock returns. The phenomenon 
that stocks with higher B/P tend to yield higher returns than stocks with lower B/P 
(e.g., Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein 1985; Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok, 1991) 
has been widely investigated, and explanations from both mispricing (Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994) or rationality perspective (Fama and French 1993) have 
been mainly challenged by the subsequent evidence. We offer a rational explanation 
using the mechanism of unconditional accounting conservatism following Penman 
and Reggiani (2013) (henceforth, P&R). 
In a pricing equation, a riskless earnings growth adds to price, while a risky growth 
adds to required return making B/P higher due to denominator effect, thus a higher 
B/P corresponds to higher returns (a typical observation of B/P effect). Such risky 
growth is produced by conservative accounting, which generates an asymptotic bias 
between price and book value, B<P (see, Feltham and Ohlson, 1995; Ohlson, 1995). 
Specifically, earnings are deferred to future under uncertainty until they become 
low beta asset (e.g. booked sale). This produces future growth, but since the deferral 
is due to uncertainty, the growth becomes risky and should be compensated with a 
proper return. If this uncertainty perception aligns with the market’s risk perception, 
conservative accounting rationally explains B/P effect. P&R find support to this 
argument using B/P; when accounting is conservative, returns to buying stocks 
based on B/P seem to be rewards for buying the risk in the expected growth, which 
can be attributable to the (risky) growth produced by earnings deferral. 
We build on P&R, and test the above argument by using hidden reserves (HR/P) 
proxying unconditional conservatism. We argue that HR/P better captures than B/P 
the returns associated with risky growth generated by accounting conservatism, thus 
provides a more adequate platform to test conservatism argument. Indeed, HR/P is 
more associated with risky growth, while B/P covers both risky and riskless growth 
(bias between P and B is accumulated over time covering different projects with 
varying risk degrees). Evidence confirms the riskiness of HR/P; Future earnings to 
hidden reserves are more volatile (Amir, Guan, Livne, 2007), investors ask higher 
compensation for buying such projects (Chambers, Jennings, Thompson, 2002), 
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they are directly expensed despite potential benefits (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996). 
On the other hand, a higher B/P cannot always predict higher returns/growth. A 
firm can be less conditionally conservative (losses are delayed while investors 
immediately sell them). This also leads to higher B/P, but can predict no returns 
(adverse effect is already sold) whilst predicting only future losses. Similarly, firms 
can grow by acquisitions that are recorded at fair values. B/P becomes again higher, 
but there is no return/growth to predict related to these projects since expectations 
are already booked, i.e., conservatism effect has disappeared. 
We hypothesise and find first of all that HR/P is positively associated with both B/P 
and future returns initially supporting the notion that it can explain B/P effect. We 
next find that HR/P is also positively and monotonically associated with both future 
returns and earnings growth for any given LTE/P and B/P. We construct LTE/P 
following P&R by disaggregating the price into short term (STE) and long term 
(LTE) earnings. STE is obtained applying risk free rate, so that LTE represents 
hypothetically the risky part of price covering risky growth. We consider HR/P to 
better capture returns associated with risky growth generated by accounting system 
within LTE, and our results indicate so; as HR/P increases (as earnings deferral to 
future increases), growth in LTE increases. Since the deferral is due to uncertainty, 
higher returns to higher HR/P for any given LTE/P seem to be rewards of buying 
this risky growth. We further find that when B/P (HR/P) and future returns are at 
their lowest, earnings growth is at its lowest, and when B/P (HR/P) and future 
returns are at their highest, earnings growth is at its highest.  
In sum, our paper makes the following contributions to existing knowledge. Firstly, 
we show that unconditional accounting conservatism rationally explains B/P effect 
in stock returns. Secondly, we show that stock market anomalies can be traced and 
explained within the accounting system. Financial reports as publicly available 
fundamental bridges between investors and firms can inform and enhance our 
understanding of the underlying sources of market anomalies. Thirdly, by 
documenting that conservatism is a response to risk surrounding earnings that aligns 
with the risk perception of investors, we also shed more light on the rationale of 
accounting conservatism.  
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follow. The next section provides 
literature review and develops hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the data, Section 
3.4 explains research design and presents the results. Section 3.5 reports sensitivity 
analyses and Section 3.6 concludes the study.  
3.2. Literature review and hypotheses  
3.2.1. Literature review  
Research shows that stocks with higher ratios of fundamentals to price (e.g., high 
B/P, E/P) called value stocks tend to yield higher returns than stocks with lower 
ratios of fundamentals to price called growth stocks (e.g., Basu, 1977, 1983; Ball, 
1978; Schiller, 1981; Rosenberg et al., 1985; Chan et al., 1991; Fama and French, 
1992, 1993; 1995; 2008; Lakonishok et al., 1994; Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan, 
1995; Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok, 1995). B/P effect is one of the prominent 
such observations. First enumerated in Graham and Dodd (1934) as value stocks 
outperforming growth stocks, the regularity is against the modern finance paradigm 
that embraces the notion that higher expected risks should be compensated with 
higher expected returns (Fama, 1980; Merton, 1980). However, for firms with 
higher B/P, expected growth is thought to be lower requiring lower return, hence 
higher returns to higher B/P do not seem to fit into this notion. Moreover, the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) shaping the concepts of return and risk predicts that 
expected returns of stocks are a positive function of their market βs, and B/P also 
positively correlated with stock returns can be seen as anomalous35.  
While some scholars argue that the phenomenon is caused by mispricing of stocks 
(e.g., DeBondt and Thaler, 1985; Lakonishok et al. 1994; Zhang, 2013), others offer 
explanations from the rationality point of view (e.g., Fama and French 1992, 
                                                          
35
 Investors are exposed to two types of risk; unsystematic (firm specific) and systematic (market 
specific), and the only relevant risk to investor is the systematic risk requiring compensation since 
the former can be diversified away. Theory assumes unsystematic risk simply a random noise of a 
stock’s return that does not co vary with the market as a whole. Since the random noise has zero 
expected return, it can be diversified away by adding more stocks to the portfolio (see Sharp, 1964; 
Lintner, 1965). CAPM portrays the relationship between expected returns and systematic risk of a 
stock as the following stating that a stock is expected to earn risk-free rate plus a reward for bearing 
risk measured by β. Deviations from this structure are defined as anomalies. ܧሺܴ௜ሻ = ௙ܴ + ߚ௜[ܧሺܴ௠ሻ − ௙ܴ] 
Where E(R) is expected rate of return of stock i, Rf  risk free rate, [E(Rm)-Rf)]  the equity risk premium 
of the market portfolio beyond the Rf, and ߚ the measure of systematic risk capturing the tendency 
of sock return to co vary with the return of the market portfolio, Rm.. 
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Bernard, Thomas and Wahlen, 1997; Dechow and Sloan 1997). Lakonishok, et al. 
(1994) argue that some investors tend to overbuy value stocks performing well in 
the past, while oversell growth stocks performing badly, and contrarian investors 
bet against such naive investors leading to the observed pattern36. Zhang (2013) 
further argues that the value/growth puzzle can be partially explained by investors’ 
preference for positive skewness in returns consistent with the S-shaped utility 
function observed in the consumer behaviour in lottery purchase and gambling.  
On the other hand, Fama & French (1992) consider B/P as a risk factor not captured 
by market β. For instance, Fama & French (1993) argue that B/P proxy distress risk. 
Higher B/P reflects higher distress risk, and higher returns are compensation to this 
risk. Similarly, Berk (1995) and Fama and French (2007) argue that investors 
require higher returns from low profitability firms, which are assumed to be riskier, 
and pricing of this risk results in higher B/P (high B/P stocks are less profitable and 
grow less rapidly, while low B/P stocks tend to more profitable and fast growing. 
High expected growth and profitability combine with lower expected returns to 
produce low B/P, while low profitability, slow growth, and higher expected returns 
produce high B/P)37. However, subsequent evidence mainly challenges to these 
explanations (e.g., Gold and Stambugh 1997; Novy-Marx 2013). 
3.2.2. Conservative accounting argument   
We provide a rational explanation to the phenomenon using the mechanisms of 
unconditional accounting conservatism following P&R, who test two alternative 
growth scenarios in a pricing equation. To express how conservatism can explain 
B/P effect in stock returns consider a pricing equation such as the residual income 
model (RIM) with growth (Edwards and Bell, 1961; Ohlson, 1995)  
                                                          
36 Contrarian investors by selling growth stocks and buying value stocks employ an effective method 
of exploiting miss valuation in the cross section. Contrarian strategies ‘invest disproportionately in 
stocks that are underpriced and underinvest in stocks that are overpriced’, which outperforms the 
market (Lakonishok, et al, 1994, p.1542).   
37
 Other explanations include Berk, Green, and Naik (1999, 2004) growth options: investment 
projects such as R&D and advertisement involve systematic risk, which has potential to unravel the 
underlying of the value anomaly. Carlson, Fisher, Giammarino (2004); systematic risk associated 
with firm level investment is the determinant of the value premium. Cochrane (1991, 1996), Q-
theory: if market is complete, a firm’s investment returns and stock returns are equal in equilibrium, 
and excess returns are correlated with the changes in investment growth, which implies that value 
effect disappears after controlling for investment (growth). 
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௧ܲ = ܤ௧ + ா�+భ−௥஻�௥−௚      (1) 
Where P  denotes price, B book value of equity, r required return, g earnings growth 
with r> g, and Et+ 1-rBt residual earnings (RE). In Equation (1), if the growth is 
riskless, it is expected to add to price (P  increases), while a risky growth adds to 
required return (r increases). In the second case, B/P is higher due to denominator 
effect and corresponds to higher return. A risky growth is produced by accounting 
system; Conservatism requires earnings to be deferred to future under uncertainty 
producing future earnings growth. Since the deferral stems from uncertainty, this 
growth is also risky and should be compensated with a required return. If this 
uncertainty perception of accounting coincides with market’s risk perception, then 
conservative accounting rationally explains B/P effect. Using B/P ratio to proxy 
conservatism, P&R find support to this argument; When accounting is conservative 
(B/P), higher returns to higher B/P appear to compensate buying the risk in the 
expected earnings growth. The Authors attribute this (risky) growth to the growth 
stemming from earnings deferral produced by conservative accounting. 
We build on P&R and test conservatism argument by a variable more associated 
with risky growth than B/P. The argument distinguishes how riskless/risky growth 
manifests in a pricing equation; one adds to price, another to required return, but in 
practice, both can be in play, and B/P covers both (the difference between the price 
and book value is a cumulation of past projects that involve various degrees of risk, 
some may even involve zero risk such as the advanced payments for future sales 
not yet booked in B but recoded as liability, whilst share price incorporates them). 
We attempt to distinguish two growth types by using hidden reserves (HR/P) 
(Penman and Zhang, 2002), a proxy to unconditional conservatism38. HR/P is based 
on R&D and advertising expenditures associated with high risk39, and highly likely 
                                                          
38 Literature considers two forms of conservatism. In the conditional form, accounting recognises 
events asymmetrically conditional on news. Bad news is recognized quicker as losses than good 
news as gains, thus book value is written down with adverse circumstances, but not written up when 
the news is favourable (Basu, 1997). In the unconditional form, however, accounting generates bias 
independent of news (Beaver and Ryan, 2000, 2005). Common examples are immediate expensing 
of R&D and advertising expenditures, historical cost accounting, accelerated depreciation, and LIFO 
valuation (if inventory prices are increasing). It is determined at the inception of assets and liabilities, 
and results in the creation of hidden reserves or unrecorded goodwill (Pope and Walker, 2003). 
39
 The riskiness explanation of tangible investments has reasonable grounds. Outcomes of CAPEX 
are more comparable and predictable examining past performance of similar investments, industry 
98 
 
to produce risky earnings growth. Indeed, research confirms the riskiness of HR/P; 
Intangible investments as the basis of HR/P exhibit more volatile future earnings 
than CAPEX (e.g., Kothari et al., 2002, Amir et al., 2007), investors demand higher 
compensation for buying these projects (e.g., Chambers et al. 2002), and accounting 
recognises them as expenses despite possible benefits, while CAPEX is capitalised 
(e.g., Lev and Sougiannis 1996).  
In addition, a higher B/P cannot always inform higher returns and higher growth. 
A firm can be less conditionally conservative; Manager can delay restructuring 
costs, charge less impairment, and defer losses to future rather than profits, while 
market immediately sells them. This leads to a higher B/P, but this B/P cannot 
predict returns since the related risk is already sold, whilst it can predict only future 
losses. Moreover, firms may acquire other firms/projects in order to grow, and these 
transactions are recorded at their market values in the balance sheet. Conservatism 
bias disappears and results in a higher B/P. But again, it cannot predict higher 
returns or growth since expectations related to these transactions are already booked 
Theoretically, if B=M, there is no future growth (g=0) stemming from existing 
projects, and thus B/P cannot predict returns. Formally, the required return, r, can 
be expressed using the residual income model in the following form, 
ݎ = ா�+భ௉� + ቀͳ − ஻�௉�ቁ ݃     (2)  
If  ݃ = Ͳ and/or B= P   ݎ = ா�+భ௉�   
The equation simply indicates that when g=0 and/or P/B=1, required return is the 
earnings yield, i.e., B/P can add to the explanation of return only if there is earnings 
growth and accounting is conservative (Penman and Reggiani, P&R, 2013, p.1026). 
3.2.4. Hypotheses  
In a pricing equation, a risky earnings growth adds to required return rather than to 
price making B/P higher, and since we assume that risky growth is produced by 
conservative accounting, we expect a positive association between HR/P and B/P, 
                                                          
indicators, etc., but intangible investments are particular to firms, not easy to trade, take more time 
to turn into cash, and result in less predictable outcomes (Amir et al., 2007). 
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H1: HR/P is positively correlated with B/P  
Immediately expensing of R&D, advertisement expenditures and LIFO valuation 
result in relatively lower forward earnings, hence we expect a negative association 
between HR/P and E/P,  
H2: HR/P is negatively correlated with E/P  
Given that intangible investments are subject to higher uncertainty/risk regarding 
their future benefits (Chambers et al., 2002; Kothari et al., 2002; Amir et al., 2007), 
we argue that by deferring earnings recognition to future, conservatism responds to 
risk. If this risk perception aligns with market’s risk perception, HR/P can explain 
future returns (assuming, future returns are rewards for buying risk), hence we 
expect a positive association between HR/P and future stock returns. However, a 
positive association between future returns and R&D and advertising expenditures 
(the basis of hidden reserves) is already established by prior research (e.g., Lev and 
Sougiannis, 1996; Chan, Lakonishok, Sougiannis, 2001; Penman and Zhang, 2002; 
Al Horani, Pope, and Stark, 2003; Eberhart, Maxwell and Siddque, 2004), and it is 
still unclear whether this is due to mispricing or rewards of buying risk. Hence, to 
distinguish our findings from alternative mispricing explanations, we disaggregate 
the price into short term earnings (STE) and long term earnings (LTE) following 
P&R using the residual income valuation model,  
 where ௧ܲ − ܤ௧ = ܴܧ௧+ଵ ቀଵ௥ቁ⏟    ሺଵሻ + ܴܧ௧+ଵ ቀ ଵ௥−௚ − ଵ௥ቁ⏟          ሺଶሻ    (3) 
Applying risk-free rate to (1) we obtain ܵܶܧ = ா�+భ−௥�஻�௥� , and hence (2) represents 
hypothetically the risky portion of price (LTE) covering also risky growth. Dividing 
the sides by P , we obtain  ௅�ா௉ = ͳ − ா�+భ−௥�஻�௥�௉� − ஻�௉� . By construction, LTE/P and 
STE/P are negatively correlated, while STE/P (LTE/P) is positively (negatively) 
correlated with E/P.  
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Since intangible investments that cause the accumulation of hidden reserves reduce 
short term earnings, but increase long term earnings in recognition of risk, the 
expected correlation between returns and HR/P should also hold for any given LTE.  
H3: HR/P is positively correlated with future returns for any given LTE/P 
Unconditional conservatism by deferring earnings is expected to produce future 
earnings growth, hence we further expect a positive association between HR/P and 
future growth for any given LTE/P. This, together with H1, will indicate that hidden 
reserves produce risky earnings growth in the long term, and investors who buy this 
growth are compensated with higher returns, 
H4: HR/P is positively correlated with future growth for any given LTE/P  
If unconditional conservatism explains B/P effect in stock returns, the observations 
we test in H3 and H4 will also hold for any given B/P. This will indicate that higher 
returns are rewards for buying risky growth that adds to required returns and makes 
B/P higher. Accordingly, the B/P effect in stock returns is rationally explained.  
H5: HR/P is positively correlated with future returns for any given B/P 
H6: HR/P is positively correlated with future growth for any given B/P 
Conservatism argument is based on the riskiness of growth in future earnings 
proxied by LTE/P that results in higher B/P. If the growth is riskless, however, it 
should add to price, and corresponds to lower B/P and lower returns. Accordingly, 
growth can be correlated with both lower and higher B/P, but correlated with higher 
returns only if B/P (HR/P) is also higher if it represents risk. This requires that if 
B/P (HR/P) and future returns are at their highest, future earnings growth should 
also be at its highest, which will indicate that buying expected risky growth based 
on B/P (HR/P) will yield higher returns 
H7: When B/P (HR/P) and future returns are at their lowest, future growth 
is at its lowest, and when B/P (HR/P) and future returns are at their highest, future 
growth is at its highest 
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3.3. Data and sample selection 
The sample covers US listed firms excluding financial sector (SIC codes 6000 to 
6999) for the period 1963 and 2014. We obtain financial data from COMPUSTAT, 
analysts’ earnings forecast data from IBES (summary history statistics), market data 
from CRSP, and 10-year US Treasury bond rates from the US Federal Reserve, H15 
Reports. In data selection process, we follow P&R excluding firms with missing 
book values, earnings before extraordinary items, shares outstanding, stock prices 
and stock returns. We use realised t+ 1 earnings for 1963-2014 period to calculate 
E/P, but in the robustness tests, we also use analysts’ earnings forecasts but only for 
1977-2014 period (see Appendix C for variable definitions). We also exclude firms 
with stock price less than 20 cents, and winsorise data to 1% to 99% to eliminate 
extreme values. Our final sample consists of 103,645 firm-years observations.  
3.3.1. Constructing hidden reserves (HR/P) 
Hidden reserves have been widely used to proxy unconditional conservatism (e.g., 
Penman and Zhang, 2002; 2016; Pae and Thornton, 2010; Kim, Nekrasov, Schrof, 
and Simon, 2015, Biddle, Ma, Song, 2016), which we compute as the following. ܪ�݀݀݁݊_ܴ݁ݏ݁ݎݒ݁ݏ௧ = ܴ&ܦݎ݁ݏ௧  + ܣܦܸݎ݁ݏ௧ + ܮܫܨܱݎ݁ݏ௧  
We compute HR/P as Hidden_Reserves deflated by market value of equity three 
months after the fiscal year end [MV=price (Compustat PRCC_F, #199) X common 
shares outstanding (Compustat CSHO, #25)].  
R&Dres denotes the unamortised balance of R&D (Compustat, XRD, #46) asset 
that would have appeared on balance sheet had it been capitalised and subsequently 
amortised at a straight-line rate of 20% assuming a uniform distribution ܴ&ܦݎ݁ݏ௧ = Ͳ.ͻܴ&ܦ௧ + Ͳ.͹ܴ&ܦ௧−ଵ + Ͳ.ͷܴ&ܦ௧−ଶ + Ͳ.͵ܴ&ܦ௧−ଷ + Ͳ.ͳܴ&ܦ௧−ସ 
ADVres is the unamortised balance of advertisement (Compustat, XAD, #45) asset 
that would have appeared on balance sheet had it been capitalised and subsequently 
amortised using a sum-of-the-year's digit method over two years (assuming XAD 
to have a useful life of one or two years and provides more benefits first initiated).  
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ܣܦݎ݁ݏ௧ = ܣܦ ௧ܸ + ͳ͵ܣܦܸ௧−ଵ 
LIFOres denotes LIFO (Compustat LIFR, #240) reserves reported in the inventory 
footnotes in financial reports. It is relevant to hidden reserves because, if a firm 
increases its investment in inventory under LIFO its current earnings is depressed.  
We acknowledge that hidden reserves as we employ in our analysis disregards other 
forms of ‘hidden reserves’ related to other assets/liabilities such as bad-debt 
allowances, depreciation allowances resulting from accelerated depreciation, other 
asset valuation allowances, deferred revenue, overestimated pension liabilities and 
other estimated liabilities. However, these items involve discretion and are not 
reliably measurable due to estimates or accounting manipulation. Besides, some of 
these items might not be recurring and not relevant to investors (Penman and Zhang, 
2002). Therefore, we focus on only items that are more detectable and less subject 
to managerial discretion (permanent accounting policies/regulation and mandates 
require that internally generated intangibles such as R&D and advertising 
expenditures are directly expensed, LIFO reserve disclosed, etc.). According to Lev 
and Sougiannis (1996), the average understatement of reported earnings due to 
R&D expensing is %21 for 1976-1991 in the US, which implies that our selected 
items to form hidden reserves represent an economically significant part of all 
hidden reserves, and provide a sufficient measure to test conservatism argument. 
Note, McNichols, Rajan, and Reichelstein (2014) also introduce an accounting 
conservatism measure (conservatism correction factor to B/P and Tobin’s Q), 
however, consider HR/P to better capture the returns associated with risky growth 
generated by accounting conservatism, therefore, we focus on HR/P rather than 
other forms of accounting conservatism. We construct hidden reserves by 
hypothetically capitalising R&D (Advertising) expenditures and amortise them 
over five (two) years. Accordingly, if a firm reports R&D, it means we are able to 
keep this firm in the sample for five years. Similarly, LIFO reserves become almost 
a permanent item in the deep notes once reported unless the firm changes the 
valuation method or inflation is negative. It is also enough for a firm to be included 
in our sample, even one of three items is reported. These approaches altogether 
reduce the missing data problem to a minimum level.  
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3.3.2. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis. Median 
(mean) HR/P is 8.9 (15.5) of the price, while median(Mean) B/P is 0.54 (0.76), 
which indicates that around %45 of the value in price is reflected in the expected 
future earnings consistent with P&R. The distributions of STE/P and LTE/P show 
how total expected residual earnings implicit in the price are broken down into short 
term and long term earnings. At the median, we observe that STE/P accounts for 
%28 of price if forward or t+1 residual earnings are calculated and perpetually 
discounted by the risk-free rate without growth. Since our sample covers also loss 
making firms, the mean STE/P will be dominated by the losses (mean STE/P will 
emerge as negative). Indeed, we observe mean STE to be %-0.34, very similar to 
%-0.42 in P&R (see P&R, 2013, p.1033 Table 1). For more intuition, consider two 
firms, one reporting CU100 profit and the other reporting CU100 loss. Both report 
CU900 book value of equity. Assuming, Rf=%10, for the profit making firm RE=10 
(REt+ 1= Et+ 1-RfBt), and the price is 10/0.10=100 (REt+ 1/Rf,), while for loss making 
firm RE=-190, and the price is -190/0.10=1900. Notice that for valuation purposes, 
RE must be greater than zero (positive cash flow), but in our analysis, for loss 
making firm-years, RE will be less than zero, and will dominate the mean values, 
therefore, we urge our reader to focus on median value on his assessment.  
Table 3.2 reports the Spearman (upper diagonal) and Pearson (lower diagonal) 
correlation coefficients over the period 1963-2014 (Pearson correlation coefficients 
benchmark linear relationships among variables while Spearman correlation is 
highly sensible to monotonic relationship). Scattering the plots (not tabulated) 
indicates mostly monotonic relations among the tested variables, hence Spearman 
correlations may be considered more representative of the data. Table 3.2 shows 
the expected signed associations among variables: HR/P is positively correlated 
with B/P (consistent with H1), negatively correlated with E/P (consistent with H2), 
positively correlated with future returns (consistent with H3 and H5) and future 
earnings growth (consistent with H4 and H6). It also shows a positive association 
between earnings growth and stock returns (consistent with H7). HR/P is negatively 
(positively) correlated with STE/P (LTE/P), while STE/P (LTE/P) is positively 
(negatively) correlated with E/P as expected. 
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3.4. Empirical analysis and portfolio sorts 
We employ portfolio sorting method following P&R. One main advantage of this 
method is that it provides a clear picture of how stock returns vary across a spectrum 
of portfolios for a chosen variable. Specifically, portfolio sorting shows whether the 
correlations among the tested variables are monotonic. We use both individual and 
joint portfolios. In the individual portfolios, we test the associations between the 
two variables across decile portfolios, and in the joint portfolios, we test the joint 
associations between three variables across 25 joint quintile portfolios.  
To form individual portfolios in Table 3.3 each year between 1963-2014 we rank 
firms in equal numbers into ten deciles according to their HR/P from low to high 
three months after fiscal year end. Cut-off points for the allocation of stocks to the 
portfolios are those for the prior year data to avoid look-ahead bias as in P&R. We 
then observe B/P, E/P, LTE/P, STE/P, future earnings growth and future returns 
(buy and hold stock returns are accumulated over twelve months following the 
portfolio formation date each year. We report the average of these annual returns). 
Other figures reported are the means over years of portfolio means for each year. 
The t-statistics are calculated as the mean differences over years between the 
highest and lowest portfolios (as are the other t-statistics in the following tables). 
To form joint portfolios in the lower part of the tables, we use the following method, 
for instance for the results reported in Table 3.4 (returns to joint portfolios of HR/P 
and LTE/P), between 1963-2014 each year, we rank firms in equal numbers into 
five quintiles on their LTE/P from low to high three months after fiscal year end. 
Within each LTE/P quintile, we then regroup firms each year in equal numbers into 
five quintiles this time on their HR/P from low to high three months after fiscal year 
end. This process results in 25 joint portfolios. Finally, for each joint portfolio, we 
observe future returns as defined above. Other joint portfolios are formed in the 
same way replacing the relevant variables. To form portfolios in the upper part of 
the tables, for instance for the results reported in Table 3.4 (returns to LTE 
portfolios), between 1963-2014 each year, we rank firms in equal numbers into five 
quintiles on their LTE/P from low to high three months after fiscal year end. For 
each LTE portfolio, we calculate future returns as defined above.  
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3.4.1 Individual portfolio sorts 
To test H1 and H2 (respectively, HR/P is positively correlated with B/P and 
negatively correlated with E/P), we employ individual portfolio sorts, which test 
associations between the two variables across decile portfolios. For individual 
portfolio formation refer to section 3.4  
Table 3.3 reports the characteristics of HR/P decile portfolios by B/P, E/P, LTE/P, 
STE/P, future earnings growth and future average stock returns, and shows that 
HR/P is positively correlated with B/P (confirming H1) and negatively correlated 
with E/P (confirming H2). Associations are monotonic and the differences between 
the highest and lowest portfolios are significant at %1. Table also shows that HR/P 
is positively correlated with future returns (consistent with H3 and H5), earnings 
growth and residual earnings growth (consistent with H4 and H6). Again, the 
associations are monotonic, and the differences between the lowest and highest 
deciles are significant at the %1 level. We further observe a negative (positive) 
correlation between HR/P and STE/P (LTE/P). In sum, Tables 3.2 and 3.3 confirm 
hypotheses H1 and H2, and lend strong support to other hypotheses. 
3.4.2 Returns and earnings growth to joint LTE/P and HR/P portfolios 
To test H3 (HR/P is positively correlated with future returns for any given LTE/P), 
we employ joint portfolio sorts, which test joint association between two variables 
for a third variable (returns to HR/P for a given LTE/P) across 25 joint quintile 
portfolios vertically and horizontally. See section 3.4, for joint portfolio formation. 
Table 3.4 reports future returns to LTE/P alone (upper part of the Table) and HR/P-
LTE/P joint portfolios with LTE/P along columns and HR/P rows. Portfolio returns 
to LTE/P alone (upper part of the Table) indicate a negative monotonic association 
between LTE/P and future returns (35.9% annual returns to lowest LTE/P vs 1.5% 
annual returns to highest LTE/P). The difference between the highest and lowest 
quintiles is significant at the 1% level. Since the LTE/P ranking is an inverse 
ranking on E/P, this result confirms previous evidence that E/P and returns are 
positively correlated (e.g., Basu, 1977). Confirming H3, in the joint portfolios 
(lower part of Table), we observe that HR/P is positively and monotonically 
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associated with future returns for any given LTE/P. As HR/P increases, future 
returns increase in any LTE/P portfolio (For instance, average annual returns to 
joint portfolio of lowest LTE/P-highest HR/P are 40.5%, while returns to joint 
portfolio of highest LTE/P-lowest HR/P are -4.1%). Monotonic relations are also 
confirmed across vertical and horizontal portfolios, and hedge portfolio returns are 
significant at the 1% level, which strongly suggests that high returns to high HR/P 
are rewards for buying risk in the expected earnings growth in long term earnings.  
To test H4 (HR/P is positively correlated with future earnings growth for any given 
LTE/P), we employ joint portfolio sorts, which shows future earnings growth to 
HR/P for a given LTE/P across 25 joint portfolios vertically and horizontally. See 
section 3.4, for joint portfolio formation. 
Table 3.5 reports future earnings growth to LTE/P alone (upper part of the Table) 
and HR/P-LTE/P joint portfolios with LTE/P along columns and HR/P rows. H4 
requires that if the deferral of earnings recognition leads to future earnings growth, 
we should observe increasing subsequent earnings growth in both LTE/P and HR/P-
LTE/P joint portfolios. Results confirm these expectations. On the upper part of the 
Table, we observe that earnings growth is monotonically increasing in LTE/P, and 
in the joint portfolios, for any given LTE/P, HR/P is positively and monotonically 
correlated with earnings growth (associations are monotonic across vertical and 
horizontal portfolios, and growth differences between the highest and lowest LTE/P 
portfolios are significant at the 1% level). 
Overall, Tables 3.4 and 3.5 confirm H3 and H4; HR/P is positively correlated with 
both future returns and future earnings growth for any given LTE/P. These results 
indicate that as HR/P increases (as earnings deferral to future increases), growth in 
LTE increases, and since the deferral is due to uncertainty, higher returns to higher 
HR/P for any given LTE are rewards for buying this risky growth. 
3.4.3 Returns and earnings growth to joint B/P and HR/P portfolios 
To test H5 (HR/P is positively correlated with future returns for any given B/P), we 
employ joint portfolio sorts, which shows future returns to HR/P for a given B/P 
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across 25 joint quintile portfolios vertically and horizontally. See section 3.4, for 
joint portfolio formation. 
Table 3.6 reports future returns to B/P alone (upper part of the Table) and HR/P-
B/P joint portfolios with B/P along columns and HR/P rows. Portfolio returns to 
B/P alone (upper part of the Table) indicate a positive monotonic association 
between B/P and future returns (9.6% annual returns to lowest B/P vs 22.9% annual 
returns to highest B/P). The difference between the highest and lowest quintiles is 
significant at the 1% level. This is a typical observation of B/P effect in stock returns 
documented by prior research and defined as anomaly. Confirming H5, in the joint 
portfolios, we observe that HR/P is positively and monotonically associated with 
future returns for any given B/P. As HR/P increases, future returns increase in any 
given B/P portfolio (For instance, average annual returns to joint portfolio of 
highest B//P-highest HR/P are 29%, while returns to joint portfolio of lowest B/P-
lowest HR/P are 6%). 
Monotonic relations are confirmed across vertical and horizontal portfolios, and 
hedge portfolio returns are all significant at the 1% level. As HR/P increases, future 
returns increase, and corresponds to higher B/P. When both B/P and HR/P are at 
their lowest (highest), the future returns are 6% (29.9%).  
To test H6 (HR/P is positively correlated with future earnings growth for any given 
B/P), we employ joint portfolio sorts, which shows future earnings growth to HR/P 
for a given B/P across 25 joint portfolios vertically and horizontally. See section 
3.4, for joint portfolio formation. 
Table 3.7 reports future earnings growth to BP alone (upper part of the Table) and 
HR/P-B/P joint portfolios with B/P along columns and HR/P rows. On the upper 
part of the Table, we observe a positive association between B/P and earnings 
growth (the growth difference between the lowest and highest B/P portfolios is 
significant at the 1% level), while in the joint portfolios, we observe that for any 
given B/P, earnings growth is positively and monotonically associated with HR/P, 
confirming H6 (growth differences between the highest and lowest LTE/P 
portfolios are again significant at the 1% level). As HR/P increases earnings growth 
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increases, and corresponds to a higher B/P; when both B/P and HR/P are at their 
lowest (highest), earning growth is 10.7% (35.5%).  
These observations overall confirm H5 and H6, and indicate that HR/P captures 
risky growth that is priced as risky by investors. Risky growth associated with HR/P 
yields higher returns and results in higher B/P (since the risky growth is offset by 
returns rather than adding to price). Hence, unconditional conservatism appears to 
provide a rational explanation to B/P effect in stock returns. 
3.4.4 Earnings growth to joint portfolios of returns and B/P (HR/P) 
To test H7 (When B/P (HR/P) and future returns are at their lowest, future growth 
is at its lowest, and when B/P (HR/P) and future returns are at their highest, future 
growth is at its highest), we sort future earnings growth (after t+1) to future returns 
(at t+1) for a given B/P (HR/P) across 25 joint portfolios vertically and horizontally. 
See section 3.4, for joint portfolio formation. 
The conservatism argument relies on the riskiness of future growth in LTE assumed 
to be produced by conservative accounting, and our findings has indicated so far 
that higher returns to higher B/P (HR/P) are rewards for buying this risk. If the 
growth is riskless, however, it should add to price, and result in lower B/P. 
Accordingly, to confirm our main findings, we should also observe a lower future 
growth to correspond to a lower B/P (HR/P) and also to lower future returns (since 
future growth will involve less risk when HR/P is lower). This requires H7.to hold 
(notice that H7 automatically requires also future returns to be positively correlated 
with future earnings growth). 
Table 3.8 reports future earnings growth to B/P alone (upper part of the Table) and 
Returns-B/P joint portfolios with B/P along columns and Returns rows. Confirming 
our expectation, Table 3.8 shows that (i) future returns are positively associated 
with future growth, and that (ii) when B/P and future returns are at their lowest 
(highest), future growth is at its lowest (highest) [-18.1% versus +24.7%]. This 
pattern repeats across both horizontal and vertical joint portfolios and growth 
differences between the highest and lowest portfolios are significant at the 1% level.  
109 
 
Table 3.9 reports future earnings growth to HR/P alone (upper part of the Table) 
and Returns-HR/P joint portfolios with HR/P along columns and Returns rows. 
Confirming our expectation, Table 3.9 shows when HR/P and future returns are at 
their lowest (highest), future growth is at its lowest (highest) [-21.7% versus 
+26.3%]. Associations are confirmed across horizontal and vertical joint portfolios, 
and growth differences in highest/lowest joint portfolios are significant at 1%.  
These observations overall confirm our hypotheses, and indicate that unconditional 
conservative accounting rationally explains B/P effect in stock returns. 
3.5. Sensitivity analyses 
3.5.1. LTE calculated by Analysts’ consensus forecasts of forward earnings  
We also check the robustness of our main tests using analysts’ earnings forecasts 
from IBES. We employ the initial analysts’ consensus (median) forecasts of 
forward earnings (for year t+1) released between 0 and 60 days after the year t 
actual earnings are announced. We denote long term earnings computed via 
analysts’ forecast as ALTE (corresponding to LTE in the main tests). The data 
selection process yields 52,255 firm year observations for the period 1977-2014 as 
opposed to 103,645 firm year observations using LTE for the period 1963-2014 
(analysts’ earnings forecasts are available since 1976). We repeat the tests with 
ALTE that involve LTE. These tests mainly indicate that the results obtained 
through LTE are robust to ALTE.  
Table 3.10 reports one of these tests as an example for the variables used in Table 
3.4 that tests H3 (HR/P is positively correlated with future returns for any given 
LTE/P), which shows joint association between HR/P for a given ALTE/P across 
25 joint quintile portfolios vertically and horizontally. See section 3.4 for joint 
portfolio formation. Table 3.10 reports future returns to ALTE/P alone (upper part 
of the Table) and HR/P-ALTE/P joint portfolios with ALTE/P along columns and 
HR/P rows. Portfolio returns to ALTE/P alone (upper part of the Table) indicate a 
negative association between ALTE/P and future returns. The hedge portfolio rerun 
is significant at the 1% level. Confirming H3, in the joint portfolios (lower part of 
Table), we observe that HR/P is positively associated with future returns for any 
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given ALTE/P (For instance, average annual returns to joint portfolio of lowest 
ALTE/P-highest HR/P are 33.7%, while returns to joint portfolio of highest 
ALTE/P-lowest HR/P are 9.7%), and hedge portfolio returns are significant at 1%. 
3.5.2. Using net operating assets (NOA) to deflate hidden reserves 
We also perform our tests using average net operating assets as denominator for 
hidden reserves instead of market value of equity and replace HR/NOA with HR/P 
in the tests using HR/P (see Appendix for NOA definition). These tests show that 
our results are not driven by the deflator of hidden reserves, and confirm that the 
results obtained through HR/P are robust to HR/NOA.  
Table 3.11 reports one of these tests as an example for the variables used in Table 
3.4 that tests H3 (HR/P is positively correlated with future returns for any given 
LTE/P) [see section 3.4, for joint portfolio formation]. Table 3.11 reports future 
returns to LTE/P alone (upper part of the Table) and HR/NOA-LTE/P joint 
portfolios with LTE/P along columns and HR/NOA rows. Again, confirming H3, 
in the joint portfolios (lower part of Table), we observe that HR/NOA is positively 
associated with future returns for any given LTE/P (For instance, average annual 
returns to joint portfolio of lowest LTE/P-highest HR/NOA are 44.4%, while 
returns to joint portfolio of highest LTE/P-lowest HR/NOA are -3.3%), and hedge 
portfolio returns are all significant at the 1% level. 
3.5.3. Cross section Return regressions on HR/P and B/P  
We also perform cross section regressions in order to overcome some potential 
pitfalls of portfolio sorting method. For instance, portfolio sorts may not provide 
clearer picture about the marginal effects of a variable on returns beyond another 
variable. Portfolio sorts do not also allow controlling the factors that may affect 
future returns. In particular, we test whether HR/P explains future returns beyond 
B/P and better than B/P. We run the following return regression with control. ܴ݁ݐ௜௧+ଵ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܪܴ/ ௜ܲ௧ + ߚଶܤ/ ௜ܲ௧ + ߜ௝ܺ௜௧+ߝ௜௧+ଵ  (4) 
Where Ret denotes annual buy and hold returns for firm i at time t+ 1 accumulated 
over 12 months starting from after three month of fiscal year end (we also employ 
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size and market adjusted returns, and the results are similar). X denotes control; firm 
size (logMv), market Beta, E/P and past returns following the literature (e.g., Fama 
and French, 1993). Beta is estimated by 60 month rolling regression using the 
market model (ܴ݁ݐ௜௧ − ௙ܴ) = ߙ + ߚ௜(ܴ݁ݐ௠௧ − ௙ܴ) + ߳௜௧ ௙ܴ is the risk free rate (the 
10-year US Treasury bond rate) from the US Federal Reserve, H15 report for the 
relevant year, ሺܴ݁ݐ௠௧ − ௙ܴሻ the equity risk premium of the market portfolio, Retmt 
the CRSP monthly value weighted return on a market portfolio cumulated over 12 
months. The model is run for both B/P and HR/P and separately for B/P (HR/P). 
We expect the coefficient on HR/P to be greater than the coefficient on B/P to be 
consistent with the notion that HR/P is more associated with risk than B/P. 
Table 3.12 reports the results of Equations (4), and shows that both HR/P and B/P 
are positively correlated with future returns after controlling for the factors that may 
affect returns (coefficients are significant at the 1% level). Moreover, confirming 
our expectation, Table also shows that the coefficient on HR/P is greater than the 
coefficient on B/P (the difference between two coefficients is significant at 1%). 
We also run cross section regressions for other variables corresponding to other 
tables. These regressions (not tabulated) indicate that our main findings are also 
robust to cross section regression setting.  
3.5.4. Other sensitivity tests 
We repeat the tests within firm size dimension. Size effect in stock returns has 
already been documented by previous research (e.g., Banz, 1981, Fama and French 
1993 and 1995). We test whether our results differ when we control for firm size. 
Small cap effect may play a role in our tests by exhibiting higher dispersion in the 
tested variables, in particular, for the lowest/highest portfolios (see, Fama and 
French, 2008). Although the microcap firms are 3% of the total market 
capitalisation on average, they account for about 55% of the total number of firms 
in our sample. Therefore, following Fama and French (2008), we rank firms each 
year by their market values by coding them as small, medium and large (less than 
20%, between 20% and 50%, and over 50% of the mean sample size, respectively). 
Our tests (not tabulated) on these size portfolios show that there are some deviations 
in the small cap sample, but the results for medium and big firms are similar. 
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We perform growth tests with both two year ahead analysts’ growth expectations 
and residual earnings growth. Since analysts do not provide two year ahead earnings 
forecasts for every firm, these tests are run by relatively very small sample sizes in 
joint portfolios. Our tests (not tabulated) show that analysts’ growth expectations 
provide a somewhat similar picture to the one indicated by our main tests although 
the relations between the variables are not as strong as in the main tests (probably 
analysts’ forecasts for two year ahead earnings may be subject to larger bias). The 
growth rates for residual earnings provide very similar results (not tabulated). 
3.6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we examine whether unconditional accounting conservatism provides 
a rational explanation to book to price (B/P) effect in stock returns (stocks with 
higher B/P yielding higher returns than stocks with lower B/P (e.g., Rosenberg, 
Reid, and Lanstein 1985). Various explanation from both mispricing (Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994) and rationality point of view (Fama and French 1993) 
have been mainly challenged by subsequent evidence. We provide a rational 
explanation to the phenomenon using the mechanism of unconditional accounting 
conservatism following P&R.  
We test an argument that in a pricing equation, a riskless earnings growth adds to 
price, while a risky growth adds to required return. The process makes B/P higher 
due to denominator effect and it corresponds to higher returns. Risky growth is 
produced by conservatism principle because it requires accounting to defer earnings 
to future if there is uncertainty. Such deferral produces future earnings growth. We 
test whether this growth assumed to be risky helps explain B/P effect in stock 
returns. Our main variable to proxy unconditional accounting is HR/P which are 
based on R&D, advertisement expenditures and LIFO reserve that we consider to 
be more associated with risky growth.  
We find HR/P is positively associated with both B/P and future returns, and that 
HR/P is also positively and monotonically associated with both future returns and 
earnings growth for any given LTE/P and B/P, and in the final set of tests, we further 
find that when B/P (HR/P) and future returns are at their lowest, earnings growth is 
at its lowest, and when B/P (HR/P) and future returns are at their highest, earnings 
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growth is at its highest. By these results, our paper makes following contributions 
to existing knowledge. It shows that unconditional accounting conservatism 
rationally explains B/P effect in stock returns. It also shows that stock market 
anomalies can be traced and explained within the accounting system. Finally, it 
shows that conservatism is a response to risk that aligns with the risk perception of 
investors, thus provides further insights about the rationale of accounting 
conservatism.  
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Appendix C  
Variable definitions ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊ݏሺ௧+ଵሻ 12 month buy and hold stock returns. Monthly return accumulation 
started after three months of the fiscal year end (accounting data for 
a fiscal year are presumed to have been published until this point). 
 
B/P Book value of equity divided by market value of equity  
B=Common ordinary equity total (Compustat CEQ, #60) + 
Preferred treasury stock (Compustat TSTKP, #227) - Preferred 
dividends in arrears (Compustat DVPA, #242)  
 ݃ሺ௧+ଶሻ   Earnings Growth. Following P&R growth rates are calculated as  ݃௧+ଶ = ܧܽݎ݊�݊݃ݏ௧+ଶ − ܧܽݎ݊�݊݃ݏ௧+ଵ|ܧܽݎ݊�݊݃ݏ௧+ଶ| − |ܧܽݎ݊�݊݃ݏ௧+ଵ| 
Ex post growth calculation limits the growth rates between ±ʹ in the 
extreme only for firms that survived two years ahead. Hence, the 
results will be generalisable only to firms that remained listed at least 
two years (according to P&R, the survivorship rates differ between 
%76 for low B/P group and %70 for high B/P group between 1963 
and 2006). An alternative method allowing larger deviations in 
growth is also used in the robustness tests as the following:  
if t+1 earnings is positive ݃௧+ଶ = ா�௥௡௜௡௚௦�+మ−ா�௥௡௜௡௚௦�+భா�௥௡௜௡௚௦�+భ   
if t+1 earnings is negative ݃௧+ଶ = −[ா�௥௡௜௡௚௦�+మ−ா�௥௡௜௡௚௦�+భா�௥௡௜௡௚௦�+భ ] 
 
E/P Earnings to price ratio is forward earnings (t+1) deflated by market 
value of equity at time t. We use estimates of forward earnings to 
compute STE following P&R, which are based on reported earnings 
for year t before extraordinary and special items with a tax 
adjustment to special items at prevailing statutory tax rates for the 
year [(compustat IB, #18) - (Compustat item SPI, #17)] 
 
ALTEP Long term earnings calculated using analysts’ earnings forecasts 
from IBES for year t+ 1. We use the first consensus (median) 
forecast released between 0 and 60 days after the year t actual 
earnings is announced . 
 
NOA Net operating assets used to calculate HR/NOA as an alternative to 
HR/P. NOA=Plant Property Equipment (Compustat PPENT, 
#8)+Current Assets (Compustat ACT, #4) - Cash & short term 
investment (Compustat CHE, # 1) - Operating liabilities (Current 
liabilities, Compustat LCT, #5) – current debt Compustat DLC, #34) 
 
Rf Risk free rate, 10-year US Treasury bond rate for the relevant year 
between 1963-2014 obtained from the WRDS database US Federal 
Reserve, H15 reports  
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Table 3.1 
Descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis 
 
 
 
 
  
N Mean Std.Dev 25% Median 75%
HR/P t 103,645 0.155 0.181 0.033 0.089 0.206
B/P t 103,645 0.760 0.871 0.292 0.543 0.958
E t+ 1 /P t 103,645 0.020 0.206 0.001 0.049 0.089
Return t+ 1  (%) 105,358 15.61 60.24 -15.36 13.75 43.41
Growth t+ 2  (%) 97,595 3.48 96.38 -33.56 1.09 44.61
STE/P t 103,645 -0.340 2.696 -0.854 0.283 0.928
LTE/P t 103,645 0.580 2.681 -0.611 0.163 1.117
Market Value of equity (million $) 103,645 1979.3 12566 23.1 103.3 547.7
HR/P denotes hidden reserves, Return average annual future stock returns, Growth futue earnings growth, B/P book
to price, E/P forward earnings to price, STE (LTE) short (long) term earnings where B/P+ STE/P+ LTE/P= 1 . The
distributions are from data pooled over firms and years. Variables (except for returns, growth and MV) are winsorised
to %1 and %99 to avoid extreme observations. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 3.2 
Correlations: Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal) 
 
 
  
- 0.40 *** -0.19 *** 0.12 *** 0.07 *** -0.24 *** 0.11 ***
0.38 *** - 0.12 *** 0.13 *** 0.07 *** -0.18 *** -0.15 ***
-0.02 *** 0.37 *** - 0.08 *** -0.09 *** 0.50 *** -0.62 ***
0.10 *** 0.09 *** 0.04 *** - 0.11 *** 0.11 *** -0.15 ***
0.05 *** 0.04 *** -0.09 *** 0.15 *** - -0.21 *** 0.20 ***
-0.21 *** -0.09 *** 0.47 *** 0.23 *** -0.16 *** - -0.95 ***
0.07 *** -0.23 *** -0.51 *** -0.27 *** 0.15 *** -0.91 *** -
Return t+ 1 Growth t+ 2 STE/P t LTE/P t
STE/P t
LTE/P t
The sample consists of 103,645 firm year observations. HR/P denotes hidden reserves, Return average annual future
stock returns, Growth futue earnings growth, B/P book to price, E/P forward earnings to price, STE (LTE) short
(long) term earnings where B/P+ STE/P+ LTE/P= 1 . The distributions are from data pooled over firms and years.
Variables (except for returns and growth) are winsorised to %1 and %99 to avoid extreme observations. See Appendix
for variable definitions.  *** denotes the statistical significance at 1% level
Return t+ 1
Growth t+ 2
HR/P t
HR/P t B/P t
E t+ 1 /P t
E t+ 1 /P t
B/P t
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Table 3.3 
Characteristics of HR/P portfolios with respect to other variables used in the 
tests  
 
  
HR/P 
portfolios
Mean 
B/P 
Mean 
E/P
Mean 
Annual
 Returns 
(%)
Mean 
Earnings
Growth 
(%)
Mean 
Residual 
Earnings
Growth 
Mean 
STE/P
Mean 
LTE/P
Low 0.544 0.038 8.76 -2.45 -6.24 0.185 0.269
2 0.562 0.045 9.80 -1.34 -5.53 0.264 0.175
3 0.571 0.044 12.16 -0.28 -3.94 0.211 0.216
4 0.592 0.046 12.91 0.39 -2.76 0.191 0.217
5 0.633 0.045 14.22 1.86 -1.18 0.144 0.223
6 0.693 0.041 16.89 2.72 1.97 -0.038 0.345
7 0.758 0.035 17.32 6.04 4.59 -0.191 0.433
8 0.838 0.022 20.59 8.56 9.9 -0.542 0.705
9 0.973 -0.005 23.56 12.48 14.3 -1.136 1.162
High 1.435 -0.107 32.23 19.97 20.73 -2.488 2.052
High-Low 0.891 -0.145 23.47 22.42 26.97 -2.673 1.783
t-stat 50.02 -31.71 23.56 15.72 16.81 -58.51 53.17
The sample consists of 103,645 firm year observations. Portfolios are formed each year between 1963-
2014 by ranking firms in equal numbers into ten deciles three months after fiscal year end according to
their HR/P from low to high. Cut-off points for the allocation of stocks to the portfolios are those for the 
prior year data to avoid look-ahead bias as in P&R. For each HR/P portfolio, we then observe B/P, E/P,
LTE/P, STE/P, future earnings growth and future stock returns (buy and hold returns are accumulated
over twelve months following the portfolio formation date each year. We report the average of these
annual returns). Other numbers reported are the means over years of portfolio means for each year. The
t-statistics are calculated as the mean differences over years between the highest and lowest portfolios
(as are the other t-statistics in the following tables). HR/P denotes hidden reserves, Return average
annual future stock returns, Growth futue earnings growth, B/P book to price, E/P forward earnings to
price, STE (LTE) short (long) term earnings where B/P+ STE/P+ LTE/P= 1. The distributions are from
data pooled over firms and years. Variables (except for returns and growth) are winsorised to %1 and
%99 to avoid extreme observations. See Appendix for variable definitions.  
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Table 3.4 
Mean Annual Returns (%) to LTE/P and HR/P portfolios 
 
  
Low 2 3 4 High H-L t-stat
Low 35.1 19.8 9.8 -1.7 -4.1
2 36.7 20.9 11.3 -0.6 -1.9
3 37.1 21.5 10.8 1.7 2.4
4 41.1 22.5 12.3 5.4 6.1
High 40.5 26.3 18.1 13.3 14.4
H-L 5.4 6.5 8.3 15 18.5
t-stat 5.06 7.40 8.25 13.23 12.89
The sample consists of 103,645 firm year observations. To form portfolios in the upper part of the
Table, between 1963-2014 each year, we rank firms in equal numbers into five quintiles on their
LTE/P from low to high three months after fiscal year end. Cut-off points for the allocation of
stocks to the portfolios are those for the prior year data to avoid look-ahead bias as in P&R. For
each LTE/P portfolio, we observe future returns (buy and hold stcok returns are accumulated over
twelve months following the portfolio formation date each year. We report the average of these
annual returns). The t-statistics are calculated as the mean differences over years between the
highest and lowest portfolios. See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables (except returns) are
winsorised to %1 and %99.
To form joint portfolios in the lower part of the table, within each LTE/P quintile formed above, we
regroup firms each year in equal numbers into five quintiles this time on their HR/P from low to
high three months after fiscal year end. This process results in twenty-five joint portfolios, and for
each joint portfolio, we observe future returns as defined above.
LTE/P
H
R
 
to
 P
ri
ce
 
(H
R
 
/ P
)
Ranking on LTE/P 
(a reverse ranking 
on E/P)
35.9 21.7 12.2 3.2 1.5 -34.4 -79.06
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Table 3.5 
Mean Earnings Growth (%) to LTE/P and HR/P portfolios 
 
 
 
  
Low 2 3 4 High H-L t-stat
Low
-5.1 1.5 8.5 27.9 44.7
2
-3.4 3.0 7.3 30.9 46.1
3
-3.9 1.5 7.3 35.2 51.6
4
-1.9 3.8 10.5 47.1 62.1
High 3.8 5.6 20.4 55.9 70.0
H-L 8.9 4.1 11.9 28 25.3
t-stat 6.95 3.43 8.04 10.93 10.88
LTE/P
H
R
 
to
 P
ri
ce
 
(H
R
 
/ P
)
Ranking on LTE/P 
(a reverse ranking 
on E/P)
-2.1 2.9 10.8 39.4 54.9 57 69.32
To form joint portfolios in the lower part of the table, within each LTE/P quintile formed above, we
regroup firms each year in equal numbers into five quintiles this time on their HR/P from low to
high three months after fiscal year end. This process results in twenty-five joint portfolios, and for
each joint portfolio, we observe future earnings growth (after t+1).
The sample consists of 97,595 firm year observations. To form portfolios in the upper part of the
Table, between 1963-2014 each year, we rank firms in equal numbers into five quintiles on their
LTE/P from low to high three months after fiscal year end. Cut-off points for the allocation of
stocks to the portfolios are those for the prior year data to avoid look-ahead bias as in P&R. For
each LTE/P portfolio, we observe future earnings growth (after t+1). We report the annual average
of these growth rates. The t-statistics are calculated as the mean differences over years between the
highest and lowest portfolios. See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables (except growth rate)
are winsorised to %1 and %99.
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Table 3.6 
Mean annual returns (%) to B/P and HR/P portfolios 
 
  
Low 2 3 4 High H-L t-stat
Low 6 10 13 17.7 19.5
2 9.3 12.7 14.9 18.2 22.3
3 12.1 14.7 16.0 19.3 26.4
4 12.5 16.3 19.4 22.6 28.5
High 23 23.7 24.8 28.7 29.9
H-L 17 13.7 11.8 11 10.4
t-stat 10.13 9.16 8.53 7.65 6.98
The sample consists of 103,645 firm year observations. To form portfolios in the upper part of the
Table, between 1963-2014 each year, we rank firms in equal numbers into five quintiles on their
B/P from low to high three months after fiscal year end. Cut-off points for the allocation of stocks
to the portfolios are those for the prior year data to avoid look-ahead bias as in P&R. For each B/P
portfolio, we observe future returns (buy and hold stcok returns are accumulated over twelve
months following the portfolio formation date each year. We report the average of these annual
returns). The t-statistics are calculated as the mean differences over years between the highest and
lowest portfolios. See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables (except returns) are winsorised
to %1 and %99.
To form joint portfolios in the lower part of the table, within each B/P quintile formed above, we
regroup firms each year in equal numbers into five quintiles this time on their HR/P from low to
high three months after fiscal year end. This process results in twenty-five joint portfolios, and for
each joint portfolio, we observe future returns as defined above.
Ranking on B/P 
alone
H
R
 
to
 P
ri
ce
 
(H
R
 
/ P
)
18.5 22.9 13.3 25.65
B/P
9.6 12.5 15.1
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Table 3.7 
Mean Earnings Growth (%) to B/P and HR/P portfolios 
 
 
 
  
Low 2 3 4 High H-L t-stat
Low 10.7 12.4 12.3 17.3 29.4
2 8.9 11.7 10.5 18.9 31.4
3 13.2 12.6 13.0 20.4 39.4
4 15.35 17.3 17.6 26.2 41.2
High 22.5 24.9 31.9 35.9 35.5
H-L 11.8 12.5 19.6 18.6 6.1
t-stat 6.80 6.75 10.79 9.17 2.85
The sample consists of 97,595 firm year observations. To form portfolios in the upper part of the
Table, between 1963-2014 each year, we rank firms in equal numbers into five quintiles on their
B/P from low to high three months after fiscal year end. Cut-off points for the allocation of stocks
to the portfolios are those for the prior year data to avoid look-ahead bias as in P&R. For each B/P
portfolio, we observe future earnings growth (after t+1). We report the annual average of these
growth rates. The t-statistics are calculated as the mean differences over years between the highest
and lowest portfolios. See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables (except growth rate) are
winsorised to %1 and %99.
To form joint portfolios in the lower part of the table, within each B/P quintile formed above, we
regroup firms each year in equal numbers into five quintiles this time on their HR/P from low to
high three months after fiscal year end. This process results in twenty-five joint portfolios, and for
each joint portfolio, we observe future earnings growth (after t+1).
B/P
H
R
 
to
 P
ri
ce
 
(H
R
 
/ P
)
Ranking on B/P 
alone 15.8 14.2 17.4 23.7 35.4 19.6 22.28
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Table 3.8 
Mean Earnings Growth (%) to B/P and returns portfolios 
 
 
 
  
Low 2 3 4 High H-L t-stat
Low
-18.1 -15.5 -14.1 -6.5 8.5
2
-10.6 -10.4 -7.8 -3.6 4.4
3 1.6 2.2 1.8 2.4 7.8
4 6.7 7.6 7.7 10.3 15.1
High 15.1 16.7 17.5 19.1 24.7
H-L 33.2 32.2 31.6 25.6 16.2
t-stat 18.29 17.94 16.97 12.82 7.51
The sample consists of 97,595 firm year observations. To form portfolios in the upper part of the
Table, between 1963-2014 each year, we rank firms in equal numbers into five quintiles on their
B/P from low to high three months after fiscal year end. Cut-off points for the allocation of stocks
to the portfolios are those for the prior year data to avoid look-ahead bias as in P&R. For each B/P
portfolio, we observe future earnings growth (after t+1). We report the annual average of these
growth rates. The t-statistics are calculated as the mean differences over years between the highest
and lowest portfolios. See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables (except growth rate) are
winsorised to %1 and %99.
To form joint portfolios in the lower part of the table, within each B/P quintile formed above, we
regroup firms each year in equal numbers into five quintiles this time on their annual returns (at t+1) 
from low to high three months after fiscal year end. This process results in twenty-five joint
portfolios, and for each joint portfolio, we observe future earnings growth (after t+1).
B/P
A
n
n
u
a
l S
to
ck
 
R
et
ur
n
s 
(%
)
Ranking on B/P 
alone 15.8 14.2 17.4 23.7 35.4 19.6 22.28
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Table 3.9 
Mean Earnings Growth (%) to HR/P and returns portfolios 
 
 
 
  
Low 2 3 4 High H-L t-stat
Low
-21.7 -19.5 -13.6 -14.4 -15.5
2
-9.2 -10.1 5.9 3.2 6.7
3 0 -1.9 1.2 3.6 8.1
4 5.8 7.9 10.1 12.4 16.7
High 12.9 17.6 18.4 18.6 26.3
H-L 34.6 37.1 32 33 41.8
t-stat 15.79 17.27 14.09 8.41 4.27
The sample consists of 97,595 firm year observations. To form portfolios in the upper part of the
Table, between 1963-2014 each year, we rank firms in equal numbers into five quintiles on their
HR/P from low to high three months after fiscal year end. Cut-off points for the allocation of stocks
to the portfolios are those for the prior year data to avoid look-ahead bias as in P&R. For each B/P
portfolio, we observe future earnings growth (after t+1). We report the annual average of these
growth rates. The t-statistics are calculated as the mean differences over years between the highest
and lowest portfolios. See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables (except growth rate) are
winsorised to %1 and %99.
To form joint portfolios in the lower part of the table, within each HR/P quintile formed above, we
regroup firms each year in equal numbers into five quintiles this time on their annual returns (at t+1) 
from low to high three months after fiscal year end. This process results in twenty-five joint
portfolios, and for each joint portfolio, we observe future earnings growth (after t+1).
HR/P
A
n
n
u
a
l S
to
ck
 
R
et
ur
n
s 
(%
)
Ranking on HR/P 
alone -2.0 0.3 2.4 7.2 16.7 18.7 18.83
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Table 3.10 
Mean Annual Returns (%) to ALTE/P and HR/P portfolios 
 
  
Low 2 3 4 High H-L t-stat
Low 21.0 15.6 12.9 8.5 9.7
2 22.8 17.2 12.7 11.2 10.9
3 22.9 20.6 15.0 10.7 13.1
4 24.7 19.6 17.2 12.7 13.9
High 33.7 24.8 18.7 16.5 16.7
H-L 12.7 9.2 5.8 8 7
t-stat 4.54 4.72 3.22 4.47 3.36
ALTE/P
H
R
 
to
 P
ri
ce
 
(H
R
 
/ P
)
Ranking on 
ALTE/P alone 24.4 18.5 14.0 11.9 11.9 -12.5 -15.17
ALTE denotes the long term earnings (LTE) computed using the initial analysts' consensus earnings
forecast for year t+1 (after the year t earnings is announced). Forecasts are obtained from the IBES
files during 1977-2014 period (available data period). The sample consists of 52,235 firm year
observations. To form portfolios in the upper part of the Table, between 1977-2014 each year, we
rank firms in equal numbers into five quintiles on their ALTE/P from low to high three months after
fiscal year end. Cut-off points for the allocation of stocks to the portfolios are those for the prior
year data to avoid look-ahead bias as in P&R. For each ALTE/P portfolio, we observe future
returns (buy and hold stcok returns are accumulated over twelve months following the portfolio
formation date each year. We report the average of these annual returns). The t-statistics are
calculated as the mean differences over years between the highest and lowest portfolios. See
Appendix for variable definitions. Variables (except returns) are winsorised to %1 and %99.
To form joint portfolios in the lower part of the table, within each ALTE/P quintile formed above,
we regroup firms each year in equal numbers into five quintiles this time on their HR/P from low to
high three months after fiscal year end. This process results in twenty-five joint portfolios, and for
each joint portfolio, we observe future returns as defined above.
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Table 3.11 
Mean Annual Returns (%) to LTE/P and HR/NOA portfolios 
 
  
Low 2 3 4 High H-L t-stat
Low 34.0 19.2 10.2 0.4 -3.3
2 35.3 20.0 9.4 -0.2 -0.1
3 36.0 21.5 10.1 2.9 0.4
4 39.3 23.4 14.4 5.3 4.7
High 44.4 30.3 20.1 9.3 9.8
H-L 10.4 11.1 9.9 8.9 13.1
t-stat 9.67 11.90 10.34 7.61 7.61
The sample consists of 103,645 firm year observations. To form portfolios in the upper part of the
Table, between 1963-2014 each year, we rank firms in equal numbers into five quintiles on their
LTE/P from low to high three months after fiscal year end. Cut-off points for the allocation of
stocks to the portfolios are those for the prior year data to avoid look-ahead bias as in P&R. For
each LTE/P portfolio, we observe future returns (buy and hold stcok returns are accumulated over
twelve months following the portfolio formation date each year. We report the average of these
annual returns). The t-statistics are calculated as the mean differences over years between the
highest and lowest portfolios. See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables (except returns) are
winsorised to %1 and %99.
To form joint portfolios in the lower part of the table, within each LTE/P quintile formed above, we
regroup firms each year in equal numbers into five quintiles this time on their HR/NOA from low to
high three months after fiscal year end. This process results in twenty-five joint portfolios, and for
each joint portfolio, we observe future returns as defined above.
LTE/P
H
R
/N
O
A
Ranking on LTE/P 
(a reverse ranking 
on E/P)
35.9 21.7 12.2 3.2 1.5 -34.4 -78.80
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Table 3.12 
Return regressions on HR/P and B/P (1963-2014) 
 
  
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat
Intercept 0.262 *** 0.245 *** 0.242 ***
HR/P (a) 0.091 *** 25.17 0.086 *** 22.57
B/P (b) 0.008 *** 11.69 0.003 *** 3.63
Diff (a-b) 0.083 *** 20.25
CONTROLS YES YES YES
%R 2 72.2 72.3 72.4
N 103.289 103.289 103.289
B/P alone HR/P alone HR/P and B/P together 
Table reports the results of equations (4). Ret denotes annual buy and hold returns for
firm i at time t+1 accumulated over 12 months starting from after three month of
fiscal year end. X denotes controls; firm size (logMv), market Beta, E/P and past
returns. Beta is estimated by 60 month rolling regression using the market model (Reti-
Rf)=α+βi(Retm-Rf)+ϵi. Rf is the risk free rate (the 10-year US Treasury bond rate)
from the US Federal Reserve, H15 report for the relevant year, (Retm-Rf) the equity
risk premium of the market portfolio, Retm the CRSP monthly value weighted return
on a market portfolio cumulated over 12 months. Variables (except return and
LogMV) are winsorised to 1% and 99% to eliminate extreme observations. ***
denotes the statistical significance at 1% level. 
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